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Various financial decisions contribute to the success of firms including investment decisions, 
dividend policy and financing decisions (capital structure). Nevertheless, other variables such 
as the industry in which the firm operates, size of the firm and ownership structure can also 
play an important role in increasing overall corporate performance. Extant research utilises a 
number of proxies for estimating corporate success, including profitability, size, employment, 
to name a few. This thesis focuses on one of the most important drivers of corporate success - 
firm growth. Arguably, growth is an ultimate goal for all companies as it benefits all 
stakeholders. In this study, firm growth is proxied using the growth-in-sales indicator. 
The financial and non-financial variables mentioned above can, in various circumstances, 
contribute or hinder firm growth. The three main corporate decisions (investment, dividends 
and financing), as reflected by the aforementioned financial measures, can contribute or 
hinder firm’s growth as there is almost always a trade-off amongst them, owing to their 
complex inter-relationships. Similarly, a non-financial determinant such as ownership 
structure can contribute to firm growth. A major factor that affects these relationships is the 
presence of information asymmetry. The latter is considered as a mediator as it could explain 
the relationship between financial, non-financial decisions and firm growth. Information 
asymmetry is measured in this thesis using three proxies to distinguish between high- and 
low-levels of information asymmetry, namely Sensitivity of stock returns to expected Return 
on Equity (Beta ROE), Probability of default of Return on Equity (PD ROE), and the Q 
Ratio. This thesis contributes to the literature of corporate finance by examining the relative 
contribution of financial and non-financial variables to firm’s growth, investigate the impact 
6 
 
of the level of information asymmetry and examine the suitability of further proxies for 
measuring information asymmetry.  
The sample used in this study is all non-financial active companies listed in the S&P500 for 
the period from 1989-2014. The empirical investigation in this study involves tests for 
collinearity, linearity, normality, endogeneity, and fixed effects. To accommodate possible 
endogeneity issues, the regression analysis employed utilises a Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) framework alongside a standard linear regression, discriminate analysis, 
and Z-score modeling. 
The results of the empirical analysis indicate a variation in the impact of financial and non-
financial variables on firm growth at high and low levels of information asymmetry 
especially regarding investment and financing decisions. A similar picture emerges for the 
cases of firm size and industry variables. Furthermore, the impact of changes in ownership 
structure appears to vary according to the level of information asymmetry and the proxy used 
to measure it. In addition, corporate dividend policy (information that is monitored closely by 
the market) has a similar effect on firm growth across all asymmetric levels. These findings 
prove that information asymmetry plays a vital role in the relationship between corporate 
financial decisions and growth of the firm. Finally, the results contribute to the relevant 
methodological discussion in the vast literature on the estimation of information asymmetry 
by demonstrating that the classical and standard proxies for information asymmetry are not 
consistent in terms of the ability to differentiate between favorable or adverse selection 
(which corresponds to low and high level of information asymmetry). Therefore, future 
research is warranted in the identification of alternative proxies that can capture such effects 
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 The agency problem has taken considerable attention of researchers from various 
disciplines including economics, management, and finance. Oliver Hart and Bengt 
Holmström won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2016 for their work on contract theory. 
Contract theory is a section of agency theory that is related to designing contracts that reduce 
conflicts of interest between executive managers and shareholders. (Hart, 1995) There has 
been considerable attention given to the agency problem by many scholars such as Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Ross (1977), and Fama and French (2002). Despite these attempts, the 
problem still prevails between managers and shareholders. One of the major causes of the 
disconnection between managers and shareholders is the existence of information asymmetry 
- where managers might intentionally or unintentionally disseminate incomplete information 
about various aspects of the business. (Akerlof, 1970)   
 The concepts of agency problem and information asymmetry are not interchangeable, 
however in some cases they could be linked to each other. For example, severe information 
asymmetry could cause more agency conflicts between managers and shareholders or 
shareholders and bondholders. Yet in other cases, the industry in which the firm operates 
requires keeping the information as private as possible like the case of R&D or 
pharmaceutical firms. In the context of this thesis, information asymmetry is considered in its 
unfavorable form as one of the main causes of agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. Information asymmetry has a severe impact on firms in general, and on share 
prices in particular. As far as investors are less or uninformed than insiders, the probability of 
facing adverse selection problems increases, especially as information dissemination can be 
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perceived as either a good or bad signal to the market. Corporate finance decisions like 
capital structure decisions, taking on new investments, and dividend payout policies can act 
as such signals for market participants. Nonetheless, the presence of information asymmetry 
could disrupt the intended signal behind these decisions. Recent developments in the theories 
related to these decisions incorporated the effects of agency issues and information 
asymmetry (Li and Zhao, 2008; Morellec and Schürhoff, 2011) showing that these decisions 
could, in fact, be affected by the presence of information asymmetry. The argument of this 
thesis is that information asymmetry has a mediating role in explaining the relationship 
between dependent variable (firm growth) and independent variables (financial and non-
financial decisions). All theoretical developments and empirical findings related to these 
types of firm financial decisions are discussed in detail in the next chapter. This chapter also 
covers in depth the issue of information asymmetry, its proxies, and causal effects. 
 Most firms share similar goals, such as wealth maximisation, profitability, and 
growth. This study focuses on one of these goals - firm growth – which is typically measured 
in terms of growth in sales, assets, employment, etc. (Delmar et al., 2003). According to 
Dobson (2004), growth should be the optimal goal of any firm as it benefits all stakeholders 
including managers and shareholders. Moreover, Geroski et al. (1997) found a significant 
positive impact of current growth rates on expectations of long run profitability and market 
value of the firm. This strengthens the propositions of Dobson (2004) that growth benefits 
stakeholders in general. The reason that firms should focus on growth rather than other 
proxies of performance such as share price stems from further practical consideration that 
share prices are highly volatile in the financial markets. Nevertheless, various firm events 
might severely affect prices in the short run despite the fact that the firm is performing well. 
For example, General Motors' share dropped from $40 to $1 within two years and Apple's 
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share dropped by more than 5% after the news of Steve Jobs' death. Thus, firms should rather 
focus on growth in terms of sales, assets, profits etc. to measure performance.  
 Prior literature has shown (Chen et al., 2010) that all three main financial decisions 
(investment, financing, and dividend decisions) do interact together and can't be distinct or 
isolated from each other. Moreover, the three of them should contribute to firm growth, if 
properly used, or hinder growth if misused. Nonetheless, non-financial variables might affect 
firm growth as well such as the industry to which the firm belongs, the size of the firm, and 
changes in its ownership structure. A major factor that could affect the relationship between 
financial and non-financial variables on one side and firm growth on the other side is the 
existence of information asymmetry as it might hinder the ability of firms to benefit from 
such determinants in a way that best serves the interests of its stakeholders.  
 Previous literature, which will be discussed in the next chapter, has examined several 
of the above relationships. For example, firm growth, its determinants, phases, and proxies 
are all examined extensively (Ardishvili et al., 1998; Delmar et al., 2003; Hamilton, 2011; 
and Coad and Guenther, 2013). Financial decisions discussed above like capital structure, 
investment in long-term and current assets, and dividend policy are the core of research in 
finance and all of them are affected by information asymmetry. The latter, its proxies and 
impact are examined ever since Akerlof (1970) presented the idea of asymmetric information. 
Prior literature suggests that investment, financing, and dividend decisions are all 
independently influenced by information asymmetry (Bolton et al., 2011; Morellec et al., 
2013; Li and Zhao, 2008; and Morellec and Schürhoff, 2011). Nonetheless, research on how 
these decisions contribute to firm growth is rather scarce with only a handful of studies in the 
literature (Fama and French, 2002; and Frank and Goyal, 2005). To the best of the 
researcher's knowledge, there is no literature examining the contribution of the three 
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decisions to firm growth and how this contribution varies according to different levels of 
information asymmetry.  
 The importance of this relationship stems from three facts. Firstly, these decisions are 
not distinct from each other (Li, 2011). Secondly, information asymmetry could hinder firm 
growth through the introduction of false signals that lead to adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems that affect firm's reputation (Li and Zhao, 2008; Lambert et al., 2011) 
Thirdly, firms that are unable to grow might not be able to attract suitable equity capital or 
credit providers. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill the gap in knowledge by examining the 
financial determinants of firm growth at high and low levels of information asymmetry using 
three suitable proxies for different levels of information asymmetry. The three proxies 
include the sensitivity of stock returns to expected return on equity (ROE), probability of 
default of ROE (PD ROE) and Q ratio. The rationale of the three proxies is discussed in 
details in the methodology section. 
 In terms of firm growth, prior literature has demonstrated that various non-financially-
related decisions can also contribute to firm growth, e.g. industry effects, ownership 
structure, and size. As such, this thesis also examines the impact of ownership structure on 
firm growth at high and low levels of information asymmetry in addition to controlling for 
industry type and size. A recent study by Al-Najjar (2015) provides inconclusive evidence on 
the impact of institutional ownership on firm performance in contradiction to the wide belief 
that ownership structure can play an important role in reducing information asymmetry 
(Fazlzadeh et al., 2011; and Judge, 2010). Hence, the conflicting findings on the role of 
ownership in reducing information asymmetry provide a suitable motivation for the 
examination of the impact of ownership structure on firm growth as it will help us to better 
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understand the role of  both financial and non-financial determinants of growth under high 
and low information asymmetry conditions.   
Significance of the Thesis  
The significance of this study stems further from practical considerations. As financing, 
investment and dividends decisions are all interrelated with each other, each decision should 
have a relative weight at any given time and should ultimately be linked to the overall goal of 
firm growth (otherwise they lose their significance). Similarly, any changes in ownership 
structure should affect firm growth positively or negatively, As such, it is very important to 
examine the relative contribution of each decision to the growth of the firm and whether or 
not this can be captured by both financial and non-financial determinants on an ex ante basis. 
Objectives of the Thesis 
The overall objectives of this thesis are as follows. 
1. Investigate the key financial determinants of firm growth at high and low levels of 
information asymmetry. 
2. Examine the impact of changes in ownership structure on firm growth at high and low 
levels of information asymmetry. 
3. Measure the relative contribution of financial determinants, ownership structure, 
industry type, and size of the firm to firm growth. 
Contribution of the Thesis 
The contribution of this thesis could be divided into academic and practical considerations. 
From a practical consideration, the expected findings could help in designing suitable firm 
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financial policies that minimise the impact of information asymmetry while maximising the 
relative contribution of each financial decision. For example, firms that suffer from high 
information asymmetry might decide to increase dividend payout ratio as a way to signal 
their profitability, whereas firms that face fewer information asymmetry problems could 
decrease their payout and invest their earnings within the business to achieve organic growth. 
It could also help firms reach higher growth rates by stressing on factors that contribute to 
growth and avoiding those that hinder it. Finally, it can help investors in selecting where to 
invest based on their understanding of firms' key policies and structures such as dividend 
policy, capital structure, investment style, and ownership structure. As for the academic 
contribution, this study helps in filling a gap in the literature as previous studies did not 
examine the contribution of financial and non-financial determinants on firm growth at high 
and low levels of information asymmetry. Also, it contributes to the literature on information 
asymmetry as it shows the differences associated with using various proxies for information 
asymmetry and how inconsistent they are. 
 This thesis is organised as follows: chapter two reviews relevant literature including 
theoretical developments and empirical studies that examine the investment, financing, and 
dividend decisions of the firm, the agency problem and the role of information asymmetry, 
including prior evidence on their implications for the aforementioned firm decisions. This 
chapter also reviews possible interrelationships and how these can determine firm growth at 
the theoretical and empirical level. 
Chapter three is the first empirical chapter investigating the relative contribution of 
investment, financing, and dividend decisions to firm growth under high and low levels of 
information asymmetry. The chapter begins with the introduction of the data selection 
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procedure and continues with the methodological framework adopted. The chapter concludes 
with the empirical examination and the presentation and analysis of the results.  
Chapter four is the second empirical chapter, and presents the effect of ownership structure 
on firm growth at various levels of information asymmetry. 
Chapter five is the third empirical chapter, and examines the relative contribution of financial 
and non-financial variables to firm growth using discriminant analysis.  
Chapter six is a summary of all key findings, relevant policy implications as well as some 
















Growth is a basic human characteristic that people exercise in almost every aspect of 
their lives. In a corporate context, firms follow humans in their need for growth as Penrose 
(1959) pointed out in her seminal book "The Theory of the Growth of the Firm" where she 
suggested that growth of firms is directly connected to a group of human beings trying to do 
or achieve something. Since then, numerous researchers have tried to understand how firms 
grow and develop proxies for measuring firm growth, for example, Miller (1987), McCann 
(1991), and Dunne and Hughes (1994) used the absolute growth in sales as a measure for 
firm growth. Other studies such as Zahra (1993), Cooper el al. (1994), Peters and Brush 
(1996) used the growth in relative employment as a proxy of firm growth. After reviewing 
extensive literature on firm growth, Ardishvili et al. (1998) came up with a list of the 
common measures that are used as possible growth indicators; sales, profit, employment, 
size, market share, and physical output. Regardless of the proxy used to measure firm growth, 
all firms tend to have the common goal of expanding their businesses, operations, and size. 
The firm is considered a legal entity so it has the capacity to engage in business 
agreements, sign contracts, and incur debts. Every major decision taken within the firm can 
impact its growth. It is argued that the primary activities of financial managers are investment 
and financing decisions (See for example Bolton et al., 2011; Morellec et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, dividend decisions are what are monitored closely by the investors and are 
likely to have a significant effect on firms' stock prices (Gitman and Zutter, 2012, pp. 19, 
561). These three areas of decision are not separate from each other; their interaction was 
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examined by Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967, pp. 427-8 who were the first to find an explicit link 
between them. Using a sample of 181 industrial and commercial firms for the period 1950-
60, they found a strong interdependence between the dividend and investment decisions. 
Moreover, the external finance decision is affected by both the investment and dividend 
decisions but does not affect them except during upswings and peaks. Consistent with this, 
Chen et al. (2010) suggested that each two of the three decisions interact together. 
This study aims at examining how the three decisions; investment, financing, and 
dividend interact to affect firm growth. What hinders this interaction is the existence of 
information asymmetry between various stakeholders. Li and Zhao (2008), and Morellec and 
Schürhoff (2011) were among the most recent studies that examined how investment, 
financing, and dividend decisions are affected by the existence of information asymmetry. 
Additionally, several studies have examined how firm growth is affected by financing, 
investment, and dividend decisions; notably Rajan and Zingales (1995); Fama and French 
(2002); and Frank and Goyal (2005). This study presents an expansion of the existing 
literature as it brings these two research questions together and examines the relative 
contribution of the three decisions to firm growth under high and low levels of information 
asymmetry. Those previous studies attempted to investigate the contribution of each decision 
individually to firm growth or the impact of information asymmetry on one of the decisions; 
but none of them, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, measured the contribution of all 
three to firm growth under various levels of information asymmetry.      
 Figure 2.1 presents a cognitive map of the literature review with all the topics that are 
covered in this thesis. As mentioned above, three decisions have an impact on firm growth; 
financing, dividend, and investment. Additionally, the information asymmetry affects this 
relationship. Therefore, the cognitive map presents the theories that tackled the three 
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decisions and also tackles the proxies used to measure information asymmetry. Moreover, 
firm growth -the dependent variable- and how is it measured is summarised as well. Another 
aspect that is examined in this thesis is the contribution of one of the major non-financial 
variables on firm growth - ownership structure - to understand the distinction between its 
impact and that of the financial decisions discussed above.  
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: section two discusses the agency theory; its 
origins, developments, and proxies used to measure information asymmetry. Section three 
addresses the growth of the firm; why focusing on growth, patterns, proxies used is 
important, and how to select the appropriate proxy. The relationship between the agency 
problem and financing, dividend, and investment decisions is presented in section four 
including empirical analysis of each one. The interaction between the three decisions and 
how they affect firms' growth is discussed in section five. Finally, the effect of ownership 
structure on firm growth is discussed in section six. 
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Figure 2.1: Structure of Relevant Theories 
-M-M theory of Capital Structure           -M-M Dividend irrelevance Th.    -Theory of Investment 
-Th. of ownership structure                    -Bird-in-hand theory                        -Theory of the Firm and Investment  
-Trade-Off theory                                -Tax differential theory 
-Pecking Order Theory                         -Signaling theory 
-FCF of capital structure Th.                 -Clientele effect theory 
     -The agency hypothesis  
                              
 
 
Information asymmetry is measured by:  
-Prob. Of adverse selection using B-S Option pricing model 
-The Sensitivity of Stock Returns to Expected ROE 
-The Q ratio 
-Probability of Informed Trade and M/B Ratio  
-Forecast-based measures such as forecast error and normalised forecast error  




Dividend Decision  Investment Decision 
Firm's Growth 
Measured by: 
-Continuous compound growth rate of total assets 
-Continuous compound growth rate of fixed assets 
-Continuous compound growth rate of sales 







This study aims to analyse the relative contribution of financing, dividend, and 
investment decisions to firms’ growth under each high and low levels of information 
asymmetry. 
The next section presents the origins of agency theory and information asymmetry. It 
is organised as follows; first, the origins of the agency problem and how the theory 
developed. Second, the measurement of information asymmetry and related empirical studies 
are presented. Lastly, the effect of the timing of the issue of securities is presented. 
2.2 Agency problem and firm growth 
2.2.1 Origins of agency problem 
A principal-agent relationship exists when someone (the agent) acts on behalf of a 
person or a group (the principal). This relationship exists in many aspects of life; a lawyer, 
for example, acts on behalf of the client etc. In a business context, shareholders, who are the 
owners of the firm, are the principals and the managers who run the business are the agents. 
Managers are supposed to work and make decisions that are matching with the best interest 
of the shareholders. A problem would occur if the agents decide to work for their own best 
interest regardless of what is best for the principals, especially if the agents know more 
information about the business operations than the principals. In this case, there exists 
information asymmetry which was first introduced by Akerlof (1970). In this paper, he 
introduced the idea of buyers and sellers of used cars to deliver his idea about owners 
knowing more than the buyers of used cars. The idea is that sellers of used cars know about 
the condition of their cars and try to hide any unobservable drawbacks from the sellers. Thus, 
sellers might purchase the cars without noticing such drawbacks. By the time they discover 
them, the transaction would have already taken place. The situation where one party of a 
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transaction knows information that the other party does not know is what was afterwards 
known as information asymmetry.   
Soon after the introduction of information asymmetry by Akerlof, the Economic 
Theory of Agency was introduced by Ross (1973) where he emphasised the existence of a 
problem regarding the agents acting on behalf of the principals. Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
in a seminal paper, presented the theory of the firm where they considered the firm as a group 
of security holders with differing goals. According to their study, the two major conflicts 
arise between bondholders and shareholders, and shareholders and management. For the first 
conflict, firms might favor shareholders' interest on the expense of bondholders which creates 
what they called "risk shifting" problem. A second conflict might arise between management 
and the shareholders when managers are paid wages but are not giving their best effort to 
align with shareholders goals. This is called the "effort problem" (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
Another agency problem was presented by Myers (1977) which he called "debt 
overhang" that takes place when firms have a huge debt outstanding. If the firm works in the 
best interest of shareholders, it might forgo safe investments, even if they have positive net 
present value, because the proceeds from those investments will shift to bondholders. The 
agency problems proposed in the publications mentioned above would be costly for firms due 
to the inappropriate behavior of managers and the costs incurred for mitigating this behavior. 
This topic caught the attention of many scholars who tried to find solutions to reduce the 
effects of the agency problem; Grossman and Hart (1983) proposed that using debt issuance 
will force managers to work hard to avoid bankruptcy. Easterbrook (1984) suggested that 
dividend payment will reduce the amount of money available for managers to misuse. Weiss 
and Beckerman (1995) pointed out the role of institutional investors in reducing agency costs 
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through effective monitoring while Murphy (1997) designed a structure for executives' 
compensation that would help aligning their goals with shareholders' interests through stock 
options and annual bonus plans. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) asserted that the board of 
directors can play an important role in reducing agency costs through effective monitoring 
and providing resources in a dependent manner.  
More recently, Gamba and Triantis (2013) suggested that usage of debt covenants to 
alleviate the agency costs would reduce the problem. Despite all of these efforts, the 
asymmetry of information still exists. Anderson (2001) argues that the propositions of more 
government regulations as a solution to the information asymmetry problem are wrong 
because such regulations do not help to solve the problem but rather create more information 
asymmetry due to the excessive usage of regulations that hinders the ability of market 
participants from finding out or acting upon relevant facts. Thus, the information asymmetry 
between managers, who know more, and shareholders still exists despite increasing 
regulation. 
This study argues that the reputation of firms that are known to have high levels of 
information asymmetry would be negatively affected because the network of shareholders, 
suppliers, creditors and other stakeholders would perceive such firms as more risky. 
Therefore, this riskiness of firms would result in higher required return by 
shareholders/creditors to compensate them for the higher risk, which in turn increases the cost 
of capital. Thus, the firms' ability to raise debt/equity needed to invest in assets will be 
hindered. Nevertheless, assets are required to generate more sales and promote growth. In 
other words, the research suggests that information asymmetry hinders the firms' growth in 
terms of losing sales and/or lack of ability to raise financing from financial markets at 
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reasonable cost due to lack to investors' trust. It is important to understand first what proxies 
could be used to measure information asymmetry in order to assess its impact on firm growth.  
2.2.2. Measuring the level of information asymmetry  
The literature cites that the agency problem between firm managers and investors is 
associated with information asymmetry. Since the agency costs cannot be easily quantified, 
the presence of information asymmetry was employed to predict the severity of the agency 
issues. Various measures of information asymmetry are empirically employed. These 
measures can be categorised into market-based, firm-based, and forecast-based proxies. This 
section discusses the proxies in each category followed by empirical examination. Starting 
with the forecast-based measures, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) followed Christie 
(1987) in using the forecasting error in earnings as a proxy to measure the level of 
information asymmetry. This measure is based on the difference between analysts' forecast of 
earnings and the actual earnings realised during the period. The severer the information 
asymmetry, the higher the forecast error will be. A main criticism to the applicability of this 
measure is that the forecast error might be caused by volatility in the firm's earnings rather 
than due to information asymmetry. To avoid this problem, the authors used the normalized 
forecast error which is the ratio of forecast error in earnings to the earnings volatility of the 
firm. They also used standard deviation in forecasts, and the volatility in abnormal returns 
that was used by Dierkens (1991). Their last measure was residual volatility in daily stock 
returns following other studies that used this measure such as Bhagat et al. (1985) and 
Blackwell et al. (1990). Their analysis revealed that spin outs result in lower information 
asymmetry after their completion. 
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As for the market-based measures, the market-to-book ratio was used by McLaughlin 
et al. (1998) to examine the relation between information asymmetry and firm performance.
1
 
They found that firms with higher information asymmetry tend to have performance decline 
after seasoned equity offerings. Moreover, the direct trade spread was commonly used to 
measure the asymmetry between investors’ price expectations and the actual stock price 
(Glosten and Harris, 1988; Madhavan et al., 1997; Huang and Stoll, 1997). The usage of 
direct trade spread faces some limitations in real life application. Callahan et al. (1997) and 
Heflin et al. (2005) suggest that the common and major critics to direct trade spread are the 
econometric problems associated with time series and price dependency that renders the trade 
spread biased. Also, Lee et al. (1993) suggested that market makers protect their interests 
from the effects of information asymmetry by simultaneously manipulating quoted bid and 
ask prices along with the quoted depths associated with those prices. This hinders the 
dependency on spread-based measures because they are incomplete and difficult to interpret.  
Another market-based proxy for measuring information asymmetry is the Probability 
of Informed Trade (PIN) suggested by Brown and Hillegeist (2007) which is based on the 
imbalances between buy and sell spreads among traders in the secondary market. They assert 
that this indirect spread-based proxy of information asymmetry can overcome the difficulties 
facing direct trade spread. However, a major limitation to trade spread according to 
Madhavan et al. (1997) is that the costs of adverse selection decrease throughout the same 
trading day. Moreover, data about daily trade spread are hard to access through financial 
databases that normally offer quarterly or annual data. This suggests that, in practice, the 
                                                           
1
 Market-to-book ratio indicates the variation in share price relative to its book value. The higher this variation 
is, the more likely investors would be less informed about the firm's performance. That is why market-to-book 
ratio is used as a proxy for measuring information asymmetry by McLaughlin et al. (1998) 
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closing spread is relatively a weak proxy and a hard to access measure of information 
asymmetry.  
Building on previously used proxies, Van Ness et al. (2001, p.5) mentioned that, 
"variables such as market-to-book, volatility, and institutional ownership are often used to 
measure the asymmetric information present in a stock. Recent papers also use adverse 
selection components as a direct measure of information problems." They examined the 
relationship between adverse selection and information asymmetry's variables, with their 
analysis suggesting that volatility is the major determinant of adverse selection, while 
market-to-book ratio and analyst forecast errors were unrelated to adverse selection. They 
concluded that there is no certain prescription to which model of adverse selection should be 
used, if any, to measure information asymmetry because adverse selection was mainly due to 
volatility of stock prices rather than asymmetry of information.  
Finally, the well-known firm-based measure for information asymmetry is Q ratio 
(Adam & Goyal, 2000; Clarke and Shastri, 2000; Varici, 2013; Brainard and Tobin, 1968; 
Tobin, 1969). 
 The above mentioned measures are empirically examined in various studies in terms 
of their consistency and reliability. In this regard, Li and Zhao (2008) develops a link 
between information asymmetry and dividend policy. They followed the suggestions of Elton 
et al. (1984) and used two proxies to measure information asymmetry: analyst earnings 
forecast errors and the dispersion in analyst forecasts. Prior research suggests that both 
proxies are positively correlated with the amount of asymmetric information.  
 There is some criticism facing the usage of earnings forecast errors as the variation of 
returns may be due to uncertainty, with information asymmetry a less significant factor. 
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However, Li and Zhao (2008) are convinced that it still works as a proxy of information 
asymmetry as they suggest that, "Other studies show that our measures for information 
asymmetry do capture dimensions beyond firm risk. Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) and 
Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) show that as firms enhance information disclosure, analyst 
earnings forecast accuracy increases while forecast dispersion decreases. Bowen, Davis, and 
Matsumoto (2002) show that conference calls improve analyst forecast precision and reduce 
forecast dispersion, and Chen and Matsumoto (2006) find that better access to management 
is associated with more accurate analyst forecasts."   
 Their analysis suggest that firms that are subject to increased information asymmetry 
problems are less likely to make dividend payments, to initiate dividends, and to increase 
dividends, and that these firms also distribute smaller amounts. This is in contrast to the 
signaling hypothesis of dividends that the higher the payout, the better the signal conveyed to 
the market. It also opposes the suggestions of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) that 
dividend payments can, in fact, reduce agency conflicts. 
In contrast to the findings of Van Ness et al. (2001), another study by Armstrong et al. 
(2011) suggested using adverse selection measures to forecast the level of information 
asymmetry. This study tried to measure the effect of information asymmetry on firms' cost of 
capital in competitive markets. Five proxies were used to measure information asymmetry: i) 
the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, ii) the bid-ask spread, iii) R&D 
expenditure, iv) scaled accruals quality (SAQ), and finally v) analyst coverage. Nevertheless, 
the data for the other accounting-based measures are either less accurate or unavailable. The 
findings of this study suggested that when markets are imperfect, information asymmetry has 
a discrete effect on cost of capital. In perfect markets, however, there is no relation between 
information asymmetry and cost of capital. This is consistent with the suggestions of Lambert 
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et al. (2011) that information asymmetry has no impact on firms' cost of capital when perfect 
competition settings exist.  
Based on the above discussion of proxies of information asymmetry and the critiques 
facing some of them, this thesis utilises three proxies of information asymmetry to 
differentiate between observations that correspond to high or low levels of information 
asymmetry. A first forecast-based proxy is sensitivity of stock returns to expected ROE (Beta 
ROE). This proxy is in line with the prior studies in the field such as Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999), Christie (1987) and Dierkens (1991). A positive figure indicates that 
investors can correctly forecast earnings, corresponding to low levels of information 
asymmetry, while a negative figure indicates inability to forecast earnings correctly due to 
information asymmetry and thus corresponds to high level of information asymmetry.  
This thesis suggests a new market-based proxy of information asymmetry that is 
based on adverse selection, as suggested by Van Ness et al. (2001). We suggest this proxy to 
overcome the drawbacks of market-based proxies discussed above such as econometric 
issues, volatility, and time cap of available information. This proxy is called the Probability 
of Default of ROE (PD ROE) which is a modification of the Black and Scholes (1972, 1973) 
option pricing model. The Probability of Adverse Selection using the Black-Scholes option 
pricing model (probability of occurrence  dN 2  is the cumulative standard normal density 
function). The  dN 2 = 0 refers to favorable selection and  dN 2 ≥ 0 refers to adverse 
selection, thus the existence of asymmetric information.  
Finally, we use the conventional firm-based measure of information asymmetry; the 
Q-Ratio that was used by Varici (2013). This measure is applied by differentiating between Q 
ratio either higher or lower than one, where the lower the Q ratio, the severer the information 
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asymmetry problem between management and market participants. This is mainly due to 
under-investment behaviour of management (Koch and Shenoy, 1999: Stein, 2003). Q ratios 
that are much higher than one might result in over investment problems like empire building, 
yet in most cases, higher Q-ratios mean that the firm is trying to utilise its capacities better 
and invest more.  
 Measuring the level of information asymmetry is important to determine its impact 
and the mediating role it plays in the relationship between financing, investment, dividend 
decisions, and ownership structure on one side and firm growth on the other side. A very 
important implication for information asymmetry in practice is how it affects corporate 
decision making. One of the major implications for information asymmetry is its impact on 
financing firms through debt and/or equity. A significant amount of research was devoted to 
the relationship between information asymmetry and the timing of securities' issues. 
2.2.3 Information asymmetry and timing of the issue 
 This section presents the theory of market timing that assumes that the timing of 
equity issues plays a major role in reducing information asymmetry associated with the issue. 
The theory is presented first, then several empirical studies that examined whether timing of 
the issue is significant or not are presented. 
2.2.3.1 Theory of timing effect on equity issues 
 A line of studies that emerged in the 1990s examined the relationship between 
financing decisions and agency problems and focused on the timing of securities' issue. The 
timing of an issue could be a signal of information asymmetry because managers know more 
than shareholders about their firm's value and could use this knowledge to issue securities 
when firm is overvalued. The first advocates of the timing effect were Lucas and McDonald 
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(1990) and Korajczyk et al. (1992) who presented dynamic models that assumed that firms 
must issue securities to invest in growth projects. The idea behind Lucas and McDonald 
(1990) was that managers have information one period ahead of the market and act according 
to this knowledge. They issue stocks to finance a new investment immediately if the stocks 
are overvalued. Nevertheless, if the stocks are undervalued and the investment could be 
delayed without incurring high costs, the managers will postpone the issue until stocks are 
fairly valued with a rise in its price. The authors assert that this timing factor is the reason 
why equity issues are normally followed by decrease in share price because most firms issue 
when their stock is overvalued. Moreover, they suggest that firms will have higher abnormal 
returns prior to the issue especially for undervalued firms.  
 An extension to this view was suggested by Korajczyk et al. (1992) who asserted that 
timing of the issue could reduce and control the informational disadvantages associated with 
stock issues. Their model assumed that information asymmetry is at its lowest level after 
information releases. Firms, therefore, try to time the new equity issues right after 
information releases to mitigate the negative price reaction. Moreover, they assert that the 
decline in stock price is positively related to the length of the period between the issue and 
last information release. The propositions of the two models have been examined by a 
number of studies over the last two decades.  Some suggested that timing is an important 
factor in deciding whether to issue equity or not. The results of some of those studies were 
presented in a comprehensive review by Klein et al. (2002). Rajan and Zingales (1995) found 
that firms tend to time their equity issue according to when they have high market-to-book 
ratio, also supporting the timing hypothesis. However, there is by no means consensus on the 
subject, some studies have suggested a relationship between equity issues and a firm's 
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business cycles, such as Choe et al. (1993); Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996); and Baker and 
Wurgler (2000).  
Additionally, an alternative implication for the timing hypothesis was presented by 
Manuel et al. (1993) who found that firms that perform well, and plan to distribute dividends, 
time the equity issue exactly after the dividend announcement. Additionally, poorer 
performers time the equity issue just before the dividend announcement of less payout ratio 
which indicates their poor performance. Baker and Wurgler (2002) presented evidence that 
supports the timing hypothesis and rejects both the pecking order and trade-off theories that 
will be discussed later. They found that low-leverage firms are those that issued equity after 
an increase in their market-to-book ratios, while high-leverage firms are those that issue debt 
because their market-to-book ratios decreased at the time they needed funds to finance new 
growth opportunities. Furthermore, the authors suggested that their evidence supporting the 
timing hypothesis is mainly due to market inefficiencies rather than information asymmetry. 
They support their proposition by citing the results of a survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) 
whom found that two thirds of financial managers consider the over - or under - valuation of 
stocks as a very important consideration when issuing new equity. Morellec and Schurhoff 
(2011) suggested that firms facing information asymmetry tend to signal their quality to 
investors through the timing of corporate actions and their mix of debt and equity financing, 
further supporting the timing hypothesis. 
 However, in contrast to those findings, Jung et al. (1996) found that timing is not an 
important determinant for firms to issue equity based on their analysis of returns following 
equity issues. Their five-year sample revealed insignificant excess returns following the 
issuance indicating that timing was not a key factor. Moreover, Frank and Goyal (2009) 
examined the capital structure decisions in publicly traded American firms over more than 
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fifty years from 1950-2003 and found that timing has no direct relation to the pattern that 
they observed. 
 The theory that information asymmetry could influence firm decisions, such as the 
timing of issuance of securities, provides evidence that information asymmetry affects firms' 
growth. Building on the propositions that information asymmetry plays a role in hindering or 
stimulating firm growth, it is important to understand why firms should focus on growth, 
understand the determinants and proxies for measuring firm growth, and empirically 
challenge the reliability of those proxies. Firm growth is discussed in the following context. 
2.3 Origins of literature on Firm Growth 
2.3.1 Why firm growth not shareholders' value 
Before advancing to the theory of firm growth, its developments, and key measures 
for firm growth, it is important to understand why stakeholders should focus on measuring 
firm growth rather than using other measures like shareholders' wealth, share price etc. In the 
finance literature, for example, Breen and Lerner (1973); Shleifer and Vishny (1988); 
Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000) among many, the researchers suggest that the goal of the 
firm is shareholders' wealth maximisation through continuous increases in share price. They 
argue that every decision within firms should be implemented only if it will add value to 
shareholders. Otherwise, managers might take decisions that serve their goals like empire 
building and prestigious benefits etc. Other goals such as profit maximisation, sustainability 
and market share are also valued by market participants but not as much as long-term 
shareholders' wealth. However, a broader view would show that firm growth would serve all 
of these goals simultaneously; Dobson (2004) illustrates why pursuing firm growth should be 
the optimal goal of managers even at the expense of shareholders' value. He suggests that 
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managers recognise their obligations to Stakeholders, which includes employees, customers, 
society and regulatory bodies, as well as shareholders. Focusing on firm growth would best 
serve the interests of all of them. 
The propositions of the author are explained in Dobson (2004) in light of both 
deontological and utilitarian theories. On the one hand, the deontological justification is that 
managers should take decisions that are consistent with the mission statement of the firm. 
The strategic goals of the firm would be achieved through focusing on firm growth as it 
serves employees' careers, market power and stability, diversity on boards of directors, and in 
turn, the long term shareholders' value. On the other hand, a utilitarian justification of firm 
growth would suggest that growth serves the aggregate welfare of all of society - growing 
firms contribute to the "common good" through creating jobs and higher GNP per capita. 
Thus, focusing on firm growth could be justified on the basis of one or both of these 
explanations. Similarly, Geroski et al. (1997) report a significant positive impact of current 
growth rates on expectations of long run profitability and market value of the firm. Another 
reason for focusing on growth is the suggestions of Aoki (1990) who asserts that employees 
might be willing to forgo current earnings if there are growth opportunities that might lead to 
future possible promotion in an expanding hierarchy. Moreover, maintaining a positive 
growth rate would result in more satisfaction and commitment for both managers and 
employees. Finally, on practical basis, as mentioned in chapter one, share prices do not 
always reflect firm performance as the high volatility in share prices could be due to various 
political, economic, or industrial reasons. This renders the share prices biased and 
inappropriate to measure overall corporate performance. However, Witt (2000) argues that 
growth has some disadvantages if not dealt with properly; bureaucracy and less motivation 
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for initiation along with steady routine methods of production might hinder the attractiveness 
of growth as a measure of a firm's performance.   
2.3.2 Definition and determinants of firm growth 
A very early attempt to understand how firms grow was presented by Ashton (1926) 
who analysed the growth pattern of British textile firms. As the author concludes, "In their 
growth they obey no one law. A few apparently undergo a steady expansion. With others, 
increase in size takes place by a sudden leap.” (Ashton, 1926, pp. 572 -573). Gibrat (1931) 
presented his theory "law of proportionate effect" which is academically referred to as 
Gibrat's law. According to his observations, a firm's expected growth rate is independent of 
its size; there is an equal probability of a proportionate change in size for all firms in a certain 
industry regardless of their size at the beginning of the examined period. Additionally, he 
explains the growth of firms on the basis of their history of multiplicative shocks, which 
might lead to infinite growth. Finally, Gibrat's law assumes a lognormal distribution of firm 
size across industries.  
Nonetheless, many limitations to Gibrat's law were presented in the years that 
followed. Kalecki (1945) suggested that it is not reasonable to assume infinite variance in 
firm size; while, Chester (1979) refuted Gibrat's law due to the existence of autocorrelation 
structure in the growth shocks. In a similar manner, Reichstein and Jensen (2005) observed 
that the annual growth rates are not normally distributed as Gibrat proposed, and Bottazzi and 
Secchi (2006) and Hymer and Pashigian (1962) both reported finding a negative relationship 
between firm size and the growth rate variance.    
Despite all the limitations facing Gibret's law, it opened the door for further research 
in the field of firms' growth. A major contribution to knowledge regarding this area was the 
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seminal book by Penrose (1959) that presented the basis for the theory of the growth of the 
firm. In her book, Penrose differentiated between two forms of growth: in terms of amount, 
and in terms of size. Her analysis defined amount as referring to the output, sales, exports etc. 
of a firm. Growth in size refers to the process of development where serial interactions lead 
to changes in the size of the firm in terms of assets, personnel etc. Penrose argues that this 
view is different from the traditional view of size where firms move from one size to another. 
In her study, there is no optimal or most profitable size but size is a 'by-product' of the growth 
process. Finally, Penrose considered the firm as a group of capabilities or productive 
resources that interact based on human decisions to create growth. Richardson (1972) 
expanded the work of Penrose to consider the firm as a network that coordinates capabilities 
in an industrial system. Thus, the growth of the firm depends on the activities it undertakes 
and the extent to which those activities synergise. Hart (1995) considered the firm to be a 
group of tangible assets and property rights that are under the same ownership and control. 
Consequently, firm growth focuses on growth of the assets.  
Numerous scholars have built on the works of Penrose, Richardson, and Hart, 
studying the factors or determinants that either help or hinder firm growth. Scherer (1970) 
claimed that changes in firm size depend mainly on economies of scale. An increase in 
economies of scale would result in declining unitary cost which is reflected in growth of 
firms' sales and profits. Storey (1994) came up with a classification of three groups of growth 
determinants; the entrepreneurs' resources, features of the firm, and adapted strategy. The 
interaction of the three groups determines the speed of growth of the firm. Almus and 
Nerlinger (1999) stressed on the importance of external factors like wages or salary range that 
might hinder the ability of firms to hire new skilled employees and therefore negatively 
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influence growth. Hoogstra and Dijk (2004) argue that factors related to the environment or 
location where the firm operates would affect its growth.  
Besides economies of scale and the other economic factors, financial performance 
was viewed by researchers as one of the key determinants of firm growth; Coad (2005) found 
a significant relationship between financial performance and firms’ growth for his sample of 
French manufacturing firms. This evidence was further corroborated by Bottazzi et al. (2006) 
who examined the same relationship using a sample of Italian firms. However, in both studies 
the magnitude of the effect of financial performance on firm growth was relatively small. 
Majumdar et al. (2014) examined the impact of a series of mergers from 1988-2001 on firms' 
performance. Their analysis revealed that firms that undertook one merger experienced zero 
or negligible growth. The second merger's effect was negative on firms' growth although the 
motive behind mergers was to grow in the first place.  
Firms do not grow in the same pattern or at the same pace; some studies have 
considered the pattern of firm growth and whether it is affected by variables such as size and 
age. In a seminal study, Evans (1987) examined this relation on a sample of about 20,000 
manufacturing firms in 100 manufacturing industries between 1976 and 1982 and found an 
inverse relation between firm growth and its size and age. This is consistent with the findings 
of Variyam and Kraybill (1992) and Geroski (2004) who found negative relationship between 
age and growth for US and European firms respectively. Das (1995) found that in a fast-
growing industry like his sample of firms from the computer hardware industry in India, 
growth increases with age. This does not necessarily contradict Evans – It is likely that the 
firms in Das’ sample were at an earlier stage in their life cycle than the ones in Evans’, when 
rapid growth can be expected. Barron et al. (1994) observed a non-monotonic relation 
between age and growth in New York credit Unions, while Hamilton (2011) found that initial 
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employment size rather than age can be attributed to a firm's growth path in his analysis of 
sixty firms over a period of fourteen years from 1994-2007.  
In a ground-breaking study, Delmar et al. (2003) theorised that there are seven 
patterns of firm growth; super absolute growers, steady sales growers, acquisition growers, 
super relative growers, erratic one shot growers, employment growers, and steady over-all 
growers. Thus, firm growth is not a process that follows certain procedures as it might take 
any or some of those patterns. Hamilton (2011) showed that smaller firms tend to grow more 
often than larger firms. Also, smaller firms grow in a continual manner unlike large ones 
where growth occurs in what he called "large isolated steps". The theory that there are 
different patterns of growth suggests that firm growth is not affected simply by 
environmental factors. The literature variously suggests that managerial decisions; mergers, 
economies of scale, factors of production, financial performance, adapted strategies and other 
factors will also affect firm growth. This, along with the evidence that there is no certain 
pattern of growth that firms will follow, highlights the importance of decision-making in 
stimulating firms’ growth. Effective decision-making evidently requires reliable metrics to 
inform it, however there is immense diversity with regards to the choice of an appropriate 
proxy for measuring firm growth. 
2.3.3 Empirical studies on measuring firm growth      
The dilemma of finding an appropriate measure for firm growth has been examined 
empirically by numerous scholars; this lead to a diversity of measures used that severely 
impairs the ability of researchers to compare results (Delmar, 1997, and Weinzimmer et al., 
1998). Delmar (1997) and Ardishvili et al. (1998) came up with identical lists of commonly 
used growth indicators: growth in assets, sales, employability, market share, profit, and 
physical output. The usage of market share and physical output is not applicable because it 
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can only be used within the same industry range, and moreover data on either of them can 
hardly be accessed according to Delmar et al. (2003). They also assert that using profit, 
although it is an important measure of success, is not reliable when compared to firm size 
because it is only evident over long term horizons. The author suggests that profits are not 
applicable because they might vary according to variable corporate expenditures from one 
period to another - a low profit in a certain period relative to prior ones does not imply a 
negative growth rate for the firm.  
The other three measures of firm growth, namely, i) sales, ii) assets, and iii) 
employment are used widely in empirical studies. Kirchhoff and Norton (1992) examined all 
three of them and found that they are interchangeable as they produced similar results over a 
seven-year period. Kimberley (1976) suggested that growth in number of employees is the 
most widely used measure of size. Growth in employment was used by Cooper et al. (1994) 
to measure the performance of 1053 new ventures representing all geographical regions and 
each industry within the region. They found that their indicators of initial human capital 
could verify the performance pattern of the sample and forecast whether the new ventures 
would fail, survive, or highly grow. Donckels and Lambrecht (1995) used networks as a 
measure of small businesses' growth, finding that growth is influenced by a firm's network of 
domestic and international contacts. Vaessen and Keeble (1995) used a sample of 2,000 UK 
SMEs and found that skill shortage and labour recruitment difficulties were among the 
reasons behind low growth firms.  
While these studies suggest that growth in employment or human capital in general is 
an appropriate measure of firm growth, Delmar et al. (2003, p.198) argue that it is 
inappropriate to rely solely on employment, suggesting that, "obvious drawbacks of 
employment as a growth indicator are that this measure is affected by labor productivity 
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increases, machine-for-man substitution, degree of integration and other make-or-buy 
decisions. A firm can grow considerably in output and assets without any growth in 
employment." In short, this study agrees with the proposition that employment alone is an 
unsuitable proxy as the current state of technological advances allows periodic growth in 
sales, assets etc. to be achieved without being associated with a proportionate growth in 
employment. A recent study by Coad and Guenther (2013) on the impact of diversification 
through introducing new products on firm growth supports this argument: Their analysis 
found that the period prior to the introduction of a product was associated with a growth in 
employment, while diversification was associated with negative employment growth (but 
positive growth in assets). 
 With the shortcomings of employment as a measure of firm growth, only two 
measures are left to be considered; growth in assets and growth in sales. Growth in assets, as 
mentioned before, was considered by Hart (1995) as the appropriate measure for firm growth 
as he considered the firm to be a group of tangible assets and property rights that are under 
the same ownership and control. Despite the fact that total assets are widely used as a growth 
indicator, it faces a severe drawback: Assets are not a reliable measure for all types of 
industries; for example, service firms do not rely on the amount of assets they possess. 
Delmar et al. (2003) suggest that usage of assets is related to the intensity of a firm's capital 
and the industry in which it operates. Thus, growth in assets is sensitive to changes over time  
The last proxy for measuring firm growth, and most widely accepted according to 
Hoy et al. (1992) and Ardishvili et al. (1998) is growth in sales or revenues. Numerous 
studies used growth in sales to measure firm growth; Barkham et al. (1995) argue that it is the 
favorite indicator even for entrepreneurs. Davidson and Wiklund (2000) assert that growth in 
sales is a highly suitable indicator across various dimensions of firms. Flamholz (1986) 
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mentioned that growing demand is reflected by sales growth, thus, growth in sales is viewed 
as the natural choice for measuring growth. However, despite all of these advantages 
favouring growth in sales as a proxy for firm growth rate, there are still some limitations 
facing its usage in practice. Delmar et al. (2003) raised the issue of inflation and currency 
exchange rates: Sales growth is sensitive for changes in either rate which might cause 
misleading firm growth rate. Also, for newly established firms, growth in terms of sales 
might take some time to occur unlike growth in assets or employment.  
The finding that every proxy for measuring firm growth faces some limitations 
encouraged advances in the field. Delmar et al. (2003) found that firm growth is a multi-
dimensional rather than a uni-dimensional phenomenon. They came to this conclusion after 
examining nineteen different measures of growth on a sample of all Swedish firms that have 
more than 20 employees. Among the measures of growth they examined were both the 
relative and absolute growth of sales, and the relative and absolute growth in number of 
employees. This is consistent with Davidsson (1989) who suggested that using multiple 
indicators would reveal better empirical results. Nevertheless, Chandler and Hanks (1993) 
suggested that researchers should devise a single method or very limited number of indicators 
for measuring growth. Delmar et al. (2003) rejected this suggestion on the basis of the 
advantages of using various measures that provides more conclusive view of empirical 
relationships. They also argue that using multiple measures provides an opportunity to 
optimise specific measures for each study's purpose.  
Various studies have stated that growth in sales and assets are the two conventional 
measures for firm growth; (Fairfield et al., 2003; Broussard, 2005; Cooper et al., 2008; 
Lipson et al., 2009; Gray and Johnson, 2011). Eldomiaty and Rashwan (2013) devised with a 
new measure of firm growth that considers the interaction between both fixed assets and 
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sales. They argue that this interaction would reduce the limitations of using either measure 
individually. The authors explain their assertion on the basis that increases in sales may or 
may not indicate the efficiency of using the assets. Similarly, growth of assets may or may 
not be associated with increases in sales. For example, the additions to fixed assets may not 
necessarily be associated with increases in productivity. The same is true in case of current 
assets. Thus, they proposed using a sales-weighted fixed assets growth.   
 Finally, in most cases, growth in assets would normally lead to growth in sales 
because increased production capabilities (assets) results in a larger capacity to make sales. 
Thus, the key to growth is investing in assets and to do so firms need to finance these 
investments. If the firm is facing high level of information asymmetry, investors would not be 
willing to provide the funds needed to finance those investments. Even if they do, they would 
require higher expected returns than would be the case without the information asymmetry. 
The interaction between financing decisions and information asymmetry is discussed 
immediately below. 
2.4 Financing, dividend, and investment decisions and information 
asymmetry 
2.4.1 Financing decision and information asymmetry 
Financing decisions are one of the major decisions that any treasurer or financial 
manager undertakes. As shown above, scholars consider the financing decision, as one of the 
two major decisions related to finance in any enterprise (along with investment decisions). In 
today's business environment where there are many financial tools, the formulation of firms' 
capital structure becomes a major issue. Capital structure is the mix of debt and equity issues 
that a firm employs when it needs to raise funds. Debt issuance can be categorised into loans 
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and bonds, though different types of both exist. Equity refers to usage of retained earnings, 
common stocks, and preferred stocks. The strategic aim of any structure of corporate capital 
is to decrease the cost of capital while maintaining an appropriate level of risk. Information 
asymmetries do affect the choice of the financial instrument and the mix of debt and equity 
employed. For example, some recent empirical studies proved that lower information 
asymmetry decreases the cost of equity capital (Armstrong et al., 2011; Lambert et al., 2011). 
Since the introduction of information asymmetry by Akerlof (1970), various studies 
considered the signal sent to investors from the financing instrument used, or in other words, 
the role of information asymmetry in determining the optimal capital structure of any firm. 
Financial managers try to formulate capital structures in a way that decreases information 
asymmetry and minimises agency costs. Various studies examined the relationship between 
financing decisions and agency problems in general and information asymmetry in particular. 
Among those studies are Jensen and Meckling, (1976); Ross, (1977); Myers and Majluf, 
(1984); Narayanan, (1988); Klein et al. (2002); Morellec et al. (2014) and many others. This 
section reviews the literature and the theoretical developments in the area of financing 
decisions and agency costs caused by information asymmetry and how they influence firm 
growth. 
The traditional view of corporate finance was that the cost of debt is cheaper than the 
cost of equity. Thus, a higher gearing level and usage of debt rather than equity would result 
in lower Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) up to a certain point beyond which the 
cost of debt starts to increase and the WACC increases in turn. At that point, the market value 
of the firm is maximised. In late 1950s, this traditional view was highly debated as 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed their theory of capital structure (MM hereafter). The 
underlying perfect market assumption of MM theory is that there are no taxes, no transaction 
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or bankruptcy costs, and a perfect market exists where information is available to all 
participants in the market and individuals and firms borrow at the same rate. Based on those 
assumptions, MM concluded that using either debt or equity financing would have no impact 
on firms' value.  
The assumptions of MM theory and their conclusions were explained using three 
propositions. Firstly, the total market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure. 
Secondly, the expected rate of return on equity increases proportionally with the gearing 
ratio, as shareholders would require an additional risk premium to compensate them for the 
risk they bear at higher gearing levels- default risk or risk of financial distress- and this will 
offset the cheaper cost of debt. Thirdly, the cut-off rate of return for new projects is equal to 
the weighted average cost of capital which is constant regardless of gearing.  
Because perfect markets do not exist in reality, MM developed a modified version of 
their model that takes taxes into consideration in a follow-up paper (Modigliani and Miller 
(1963)). Their modified version revealed different results that match the work of Durand 
(1958). Higher debt and lower equity would result in a lower cost of capital and a higher 
shareholders' value due to the effect of tax shield. Thus, the lowest WACC is at 100% debt 
level. In practice, a 100% debt financed firm never exists. At high levels of debt, borrowing 
capacity is limited, bankruptcy costs and costs of financial distress increase. Myers (1994, p. 
575) stated that: "Our theories don’t seem to explain actual financing behavior, and it seems 
presumptuous to advise firms on optimal structure when we are so far from explaining actual 




 At the time the MM theory was first published, the effect of information asymmetry 
had not yet been presented by researchers, so this factor was not considered. However, 
subsequent studies, from the mid-1970s onward, did consider this effect. The pioneering 
work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) was the first attempt to consider information asymmetry 
and agency costs as a key factor in firms' capital structures. They combined elements from 
theory of agency, property rights, and theory of finance to come up with what they called 
"theory of ownership structure of the firm" Their theory suggested that agency costs can be 
quantified as the sum of monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures 
by the agent, and the residual losses resulting from the divergence between agents' decisions 
and decisions that might have otherwise maximised the welfare of the principals. They 
suggested that the elimination of information asymmetry and agency costs could take place if 
the management of the firm owns 100% of it. However, as soon as outsiders begin to buy 
shares, which is the case in most firms nowadays, agency costs arise from the divergence of 
interests between outsider shareholders and insider managers. Finally, increasing debt 
financing would decrease agency costs as long as the remaining equity is owned by 
management only. Although the last point is not practical in real world because normally 
firms will have external shareholders, as opposed to insiders alone, it was a signal that agency 
costs and information problems could be reduced by using the appropriate capital structure. 
The study of Jensen and Meckling (1976) has opened the door for other studies to consider 
the agency costs and asymmetric information when designing the capital structure.  
Three lines of thought regarding the relationship between capital structure and 
information asymmetry were presented over the following years that were differentiated in a 
comprehensive review by Klein et al. (2002) as (i) the leverage signaling with investment 
fixed, (ii) signaling and new investment, and (iii) leverage adjustments and market timing. 
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The first deals with the signal that is conveyed to investors through a firm's capital structure 
without raising new capital to finance a new investment. The second is concerned with how 
firms finance new investments using either debt or equity and how this decision is interpreted 
by the market. The third, which was earlier presented in the section on information 
asymmetry and timing of the issue, examined the effect of timing of the issue on the signal 
conveyed to the investors. Each of these lines of research is presented in the next sections 
along with the empirical studies that examined each of them.  
 First, the leverage signaling with fixed investment is presented. One of the early 
attempts to consider the signal conveyed to investors through the firm's capital structure was 
the model by Ross (1977) where the author illustrated how the choice of debt level can signal 
firm performance to investors. Ross pointed out that managers have more information about 
the firm than shareholders, and they use this informational advantage to send signals to the 
market. His idea was that firms would not use high debt levels unless they have high future 
expected cash flows to avoid bankruptcy risk. Thus, high-valued firms can use high amount 
of debt to send a signal about its expected future success. In other words, using debt rather 
than equity sends better signals to shareholders and using equity send the opposite signals. 
 In the same year, Leland and Pyle (1977) presented another fundamental model in 
which ownership structure provides a signal about the quality of firms. In their model, the 
authors argue that managers of high-quality firms distinguish their firms by retaining a large 
ownership stake. To do so also requires the use of a higher debt level and lower outside 
equity. Their verification was that managers who are risk-averse would not own a large stake 
of costly equity. Thus, managers of high-quality firms would own a large stake because they 
believe that their equity is less costly. This derives the compatibility of the signal that using 
higher debt by managers who own large stakes sends a good signal about the quality of the 
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firm to the market. The authors' findings match the predictions of Ross (1977) that a positive 
correlation exists between using debt financing and quality of the firm.  
 A further study on the link between capital structure and asymmetry of information 
(Heinkel, 1982) showed that the capital suppliers (investors) will try to reduce the 
information gap and estimate prices of securities correctly. They do so by designing the 
financing mixture of debt and equity that eliminates insiders' adverse incentives. Heinkel 
(1982, p.1141) concluded that, "Necessary conditions for a costless separating equilibrium 
are developed to show that the amount of debt used by a firm is monotonically related to its 
unobservable true value." His conclusion was based on the assumption that information 
asymmetry is about the mean and variance of returns. He assumes that a positive relation 
exists between the mean and variance returns and that this relation drives his signaling 
equilibrium. At this equilibrium, higher-value firms, that are more risky, were found to use 
more debt to signal their quality. This finding is also consistent with findings of Ross (1977), 
and Leland and Pyle (1977). However, this theory did not consider the bankruptcy costs 
unlike Ross (1977), but assumed that managers own the firm and therefore try to design a 
capital structure to maximize their own benefit.   
 Subsequent studies were consistent with the findings of Ross (1977); Leland and Pyle 
(1977); and Heinkel (1982). For example Blazenko (1987), and Ravid and Sarig (1991) 
presented models that found a positive correlation between financial leverage and firm 
quality. The only model that suggested a different viewpoint was that developed by Brick et 
al. (1998). This model estimated that information asymmetry is only about variance of returns 
rather than the mean return. Their proposition was that when information is symmetric, the 
variance determines the optimal level of leverage, however, when information is asymmetric, 
a low level of leverage is associated with a low variance. Thus, they concluded that high-
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quality firms have low levels of debt; a finding that contradicts all previous models. This 
model assumed that investors are risk-neutral. As Klein et al. (2002, p.323) argued, "Lower 
variance usually implies other differences in firm value under risk aversion."       
 The empirical studies that examined the capital structure signaling models assumed 
that better quality is measured by higher profitability. Thus, based on most of the models 
discussed, more profitable firms tend to have higher leverage level to signal their quality and 
value to the market. However, empirical studies yielded opposite results. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) found a negative cross-sectional relation between leverage and firm profitability. This 
finding was empirically confirmed by subsequent studies (Rajan and Zinagales, 1995; Fama 
and French, 2002). Even when considering the firms' book values of assets rather than 
profitability, these studies still found a negative relation between leverage and market-to-
book ratio. However, Klein et al. (2002) noted that cross-sectional analysis might not be the 
most appropriate method to test the signaling models as the signal might be lost in the noise 
of various factors determining the capital structure. They assert that using event studies might 
be a better alternative to evaluate signaling models.  
 One of the implications of signaling models is that if managers expect higher future 
profitability, they would instruct a capital structure with a higher debt level through a 
leverage-increasing transaction. Empirically, this would be reflected by a positive (negative) 
stock price reaction to a leverage increasing (decreasing) transaction. A leverage-changing 
transaction could take one of different forms according to Klein et al. (2002): exchange 
offers, forced conversion of bonds to stocks, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and share 
repurchases. This implication was examined by numerous event studies. Harris and Raviv 
(1991) reviewed various event studies from the 1980s and found that, on average, the 
announcements about leverage-increasing transactions result in higher share price while 
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leverage-decreasing announcements resulted in a decline in share price. The exception was 
when public debt was used to increase leverage where the impact on share price was 
insignificant. This finding is consistent with the theory of capital structure signaling.   
Among the event studies that examined leverage-changing transactions and their 
impact on share price were Copeland and Lee (1991) and Born and McWilliams (1997) who 
examined the effect of exchange D/E and E/D swaps and found a positive impact of leverage-
increasing transactions on share price. Various studies examined share repurchases, a 
common debt-increasing corporate event. Share repurchases when investment is fixed means 
that the capital structure tends to have less equity and more debt. This is why scholars have 
viewed share repurchases as a capital structure signaling announcement.  
Among the studies that examined share repurchase announcements were Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (1991); Howe et al. (1992) and Maxwell and Stephens (2003). SEOs were 
tested by Brous (1992); Choe et al. (1993); and Clarke et al. (2001). Those studies among 
many others supported the hypothesis that announcements of leverage-increasing transactions 
such as share repurchase result in a positive share price reaction while leverage-decreasing 
transactions such as conversion of debt into equity and SEOs result in a negative price 
reaction. Furthermore, Erwin and Miller (1998) found a negative reaction for competitors' 
share price when the firm engages in leverage-increasing transaction. Vermaelen (1984) and 
McNally (1999) were among the studies that have examined share repurchases without 
introducing new investments. Both models used a managerial incentive structure similar to 
the one founded by Leland and Pyle (1977) and found that better-performing firms buy back 
shares so as to distinguish themselves from lower-quality ones. As McNally (1999, p.55) 
mentioned, "firms that repurchase more have higher earnings; and holding proportion 
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constant, firms where insiders have a greater ownership stake have higher earnings" This 
finding matches all previous models except that of Brick et al. (1998). 
 Unlike the studies of leverage-increasing transactions that firmly supported the 
signaling hypothesis of debt, event studies that examined the impact of announcements about 
direct issuance of debt revealed mixed results. Some studies found insignificant impact on 
share prices after corporate debt announcements like Dann and Mikkelson (1984) and 
Shyam-Sunder (1991). Howton et al. (1998) found a negative reaction regardless of dividend 
or earnings announcements. These event studies indicated that debt issuance announcements 
might reveal information to the market, but they did not support the capital structure 
signaling models due to the variability of their results. 
 Nonetheless, capital structure transactions also affect long-term performance as well 
as the stock price reaction discussed before. Empirical studies indicated a positive long-term 
performance for leverage-increasing transactions, a finding that supports the theoretical 
assertions of Ross (1977); Leland and Pyle (1977); Heinkel (1982); and Ravid and Sarig 
(1991).  Dann et al. (1991) found an increase in firms' earnings after share repurchases - a 
leverage-increasing decision. Moreover, Cornett and Travlos (1989) support the hypothesis 
that leverage-increasing events have a positive impact on earnings while leverage-decreasing 
events affect earnings negatively. Copeland and Lee (1991) found a decrease in systematic 
risk after leverage-increasing exchange offers. Unlike the previous studies, Born and 
McWilliams (1997) found no certain pattern subsequent to exchange offers. Although 
positive share price reactions cannot be attributed to firm growth directly, the positive long-
term performance suggested by most of those studies could be directly linked to firm growth.  
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 The empirical studies that examined the capital structure with fixed investment given 
the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders indicated that there is a 
signal conveyed to the market through the mix of debt and equity in firms' capital structure 
and changes in leverage level. On the one hand, many studies support the signal hypothesis 
that using more debt is considered a positive signal to the market and is reflected in higher 
share price, earnings, and operating profits. Among these studies are Copeland and Lee 
(1991); Born and McWilliams (1997); Lie et al. (2001). However, the existence of empirical 
evidence concerning negative reactions as described in Manuel et al. (1993), and Howton et 
al. (1998) hinders the reliability of the hypothesis. On the other hand, lower leverage, using 
more equity rather than debt, was found by most studies to have a negative impact on share 
price, earnings, and operating performance. For example, Hansen and Crutchley (1990); 
McLaughlin et al. (1996); Loughran and Ritter (1997) all reported a negative impact of 
equity-increasing transactions. The author has found studies that report no impact or 
insignificant changes, for example Healy and Palepu (1990), but has not found any literature 
reporting a positive impact. 
 The previous models and the empirical studies discussed above, considered changes 
in firms' capital structure without the need to raise funds to finance a new project. The 
following models and theories consider the mechanism of raising funds required for a new 
investment given the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. In other 
words, the following models try to estimate which method of financing new investments is 
more effective given the existence of information asymmetry.   
 The difference between the following theories and empirical studies emerges mainly 
from the usage of new issues rather than rigid changes within the same amount of capital. 
This line of thought emerged through a number of theories and models that are presented in 
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the following text, beginning with the Trade-Off theory first described by Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973). The Trade-Off theory was originated according to Frank and Goyal 
(2005) to avoid the extreme proposition of 100% debt in the MM theory. Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) refuted the 100% debt by stating that firms have an optimal leverage 
level that reflects a trade-off between the tax shield benefits of debt and the bankruptcy costs 
associated with high leverage level. Myers (1984) asserted that firms try to gradually move 
towards this optimal leverage level where they balance the benefit and cost of debt.  
Because firms survive for more than a single period, the process of moving towards 
an optimal leverage level takes a dynamic rather than a static phase. Thus, dynamic trade-off 
models by Kane et al. (1984) and Brennan and Schwartz (1984) analyse this continuous 
process by incorporating uncertainty, tax benefits, and bankruptcy costs. Their models 
included the effects of agency problems where they assumed that managers work for the best 
interest of shareholders. If this is the case, then lenders would have a valid reason to fear the 
existence of the agency problem as managers might take decisions that benefit the 
shareholders at the expense of lenders. Due to the fact that information asymmetry exists, 
lenders would require guarantee that their money is invested at an appropriate level of risk. 
This guarantee might take the form of monitoring the management performance. 
Furthermore, restrictive covenants might be mentioned in the lending agreement. For 
example, dividends should not exceed a certain amount to make sure that the firm maintains 
enough cash to meet future debt obligations. Other restrictions might be imposed on 
investment in risky projects or disposal of assets. Those covenants, along with monitoring 
costs, are considered an extra burden on firms and might hinder the ability of firms to invest 
in certain profitable projects. For this reason, firms may not increase debt financing beyond 
certain level due to increasing agency costs of debt.  
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Unlike the Trade-Off theory, the Pecking Order theory by Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) favored the usage of debt rather than equity to promote firm growth. The 
theory proposed that investors believe that managers know better about the firm especially 
when it comes to the firm's value, future outlook, and sources of risk. Thus, when the firm 
tries to finance a new investment, it faces an adverse selection problem because the employed 
financing tool would always be conveyed to investors as a signal of management’s perception 
towards the firm's future. On the one hand, when management decides to issue new equity, 
investors will think that management believes the firm is overvalued and that would lead to a 
drop in share price. On the other hand, issuance of debt would be perceived by investors as a 
signal of management's confidence in the profitability of the proposed investments and in the 
firm's ability to pay off its debt obligations.  
Based on these propositions, the authors argued that firms typically follow a specific 
order when considering sources of financing. This order is: internal source to be used first to 
eliminate any interference, monitoring, or restrictive covenants from outsiders, then external 
sources. Thus, retained earnings are used first as an internal financing source then debt as a 
preferable external source and finally the last resort which is issuance of equity.  
The work of Myers and Majluf (1984) proposed that firms with high information 
asymmetry should rely on debt financing. Only if the firm is facing low information 
asymmetry, it might use equity financing. The reason behind this order is the message that is 
conveyed to investors from the type of issue. The model illustrated that equity is issued only 
when it is overvalued, as a firm may pass up some growth opportunities if their equity is 
undervalued. Logically, if a firm is using equity financing, the likelihood is that it is 
overvalued at that point in time, conveying a negative signal to outside investors.   
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In support of the Pecking Order's hypothesis that favors debt financing over equity 
financing, a seminal theory was presented by Jensen (1986) that offered a different view of 
the agency costs of debt. Jensen proposed that debt financing has benefits in motivating 
management efficiency. He calls these benefits "Control Hypothesis" for debt creation. The 
author argued that firms with substantial free cash flow can either distribute dividends or 
repurchase stock. This is because the only other option is for the firm to invest in low return 
projects. The management control over free cash flow does not appeal to investors. Thus, 
even if management promises to pay permanently increasing dividends, investors would not 
trust such promises because dividends might be reduced in the foreseeable future. Dividends 
reduction is always punished in the stock market with large stock price reductions. What 
Jensen suggested as a solution to this dilemma was to issue debt instead of paying dividends 
as the former enables managers to effectively bond their promise to pay out future cash flows. 
In other words, unlike dividends, debt's principal and interest are legal obligations that make 
investors confident that the managers will have to pay out the excessive free cash and in turn 
decrease the amount of cash that managers have on hand available for spending at their 
discretion. Based on this idea, Jensen (1986) concluded that debt plays an important role in 
reducing the agency costs of free cash flow and narrow the gaps caused by information 
asymmetry. 
Although the above concept, along with the tax shield effect (interest is tax deductible) 
would favour the use of debt over equity, which is consistent with the pecking order theory, 
Jensen did not ignore the costs of debt in his study nor the cases in which this effect of debt 
will be insignificant. For example, firms without large free cash flow and firms that have 
profitable investment opportunities or high growth rates will not endure the benefits of the 
control hypothesis. This is partially in alignment with the propositions of the trade-off theory 
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in a sense that it offers a chance for reducing debt financing in certain cases, unlike the 
pecking order theory that favors debt regardless of other circumstances facing the firm. Thus, 
Jensen's theory could be considered as a middle point between the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory in a sense that it favors debt financing over equity but still leaves room 
for reducing debt and relying more on equity in certain circumstances. 
Several models were presented on the basis of the pecking order theory that tried to 
relax its assumptions. For example, Bradford (1987) presented a model where managers can 
trade in the firm's shares. This allows the firm to engage in more investment opportunities as 
this trade might mitigate some of the undervaluation effects. Viswanath (1993) presented a 
model with multi-period financing. The proposition of the model was that firms might use 
equity in the first period and then shift to debt in later periods if needed depending on the 
information signaled by the market. Daniel and Titman (1995) assumed that no adverse 
selection will occur if firm variances are unequal while firm value is known by the market. In 
this case, issuing equity would not send a negative signal to the market. Those models 
examined the signal revealed by issuance of new equity to finance new investments.  
Other models assumed that both equity and debt can be issued to finance the same 
investment opportunity. A study by Narayanan (1988) extended the work of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and allowed the firm to issue risky debt to finance new investments. As the 
study demonstrates, issuing debt, even if it is risky, is favorable for high growth firms 
because it separates them from less quality firms. Hence, even if signaling effect is ignored, 
debt is still better than equity as a mean of separating high quality from low quality firms. 
Another model by Heinkel and Zechner (1990) went further to account not only for debt, but 
also for preferred stocks. In their model, debt is issued initially to mitigate the 
underinvestment behavior. Given the tax benefit, managers tend to issue more debt which 
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creates an underinvestment problem. Issuing preferred stocks could solve this problem and 
allows issuance for more debt without creating underinvestment. Thus, the model is 
consistent with the pecking order theory that debt, preferred stocks, and common shares are 
used to develop an optimal capital structure. 
Information asymmetry and adverse selection problems were emphasized in a study by 
Noe and Rebello (1996), in which they offered various scenarios for control and capital 
structure subject to information asymmetry. The proposition of the theory is that in absence 
of information asymmetry, shareholders would prefer debt financing to benefit from their 
control over earnings and the cash that management captures. However, managers prefer 
equity financing to maximise their rent appropriation. Introducing information asymmetry to 
this equation might change the preferences of both the managers and shareholders – 
suggesting that the shareholders would base their preference for either debt or equity on the 
tradeoff between costs of payments to management and costs of adverse selection. Thus, 
shareholders might prefer equity financing if the costs of adverse selection are greater than 
costs of cash paid to managerial staff. On the other hand, managers would prefer debt 
financing if the costs of adverse selection are high even on the expense of their benefit. With 
the given managerial control over firms, managers would prefer relying on higher debt 
financing as it conveys favorable information to the market. This theory suggests that 
information asymmetry can lead to debt financing being the favoured finance mechanism, 
supporting the patterns observed in Pecking Order theory. 
Two studies advocate that there is a link between information asymmetry and the 
financing decision and found that it runs both ways. Boot and Thakor (1993) suggest that 
good firms will separate their securities so that some of them are information-sensitive, (e.g 
equity issues) to encourage investors to produce information. They suggest that equilibrium 
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will be reached because bad firms follow this path of good firms so as not to be identified in 
the market. Similarly, a study by Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) expands on the previous work 
and consider the costs of information and its impact on the choice of financing tool. They 
also allow for noisy information from outsider investors. Their findings were that the choice 
of equity or debt depends on the costs of acquiring information, the information production 
technology, and the level of information asymmetry. Insiders might prefer equity to debt 
although it is a more sensitive security to increase informed trading in the market. Thus, debt 
is favored when the cost of acquiring information is high while equity is preferred when low 
and when acquiring the information is a precise process. They also suggested that growing 
firms and young firms tend to use equity financing while mature firms tend to be debt 
financed.  
This theory contradicts the Pecking Order theory as it suggests that under information 
asymmetry, usage of equity financing rather than risky debt is preferred. It also implies that 
growth opportunities are better financed by equity rather than by debt which is consistent 
with the Trade-Off theory. Numerous empirical studies have examined the suggestion of both 
viewpoints, some of which are presented in the following text.  
 The empirical studies that examined the different tools of financing a new investment 
when information asymmetry exists revealed mixed results. For example, early event studies 
that examined the Pecking Order hypothesis like Amihud et al. (1990) and Chaplinsky (1993) 
found supporting evidence for the pecking order, while Korajczyk et al. (1993) rejected the 
hypothesis. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found mixed evidence where some of their tests 
rejected the hypothesis while others could not reject it. Jung et al. (1996) reported significant 
negative returns associated with announcements of equity issuance while for debt the 
negative returns were insignificant. However, they did also find that some firms financed 
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good investments using equity. Also, they found that firms with larger total assets; that are 
closely followed by financial analysts, tend to be financed by debt. This contradicts the 
Pecking Order that assumes that the lower the information asymmetry, the higher the 
dependence on equity financing.  
 Further support for the Pecking Order theory was suggested by McLaughlin et al. 
(1998), who reported larger post-issue declines in operating performance for equity issues 
than debt issues. This result holds even after controlling for other variables affecting long 
term performance like free cash flow and investment in tangible assets. D'Mello and Ferris 
(2000) support the pecking order because they found significant negative announcement 
returns for firms with high information asymmetry. Nevertheless, Helwege and Liang (1996) 
reject the pecking order as they found that small, high-growth firms do not infer from 
external financing but they tend to use equity as likely as they issue debt. However, they 
found that firms with surplus funds avoid capital markets in general, which is consistent with 
the pecking order that advocates internal financing to the external one.  
 Although the Pecking Order and the Trade-Off theories are not mutually exclusive, 
some studies tried to distinguish between them using the same data set. Shyam-Sunders and 
Myers (1999) compared them using the statistical power of variances in debt ratios over time. 
Their assumption was that changes in debt ratios are due to the need for external financing 
rather than a movement toward the optimal debt level. After testing both models 
independently using regression analysis, they found that both can verify the changes in debt 
level. However, the Pecking Order theory had the higher explanatory power. Further 
empirical analysis that they used found similar results for both theories. Thus, they found that 
both models cannot be rejected but more confidence is awarded to the Pecking Order 
hypothesis over the Trade-Off. Chirinko and Singha (2000) addressed what they saw as a 
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shortcoming in the Shyam-Sunders and Myers model, including the debt capacity and net 
equity issues in their analysis. After including those variables, using the same model, their 
results did not reject the pecking order, but found that the order of preference for debt over 
equity is reversed implying the need for further tests to be conducted.  
 Using more recent data than Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal 
(2000) found that debt level is not determined by the financing deficit as the earlier proposed. 
In contrast to the asymmetric information implications of the Pecking Order, they found that 
large firms with moderate leverage were the most consistent with the Pecking Order. Using 
other samples, they found that none of the predictions of the pecking order were fulfilled. 
Nevertheless, they found supporting evidence for the trade-off hypothesis using a conditional 
and unconditional target adjustment framework that tests mean reversion in financing 
behavior. Therefore, this study favored the trade-off hypothesis and rejected the pecking 
order.  
 Another attempt to test the Pecking Order theory against the Trade-Off theory was 
presented by Hovakimian et al. (2001) who allowed the target debt ratio to change over time. 
Their results were consistent with the Pecking Order in the short term. However, they also 
found that profitable firms with low leverage tend to issue debt rather than equity, supporting 
the target debt hypothesis advocated by the Trade-Off theory. Thus, their analysis suggested 
that different conditions can either favour the Pecking Order or the Trade-Off theory. Fama 
and French (2002) also found mixed results after several comparisons between the two 
approaches using an extensive data set. Some of their tests support aspects from both theories 
while other tests reject both. Therefore, they did not draw any firm conclusions about either 
theories and proposed further investigation about the topic.  
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These propositions of Fama and French (2002) and the fact that the above studies 
revealed mixed results opened the door for more recent studies to examine both theories. 
Harvey et al. (2011) examined firms in different markets including both developed and 
emerging markets. The objective of their study was to examine whether debt can reduce the 
impact of the agency problems in emerging markets where agency costs were found to be 
considerably high. Their findings concluded that debt can reduce the impact of agency 
problems, especially for firms most likely to have overinvestment problems. The results also 
indicate that shareholders benefit from "intensively monitored debt" in firms where 
information asymmetry is severe and managers are more likely to exploit shareholders. Thus, 
this study favours the use of debt in emerging markets where agency costs are high, 
suggesting that the Pecking Order hypothesis holds under these circumstances. Nevertheless, 
Frank and Goyal (2009) examined the capital structure behavior for U.S firms over the period 
from 1950-2003 and found supporting evidence for some versions of the Trade-Off theory 
not the Pecking Order hypothesis.  
Lemmon and Zender (2010) studied a large sample of firms over a 30-year period, 
examining the impact of debt capacity on financing behavior. They found that as long as 
firms have a capacity to issue more debt, that debt is preferred to equity issuance. Moreover, 
they reconcile the issuance of equity by small, high-growing firms with the Pecking Order 
propositions, concluding that the Pecking Order gives a good description of the financing 
behavior for their sample. Leary and Roberts (2010) concluded that the Pecking Order theory 
was verified in only part of their sample of financing decisions, claiming that decisions are 
not driven by information asymmetry but rather by incentive conflicts between managers, 
shareholders, and debt holders.  
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Morellec and Schurhoff (2011) examined investment and financing behavior under 
information asymmetry and demonstrated that the latter might not be translated into a 
hierarchy or a ‘pecking order’ for financing instruments. This finding contradicts the pecking 
order hypothesis. Gao and Zhu (2012) examined the relation between capital structure, 
information asymmetry, and the cost of capital in different countries. They found that firms 
with more information asymmetry tend to use more debt to finance investments but tend to 
avoid long-term debt. This finding is less common in countries with more disclosure 
requirements. Depending more on debt financing is consistent with the findings of Brav 
(2009) who found that private firms in the UK rely heavily on debt financing and have higher 
leverage ratios than public firms. Both studies supported the usage of debt over equity which 
supports, in part, the Pecking Order hypothesis.  
A number of studies have been found that contradict the pecking order theory. In 
"Pecking (dis)order", Fulghieri et al. (2013) argued that equity financing dominates debt 
financing under information asymmetry. They proposed that firms prefer equity financing 
and then shift towards debt as they mature. Moreover, firms having debt in their capital 
structure find issuing equity more attractive than issuing more debt. The conclusion of the 
study suggests that the relationship between asymmetric information and the financing 
instruments is weaker than previously believed. However, those findings are not empirically 
tested to validate this argument or refute it.  
From this survey of the literature, it appears that studies can be found that support both 
the Trade-Off and Pecking Order theories, depending on the assumptions (where a model is 
described) or the sample (in empirical studies). However, from this survey, a greater number 
of studies appear to support the Pecking Order hypothesis than the trade-off theory. The root 
of the pecking order theory is the existence of asymmetric information because management 
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knows more than outsiders and makes the financing decision based on that knowledge. The 
researcher notes that if the Pecking Order theory can be used to partly explain corporate 
financing patterns, the use of internal financing may correspond to management’s plan for 
sustainable growth rates. This depends on raising internal finance mainly through decreasing 
dividend payout in order to finance firm growth projects. This conclusion shows that for 
financing a new investment, management may use internal financing to avoid the 
complications of agency problems associated with information asymmetry as much as 
possible. If internal financing is depleted, debt financing - the financing option that is less 
information-sensitive - is preferred to equity especially at high level of information 
asymmetry.  
 To sum up, the development of theories and empirical studies that considered the debt 
signal under fixed investment presented in section 2.4.1 tends, in general, to support higher 
levels of leverage. Empirical findings by most studies surveyed here found a negative relation 
between equity announcements on one side, and share price reaction, earnings, and long-term 
operating performance on the other side. This finding suggests, in turn, a negative relation 
between equity financing and firm growth. However, the findings that presented the financing 
decision when a new investment is available varied greatly. Some studies support the Pecking 
Order hypothesis that advocates a hierarchy where debt financing is preferred to external 
equity financing. This theory focuses on the signal conveyed to the market from the type of 
issue where issuance of equity is an unfavorable signal about the firm being overvalued, 
while debt issue is a signal of management's confidence in the ability of the firm to repay 
debt obligations. Other studies support the Trade-Off theory that balances the benefits and 
costs of debt financing. It places much emphasis on tax benefits and bankruptcy costs rather 
than the asymmetry of information between managers and shareholders.  
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Existing empirical evidence could not select a more accurate or a "better" theory as 
some studies support some aspects of both or neither theories while other studies supported 
one of them and rejected the other. The theory of free cash flow by Jensen (1986) presented a 
moderator between both as it supported the Pecking Order's proposition that debt financing 
has a priority over equity financing because debt limits the cash available for managers to 
dispose. However, it still left room for equity financing to dominate in certain circumstances. 
Finally, the timing of equity issues was found by most studies to be an important element in 
reducing the impact of information asymmetry. Financing decision, like any major decision 
taken by firm's management, is believed to have an impact on the growth of the firm.  
As shown in the previous section, various theoretical developments of the theory and 
a substantial number of empirical studies were dedicated to the information asymmetry and 
capital structure; financing decision. However, only the theory of free cash flow by Jensen 
(1986) suggested a relation between financing decision and firm growth. Jensen's proposition 
that free cash might affect firms' performance was strengthened later on by the findings of 
Brush et al. (2000) who found that firms with free cash flow gain less from sales growth than 
firms without free cash due to agency considerations. Thus, if Jensen's proposition holds, 
firms shall use free cash flow in raising debt financing to mitigate agency problems. This 
implies that debt financing helps firms to benefit more from sales growth under the existence 
of agency conflicts and information asymmetry. 
Some of the empirical studies that examine financing decisions and firms' growth are 
summarised in Frank and Goyal (2005). They conclude that the effect of agency costs on debt 
financing can be extended to further effects on a firm’s future expansions and growth, 
explaining that:" The static trade-off theory predicts a negative relation between leverage 
and growth. Growth firms lose more of their value when they go into distress. Several agency 
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theories also predict a negative relation between leverage and growth. For example, the 
underinvestment problem is more severe for growth firms leading these firms to prefer less 
debt." This assertion was built on  the findings of several studies, including Long and Malitz 
(1985); Smith and Watts (1992); Barclay et al. (2003); and Frank and Goyal (2004) who used 
market value of assets to book value of assets as a measure of growth opportunities and found 
that, in general, market-to-book ratio is negatively related to leverage. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) found that this negative relation exists in all G7 countries. Frank and Goyal (2005) 
and their supporting studies, who were advocates of the Trade-Off hypothesis, conclude that 
the higher the debt levels the lower the growth opportunities of firms.  
Nonetheless, more recent empirical examinations by Lemmon and Zender (2010, 
p.1185) could not find a definite association between financing decision and firm growth, 
arguing that: "an issue left to future research is the interaction between the growth in assets, 
profitability, and financing. We have implicitly assumed that asset growth and profitability 
are exogenous to the financing decision in this analysis." Thus, they do not support the 
previous finding that lower leverage is associated with higher firm growth.  
As we have seen so far, most prior studies that examined the link between corporate 
financing behavior of firms and agency theory concentrated on the following issues i) the 
impact of the financing decision on share price, ii) the signal conveyed to investors, and iii) 
the effect on operating performance. This section extends the discussion by considering the 
impact of financing decisions on firm growth. Frank and Goyal (2005) and their supporting 
studies that predict a negative relation between a firm's leverage level and growth 
opportunities advocates the Trade-Off theory which places a lower emphasis on agency 
considerations and information asymmetry as much as tax considerations and bankruptcy 
costs. The gap in literature on the research topic is clear in the assertion of Lemmon and 
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Zender (2010) that future research should examine the interaction between financing and 
growth in assets. Thus, this research expands the work of Frank and Goyal (2005) which 
suggested that lower leverage level is associated with higher firm growth by including the 
impact of different levels of information asymmetry on the interaction between financing and 
firm growth.    
The assertions of Frank and Goyal could hold for firms facing low level of 
information asymmetry where it has less impact on operating performance and earnings; 
however, it might not be the case for firms facing high level of information asymmetry. 
Using equity financing for firms with high information asymmetry might hinder their ability 
to raise capital or at least would increase their cost of capital as investors will require extra 
return owing to the higher perceived risk. This would hinder the abilities of such firms to 
invest in growth opportunities or at least decrease its benefits from growth options in 
comparison to firms facing low information asymmetry. To further understand the influences 
on financing decisions, corporate investment and dividend policies must also be considered 
(Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967; Lee et al., 2010).  
2.4.2 Dividend decision and information asymmetry 
At theoretical level, when firms make profits, they have two alternatives for the 
disposal of cash; retain it for further investment or distribute it to shareholders in the form of 
dividends. The amount kept for investment is the retained earnings, which is the first source 
of financing as proposed by the Pecking Order theory. The decision of whether to pay 
dividends or retain earnings is the second major decision examined in this research. Lintner 
(1956) presented a survey of management's preference for dividend policy and found that 
managers tend to prefer a consistent payout pattern and that dividends are tied to the long-
term earnings of firms. 
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The dividend decision is directly linked to the financing decision discussed in the 
previous section as Easterbrook (1984, p.652) explains:" Dividends exist because they 
influence the firms' financing policies, because they dissipate cash and induce firms to float 
new securities." Therefore, paying out dividend to shareholders decreases the amount of cash 
available for financing and vice versa. The relevance of dividend decision in evaluating share 
price or the value of the firm was first proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1961), in their 
dividend irrelevance theory.  
 Before the introduction of the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the role 
of the agency problem in corporate decisions was not considered. Thus, the theories that 
examined the dividend policy before this did not consider the agency costs or information 
asymmetry associated with the dividend decision. According to Modigliani and Miller 
(1961), the distribution of earnings to shareholders does not affect the value of the firm, 
which is rather affected by the firm's risk and earning power. Thus, investment decisions are 
the key to valuing firms rather than the dividend decisions. Also, according to this theory, the 
dividend decision has no impact on the firm's growth. MM validated their theory using the 
dividend yield model, showing that dividend decision was irrelevant in determining the value 
of firms. Their argument was based on several assumptions: there is no corporate or personal 
tax, a perfect market exists where no transaction costs, a firm's investment policies are 
independent from its dividend decisions, and the market is efficient in a sense that managers 
and investors have the same information about future investment alternatives. 
 The assumptions of the MM irrelevance theory have been criticised for ignoring taxes 
and transaction costs. Thus, development in the theory considered imperfect markets with 
taxes, transaction costs, and preferences of investors. The pioneer work of Gordon (1963) and 
Lintner (1962) resulted in Gordon/Lintner "bird-in-hand" theory that was the first "relevant" 
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theory of dividend decision. The assumptions of this theory were that investors value firms 
that have higher payout ratios more than firms that pay lower dividends; where investors 
benefit from capital gains; the increase in market price of their shares. Therefore, firms that 
pay more dividends have higher market values than firms that do not pay dividends or pay 
less than its peers. Thus, unlike MM propositions, Gordon and Lintner suggested that 
dividend decision is relevant in a firm's valuation.  
 Further development in dividend relevance theories resulted in the "tax differential 
theory" first proposed by Brennan (1970) and advanced by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1979). This theory is consistent with the bird-in-hand theory in its proposition of the 
relevance of dividends. However, it contradicts the former in its assumptions. Tax differential 
theory assumes that firms that pay lower dividends are more valuable for investors due to tax 
considerations because in some countries the tax rate on dividend payments is higher than tax 
on capital gains. Thus, investors will be better off when they receive low dividends but are 
rewarded instead by capital gains. This is why the theory suggests that the highest valued 
firms are those that pay no or small dividends and retain all or most of the earnings for future 
investments. 
 A middle-ground approach between the tax differential theory and the bird-in-hand 
theory is the "Dividend Clientele effect" proposed by Pettit (1977) who found empirical 
evidence on investors' preferences of dividend payments. As the study suggests, different 
groups of investors have different dividend preferences. For example, low income investors 
might need a higher payout to support their consumption needs, whereas high income 
investors who pay higher tax rate might prefer low dividend payout ratio. This theory 
suggested that dividend policy is irrelevant; consistent with the propositions of MM and 
contradicting the bird-in-hand and tax differential theories. The reason behind this irrelevance 
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according to Pettit (1977) is that investors normally shift their investments in or out of a firm 
based on their preference until equilibrium is reached at which the payout policy of any firm 
is consistent with the clientele or the preferences of its shareholders.  
 The above theories do not contradict but rather complement each other. The 
differences between their propositions result mainly from the corporate and personal tax 
treatment. Thus, in different countries with different tax systems the applicability of theories 
differs. For example, in countries with higher personal taxes relative to corporate taxes, firms 
would tend to pay smaller dividends and vice versa. This might be the reason why each of the 
above scholars was able to reconcile their empirical data with their respective theory. 
However, with the introduction of another two key factors: the agency problem and 
information asymmetry associated with it, the researchers of dividends behaviour shifted their 
attention from tax considerations to agency and signalling ones.  
 Following the introduction of agency theory and the information asymmetry concepts 
in early 1970s, dividend models started to incorporate such fundamentals when examining 
the dividend behaviour. Ross (1977) presented an early attempt to link information 
asymmetry with the dividend decision in inefficient markets. He argued that management 
could use the dividend policy to signal information to the less informed shareholders. For 
example, a higher payout ratio would signal higher anticipated profits. This good signal is 
reflected in higher share prices. Thus, Ross (1977) agrees with the bird-in-hand propositions 
that firms that pay more in dividends are valued higher in the market. However, the 
difference between both theories is that bird-in-hand focuses on the preferences of investors 
in receiving cash on hand, while the Ross model focused on the role of information 
asymmetry and signalling effect.    
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 Development of the theory that contributed to Ross (1977) assumed that imperfect 
information exists and that taxes on cash dividends are higher than those implied on capital 
gains. Based on these propositions, if these conditions hold, the dividend policy can function 
as a signal for future cash flows (Bhattacharya, 1979). This is consistent with Ross (1977) 
model but incorporates the tax factor. Moreover, both models assume that the benefit from 
signalling would occur in current share prices or in case of liquidation, while the costs of the 
signal would take place in the future when the actual cash flows take place. Various models 
were developed in the 1980s that addressed the information content of changes in dividend 
policy and found supporting evidence for Bhattacharya’s propositions (John and Williams, 
1985; Miller and Rock, 1985; Ambarish et al., 1987).  
 Further developments in the theory tried to link the dividend policy to agency costs 
and mitigate asymmetry of information. Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) presented two 
pioneering studies in the linkage between agency problem and dividend policy. Rozeff (1982) 
presented a model in which the payout ratio is a function of the fraction of equity held by 
insiders, a firm's past and expected growth, a firm's beta coefficient, and the number of 
common stockholders. He suggested that the percentage of equity held by outsiders and the 
number of common stockholders are used as proxies to measure the agency costs. The larger 
the ownership base is, the more conflicts of interest would occur and higher agency costs 
would be incurred. His empirical test found that the coefficients were all significant and all 
affect the payout policy. Among the findings was that firms with high experienced or 
anticipated growth in revenues would establish lower payout ratios. However, when insiders 
hold a low share of the firm, a higher payout ratio is used to reduce agency conflicts of the 
dissipation of cash on hand. Thus, Rozeff (1982) suggested that the dividend policy could be 
used to mitigate agency conflicts caused by information asymmetry. 
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 Subsequently, Easterbrook (1984) presented new insights on how dividends could be 
used to reduce agency costs of managements' behaviour. He suggested that paying out more 
dividends to shareholders would reduce the funds available for managers. Thus, managers 
would regularly seek funds from financial markets where monitoring of managers' behavior 
is available at lower cost. Such monitoring could reduce the significance of information 
asymmetry. Easterbrook asserted that this could be the reason why firms in reality keep 
paying dividends and raise funds from the market. It is noted that while both Rozeff (1982) 
and Easterbrook (1984) suggested that dividend policy could be used to reduce agency 
conflicts, each suggest different reasons (reducing the cash available at management's 
discretion; and using external markets to monitor management's behaviour, respectively). 
 A different aspect of the usage of dividend policy to reduce the impact of agency 
problems and information asymmetry was developed by Jensen (1986), and was discussed in 
the previous section. Jensen (1986) highlighted the role of debt issues rather than dividends in 
reducing agency conflicts. His idea was that dividend is not a binding agreement by managers 
to disgorge cash as they might decrease the payout ratio in the future. Whereas debt is a 
binding contract to dissipate cash and thus reduce the amount of free cash available at 
management's discretion. This suggestion by Jensen (1986) presented a major challenge to 
the propositions of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) about the importance of dividend 
policy in reducing agency conflicts. Subsequent studies tried to empirically support either 
viewpoint.  
 Studies that examined the dividend behaviour focused on either the information signal 
or the agency considerations of the dividend policy. Empirical studies that examined the 
importance of dividend signalling in conveying information to the market revealed mixed 
results. Some of the studies that found significant role of dividend signalling include Beer 
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(1993); Brook and Hendershott (1998); and Balachandran and Nguyen (2004). These studies 
supported the Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) models. However, some other 
studies reject the assertion that information content in dividend signalling is important, such 
as Yoon and Starks (1995); Bernhardt et al. (2005); and Brav et al. (2005) who found no 
evidence that the information content of dividend signaling matters in the market. Unlike 
both approaches, DeAngelo et al. (1996) found that there is no evidence that dividend policy 
could distinguish firms that are more profitable. This is verified by the fact that dividend 
policies are normally stabilized whereas profitability varies from period to another. Thus, 
there is no definite conclusion about the importance of information content in dividend 
signaling due to the mixed empirical findings.  
Studies that have focused on dividend policy as a method of mitigating agency costs 
and/or reducing information asymmetry effects, include Borokhovich et al. (2005, p.42) who 
asserted that: "The results of studies on dividends and agency costs generally suggest that the 
dividend payout decision is significantly related to the degree of the agency costs within the 
firm." They supported their argument using the finding of Dempsey and Laber (1992) who 
found dividend payout to be negatively related to the level of insider stockholding and 
positively related to the number of common stockholders. Both insider stockholding and 
number of shareholders were used in their study as proxies for agency costs and severity of 
information asymmetry. Similarly, Noronha et al. (1996) who examined the relation between 
agency variables and payout ratios, found a positive relation for low growth firms among the 
payout ratio on the one hand, and the level of executive compensation and the presence of 
outside block holders on the other hand. The latter two were used as proxies for agency costs 
in this study. 
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 Building on the work of Rozeff (1982), Lloyd et al. (1985) offered an insight on the 
role of firm size in the payout policy. They found a significant relationship between the 
payout ratios on the one hand, and firm size and several agency variables (such as percentage 
of common shares held by insiders, number of shareholders, and number of shares per 
shareholder) on the other hand. Their analysis resulted in supporting evidence for the Rozeff 
(1982) theory that agency costs directly impact the payout ratio and that payout policy could 
be used to reduce agency conflicts, but added the understanding that firm size is important as 
well in determining the payout policy of firms.  
In a similar vein, Schooley and Barney Jr. (1994) presented an assumption that 
dividend policy and chief executive officer (CEO) stock ownership can interrelate together to 
reduce agency costs. They found a parabolic relation between payout and CEO ownership. 
Schooley and Barney Jr. (1994, p.372) concluded that, "Over low levels of CEO ownership, 
the observed negative relation between dividend yield and the CEO ownership percentage 
supports the agency cost explanation of corporate dividend policy. However, over high levels 
of ownership, the dividend yield begins to increase with further managerial stock ownership, 
implying there is a point beyond which CEO ownership fails to align CEOs' goals with the 
interests of other shareholders." The empirical findings of this study presented a new insight 
on the role of CEO ownership, especially that the results shifted beyond a certain point at 
which CEOs hold an intensive amount of shares. This implies that changes in ownership of 
CEOs affect the dividend policy. In this study, wherein CEO ownership was used as a proxy 
for measuring agency costs, this finding that ownership and dividend policy are interrelated 
supports the Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) propositions. 
Similarly, Moh'd et al. (1995) supported the relevance of the agency problem in 
designing the payout policy. Their regression analysis found that dividend policy is a function 
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of firm size, growth rate, ownership structure, operating/financial leverage mix, and 
bankruptcy risk. Moreover, firms act in order to minimise agency cost and transaction cost 
toward an optimal level of dividend payout. This holds across time as well as across firms. 
Finally, firms adjust their payout policy to respond to dynamic shifts in agency/ transaction 
costs. Crutchley et al. (1999) also found that dividend policy, among other variables such as 
leverage, insider ownership and institutional ownership, could work as control mechanisms 
for agency costs. 
Two agency models of dividend policy were outlined by La Porta et al. (2000); the 
outcome model and the substitute model. The outcome model of dividend behaviour suggests 
that dividend payments are a direct result of shareholders' pressure on the management to 
dissipate cash. The substitute model suggests that management distributes dividends to build 
a reputation for treatment of shareholders that would help in raising equity in the future. Both 
models are built on the agency concept but with different point of view. Empirical analysis of 
4000 firms from 33 countries with different level of shareholders' influence supported the 
outcome model that shareholders can affect the decision of insiders and enforce the 
distribution of dividends. Thus, this study supports the Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) 
theories.  
A major contribution of La Porta et al. (2000) was introducing the concept of 
shareholder protection which depends on the country's legal regime and its index of anti 
managerial rights. They used those two variables as proxies of the agency problem where 
high protection countries suffer less from agency issues and vice versa. Building on this 
proposition, Bartram et al. (2007) expanded this view and added a firm level agency variable 
and share repurchases as a possible substitute for paying dividends. Using a larger sample of 
29,610 firms from 43 countries from 2001-2006, they found that in high protection countries, 
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where the effect of agency problems is relatively lower, investors are able to enforce cash 
distribution. However, the ability of investors to do so is hindered when the firm level agency 
costs are high. Nevertheless, in low protection countries, firm level protection substitutes the 
low country protection in mitigating agency conflicts. Finally, they found empirical evidence 
that dividend payments tend to be favoured over share repurchases, especially in high 
protection countries. These findings are consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. (2000). 
However, it adds new insights on the use of firm level protection as well as the country level 
protection to reduce agency conflicts and severity of information asymmetry.  
The dividend behavior of firms in the Indian stock exchange was examined by Manos 
(2003). His analysis revealed that government ownership, debt, growth opportunities, and 
insider ownership have a negative impact on dividend payout. However, institutional, 
foreign, and dispersed ownership have a positive impact on payout ratios. The findings of the 
relation between dividend and the agency proxies; insider, institutional, and dispersed 
ownership support the findings of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) in the assertion that 
dividend policy is affected by agency variables. Nikolov and Whited (2009) examined the 
relation between agency costs and cash holding decisions. They used three agency cost 
variables: bonuses for managers that are based on profits, limited ownership of managers, and 
preference of managers for size of the firm. Their analysis indicated that firms with low 
institutional ownership hold similar amounts of cash to firms with high institutional 
ownership. This indicates that institutional ownership is not a key factor for the level of cash 
holding, and in terms in the dividend policy of firms. Moreover, there is a non monotonic 
relation between size preference and cash holding, which again indicates no certain relation 
between dividend policy and size preference. Finally, managers who seek empire-building 
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hold higher amounts of cash, as they require cash for investment and expansion. This tends to 
result in lower payout ratios.  
Some studies tackled another aspect of dividend policy i.e. the effect of legal changes 
in dividend treatment on dividend policies in practice. A characteristic example is the US’s 
2003 dividend-tax reform and its impact on corporate dividend policy. Various empirical 
models of dividend policy tackled the tax effect along with the agency considerations by 
showing that lower taxes on dividend payments leads to an increased number of firms paying 
dividends, especially those whose top executives hold larger amounts of shares and/or those 
where large shareholders are members of the board of directors. These findings suggest that 
both the tax effect and agency considerations hold for the dividend behaviour (Nam et al., 
2004; Chetty and Saez, 2005; Brown et al., 2007).  
  An explanation of the evidence found on the effect of dividend taxation was 
presented by Chetty and Saez (2010) using an agency model where shareholders and 
managers have conflicting goals. They suggested that dividend taxation gives an excuse to 
managers not to pay dividends but rather invest the money in unproductive projects. This 
creates a deadweight cost. Nevertheless, corporate taxation does not create this dilemma of 
whether to pay dividends or invest in unprofitable projects. Thus, the authors suggest that 
dividend taxation generates higher costs when firms face more agency conflicts.  
 To summarize the empirical evidence, there is strong support to the Rozeff (1982) and 
Easterbrook (1984) propositions that paying out more dividends reduce agency conflicts 
either by increasing monitoring by financial markets or by decreasing the cash on hand 
available for management to use in unproductive ways. The evidence on the signaling role of 
dividend policy in conveying information to investors suggested mixed results. Some studies 
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like Beer (1993); Brook and Hendershott (1998); and Balachandran and Nguyen (2004) 
support the signaling hypothesis, while other studies like Yoon and Starks (1995); Bernhardt 
et al. (2005); and Brav et al. (2005) reject this hypothesis. Finally, some studies found 
evidence that both dividend tax and agency considerations can interact together to determine 
the payout policy like Nam et al. (2004); Chetty and Saez (2005); and Brown et al. (2007).  
 With regards to the link between dividend policy and firm growth, few studies have 
examined the relation between a firm's growth and its dividend policy. Much emphasis was 
placed on the impact of dividend policy on share price rather than on firm growth. Studies 
that examined dividend policy and firm growth focused on the impact of firm growth on 
dividend policy not the opposite. For example, Amidu and Abor (2006) found a negative 
association between sales growth and dividend policy. Similarly, findings of Lloyd et al. 
(1985) and Collins et al. (1996) were consistent with this view as they found a negative 
relationship between historical growth in sales and dividend payout ratio.  
 More recently, Skinner and Soltes (2011) examined the relation between dividend 
policy and the quality of a firm's earnings. Earnings are widely used as a proxy for firm 
growth as mentioned before. The findings of this study indicated that dividend-paying firms 
have more persistent earnings than firms that do not pay dividends frequently and that this 
finding was stable over time. Additionally, dividend-paying firms were found to be less likely 
to incur losses, the reported losses were mainly due to special events or transitory losses. 
These findings support the argument that dividend policy and growth are related to each 
other. 
 The above studies did not consider the information asymmetry factor, whereas the 
first to suggest a negative relation between expected growth and dividend payout ratio was 
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Rozeff (1982). Yet he suggested that with increasing agency conflicts and higher information 
asymmetry a higher payout ratio would mitigate their effects. Bartram et al. (2007) did 
consider the level of agency conflicts. Among the findings of their study that examined firm 
level agency conflicts and country protection level were findings related to firm growth; at 
low levels of agency costs, at both firm level and country level, high growth firms have 
significantly lower dividend payout ratios. However, the strength of the relationship between 
payout ratios and firm growth is lower when either firm level agency costs increase or 
country protection levels decrease. This presents strong evidence that a relationship exists 
between dividend policy and firm growth and that agency costs and information asymmetry 
affect this relationship. 
 This study notices that the previous scholars that examined dividend behavior and 
firm growth focused on historical growth and its impact on dividend policy. Moreover, the 
effect of information asymmetry and/or agency costs on the relationship between dividend 
policy and firm growth was presented only by Rozeff (1982) and Bartram et al. (2007) who 
both suggested a negative relationship between dividend payout and firm growth. However 
both suggested increasing payout ratios to decrease agency costs. The evidence that historical 
firm growth and dividend policy are related and that agency costs affect this relation 
(Borokhovich (2005); Amidu and Abor (2006); and Skinner and soltes (2011)) suggest that 
the dividend policy may contribute to firm growth. This contribution differs according to the 
level of agency conflicts and information asymmetry on firm level or/and country protection 
level (La Porta et al. (2000); Bartram et al. (2007)) 
 This relationship between dividend policy and firm growth under different levels of 
information asymmetry is not separate from the firms' financing decisions. Chetty and Saez 
(2010) suggested that an area for future research is the decision to pay dividends while 
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issuing new equity. Thus, the contribution of dividend decision to firm growth is not separate 
from the capital structure of firms and their investment policies. The investment decision is 
the third decision tackled in this study. 
2.4.3 Investment decision and information asymmetry 
 A major decision taken by financial managers is corporate investment. For firms to 
grow they need to invest in assets, either current or long-term, to increase production, reduce 
costs, expand operations etc. This investment needs to be financed either internally or 
externally. Thus, corporate investment in not separate from the financing policy or the 
dividend payout discussed before as Manso (2008, p. 437) asserted that," The relationship 
between financing and investment decisions of a firm has occupied the finance literature for 
the last 50 years" Corporate investment is a rich research area, however, this study focuses on 
the relationship between corporate investment and information asymmetry and how corporate 
investment can affect firm growth.  
 The theory of investment has developed significantly years before the agency theory 
was introduced in the 1970s. Among the early models of investment behavior was the 
acceleration model that focused on the timing of investment and how firms can reach their 
desired level of investment that align with their long term view (Chenery, 1952). 
Developments in the theory of corporate investment behavior had two alternative aspects; the 
profit models of investment and capacity utilisation approach, as described by Jorgenson and 
Siebert (1968): "Much effort has been devoted to comparison of profits and capacity 
utilization theories of investment behavior."  
 The profit models of corporate investment behavior, first advocated by Tinbergen 
(1938), suggested that capital expenditures depend on firms' current and future profits. The 
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assertion was that the more profitable the firm is, the more likely it would invest in the future. 
Various empirical examinations refuted this suggestion as Kuh (1963) who examined the 
profit model against the acceleration model using a time series approach and found that the 
latter is superior in describing the investment behavior. This finding matches the results 
obtained by Grunfeld (1960) that an insignificant relation exists between profit and 
investment. The existence of a correlation between profit and investment was verified by 
Grunfeld (1963, p.219) who concluded," Our results do not confirm the hypothesis that 
profits are a good measure of those expected profits that will tend to induce investment 
expenditures. The observed simple correlation between investment and profits seems to be 
due to the fact that profits are just another measure of the capital stock of the firm." 
 The capacity utilisation models found in literature are derived mainly from the 
acceleration models that relate investment expenditures to the level of output. The theory 
assumes that higher investment expenditures should be associated with high level of output to 
capital, whereas low level of output to capital results in lower investment expenditures 
(Chenery, 1952; Koyck, 1954). However, the empirical evidence did not support the capacity 
utilisation approach although Kuh (1963) found it more superior than the profit models. The 
weakness of both capacity utilisation and profit models of investment in explaining the 
behaviour of corporate investment resulted in more theoretical advances such as the 
neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation that builds upon both the acceleration and 
profit models by adding more variables such as interest rates and commodity prices as 
determinants of investment behaviour.  
 The neoclassical theory of corporate investment found little success in earlier studies 
such as Tinbergen (1938); Klein (1950); and Roos (1958). However, later studies like that of 
Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967) re-examined the theory by taking into consideration other 
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factors like the cost of capital, price of capital goods, tax treatment, and changes in desired 
capital. Their findings provide further support to the neoclassical theory over the profit and 
capacity utilisation models.       
 Further developments in the field of corporate investment by Brainard and Tobin 
(1968) and Tobin (1969) presented Tobin's Q that is used to measure the ratio of market 
value to book value of equity and liabilities on a firm level. The more relevant use of Tobin's 
Q is its usage on aggregate level to measure the ratio between values in stock markets to 
corporate net worth. Firms with Q-ratio greater than one have a market value greater than the 
value of their assets. Thus, they are encouraged to invest more in capital (long-term assets) to 
be fairly valued. Firms with Q-ratio lower than one are undervalued by the market as they 
have a market value less than their recorded assets.  
 The impact of the agency problem and information asymmetry was obviously not 
considered in any corporate investment theory prior to their discovery in the mid-1970s. 
Thus, none of the studies listed above considered the difference in corporate investment 
behavior based on availability of information and/or agency considerations but rather focused 
on availability of funds for expenditure and the optimal use of capital based on the given 
prices, profitability measures, interest rates, tax rates etc.  
 With the introduction of agency problems and information asymmetry, different 
models tried to measure the impact of such problems on corporate investment behaviour. 
Agency conflicts related to both dividend policy and corporate financing are limited in 
comparison to those linked to corporate investment. For example, in the theory of agency and 
financing, the main conflicts arise between shareholders and management and between 
shareholders and bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The problem is limited to the 
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formulation of capital structure and the usage of different sources of financing and how they 
are perceived by investors. Similarly, in the theory of agency and dividend policy, the 
conflict arises between management and shareholders over the amount of cash holding and 
the payout policy and how the dividend policy could signal the performance of management 
to the market (Jensen, 1986).  
 Unlike both theories, the development of agency theory and corporate investment 
revealed different types of conflicts that arise between managers and principles, due to 
information asymmetry, that are directly linked to corporate investment decisions. Among 
these conflicts are the cases of over-investment and empire building, reputational problems, 
under-investment and the tendency of managers to avoid involvement in risky investments or 
the so called "quiet life" approach, and management's over-confidence (Stein, 2003). All of 
these problems have different implications for corporate investment. For example, the first 
agency problem that arises between managers and shareholders is when managers overinvest 
in risky projects or investments with negative net present value (NPV) to enlarge the assets 
under their discretion, or what is called ‘empire-building’ behaviour. The preference of 
managers in running large firms for their own benefit would become problematic if managers 
spend all available funds on new investments regardless of their profitability (Baumol, 1959; 
Williamson, 1964; Donaldson, 1984; and Jensen, 1993). Nevertheless, a negative relation 
between leverage and investment exists because debt payments will force managers to payout 
cash and decrease the cash available for overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; 1993) 
 Along similar lines, the tendency of managers to over-invest aiming at building 
corporate empires was formalised in different models such as that of Amihud and Lev (1981) 
who suggest that managers who over-invest tend to diversify their investments to make sure 
that their empire stays in the business, and that of Shleifer and Vishny (1989) who assert that 
88 
 
managers would invest in projects that need their human knowledge and capabilities to 
increase the likelihood of maintaining and securing their jobs. Furthermore, Hart and Moore 
(1995) assumed that managers' personal benefits from overinvestment will be proportionate 
with the amount the firm invests, thus, they tend to invest more to increase this benefit.  
 Further support on the above theoretical propositions was provided by the empirical 
examination of alternative corporate investment behavior such as mergers and acquisition 
decisions. Roll (1986) surveyed various studies and found that in many cases the acquirer 
firm's stock price decreased after an acquisition announcement. Other studies linked 
acquisition events to agency problems by reporting a link between negative effects and firms 
where management has low equity shares. This finding appears to be indicative of empire 
building behavior (Lewellen et al., 1985). Similarly, Morck et al. (1990) found that firms that 
engage in diversification in unrelated investments tend to suffer more from severe negative 
announcement effects. Furthermore, Richardson (2006) found a strong relation between 
investment decisions and the amount of cash available, which indicates an overinvestment 
behavior. 
 While some studies have related overinvestment agency problems solely to empire 
building behavior, others have found a separate agency conflict related to overinvestment. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) assert that managers who seek a "quiet life" would 
continue investing in negative NPV projects because otherwise it would indicate failure of 
their managerial abilities. They also found that such managers, when they do not face threats 
of takeovers, would neither discontinue negative NPV projects nor invest in new profitable 
ones. This quiet life agency issue was also discussed by Baker (2000) who found that 
managers of young venture capital firms that are mostly concerned with reputation are the 
most likely to continue investing in negative NPV projects to maintain their image.  
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 To sum up, based on these findings the overinvestment agency problem could be 
induced by management's behavior of either empire building preference or a desire for quiet 
life. However, the quiet life scenario could also result in an opposite investment-related 
agency problem: underinvestment behavior. As Agaarwal and Samwick (1999) demonstrate, 
managerial laziness or a desire for quiet life could defer managers from entering new lines of 
business or investing in new investment opportunities. As long as managers are more 
informed than shareholders (more information asymmetry) the severity of such investment-
related agency problems increases.  
 Another agency problem that has implications for corporate investment is the ‘career 
concerns' issue which is also related to reputation of managers among investors and market 
participants. Fama (1980) highlighted the impact of career concerns on managers' behavior as 
either a cause of agency conflicts or a motive to perform better. Agency problems associated 
with reputation and career concerns include the tendency of managers to focus on the short 
term, induce herding behaviour, and act reluctantly towards new investments.  
 Short-termism refers to managers' behavior when they focus on short term operating 
performance rather on the long-term shareholders' value maximisation principle (Narayanan, 
1985). Such short-term view might result in investments that generate current benefits even if 
they will not generate future benefits. This could take place when managers overinvest in 
projects to impress shareholders about their personal performance (Bebchuk and Stole, 1993). 
An opposite view is when managers try to cut current costs to signal their performance to 
shareholders. For example, managers could decrease spending on maintenance or training of 
employees etc. to generate higher current earnings regardless of the consequences of this 
underinvestment behaviour on the firm's long term earnings. (Stein, 2003)  
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 Another reputational problem that has a direct implication for corporate investment is 
the so-called herding behaviour of managers towards investment decisions. This is where 
managers tend to copy or imitate their predecessors or competitors' decisions to avoid being 
signaled as risk takers or as acting for their own interest (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; 
Zwiebel, 1995). Such herding behavior might result in investment decisions that do not 
necessarily result in firm growth but only signal that managers are risk averse. Avery and 
Chevalier (1999) suggest that herding behaviour is more likely among younger managers 
than older ones to build their reputation in the market.  
 Overall, the empire building approach suggested that an overinvestment problem 
exists, however, the reputational concern to management could result in either over- or under-
investment. The occurrence of either behavior depends on the tendency of managers to invest 
more to impress shareholders or reduce investment funding to boost current earnings.  
 Finally, the last investment-related agency problem is a direct result of managers' 
overconfidence (Stein, 2003). Managers are sometimes optimistic about the future 
performance of their firm and act based on this belief. Such overconfidence could result in 
investment decisions that induce over-investment behavior, such as takeovers (Roll, 1986). 
Similarly, Heaton (1998) suggests that overconfident managers typically believe that their 
stock price is unfairly low and tend to issue new equity. Thus, overconfidence might be a 
valid explanation for over-investment and empire building behaviour. The problem with 
overconfident managers is that they believe that their actions are in the best interest of 
shareholders. Prior research suggests that controlling such behavior is a much harder task 
than the cases of empire building or herding behavior (Heaton, 1998)  
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 The investment-related agency problems discussed above, which could be attributed 
to information asymmetry, do not eliminate the well-established agency problem of 
asymmetric information and signaling effect when it comes to corporate investment 
decisions. Among the recent studies that suggested the existence of a relationship between 
corporate investment and information signaling is Li (2011, p.722), stating that "managerial 
investment decisions likely contain information about earnings quality because managers 
make many decisions based on future profitability, and arguably have more precise and 
complete information about their firm’s profitability than do other stakeholders." However, 
as the author suggests, the information content or the signal effect of investment decisions is 
not as severe as in other corporate decisions such as the dividend payout, for example. His 
argument is based on the findings of Skinner and Soltes (2009) who examined the earnings 
quality based on dividend decisions and concluded that investment in capital and labour are 
less sensitive to information signaling than dividend decisions. 
 This finding by Skinner and Soltes (2009) is in a similar vein with the suggestions of 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and Koch and Shenoy (1999) who found that dividend 
decisions have larger information signaling effects and agency costs for firms that overinvest, 
i.e. those firms with a Tobin's Q lower than one compared to those with a Tobin's Q closer to 
or higher than one. Moreover, a U-shaped relationship exists between the amount of 
information asymmetry and Tobin's Q where firms that have a Q-ratio close to or higher than 
one have the least information problems. This implies that both over- and under-investing 
firms, especially those that over-invest, suffer more from information asymmetry that is 
relevant to their investment strategies.  
 The investment decision varies widely across firms due to the nature of the business, 
its riskiness, ownership structure, availability of cash flows, firms' capital structure, etc. This 
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study focuses on the agency problems and information asymmetry associated with corporate 
investment strategies and how they might affect firm growth. Therefore, the impact of 
corporate investment on firm growth under the above mentioned agency problem is discussed 
in the following text.   
 Unlike a firm's capital structure and the dividend policy, corporate investment can 
directly be linked to firm growth when measured in terms of growth in fixed assets. Thus, the 
more the firm invests in assets, the larger its assets' growth will be. However, when 
measuring the firm growth in terms of sales, profits, market share etc. as suggested by 
Ardishvili et al., (1989) and Delmar et al. (2003), investments in long term assets might not 
necessarily result in firm growth. Nevertheless, under the various agency problems associated 
with corporate investment, further investments might hinder firm growth. After a 
comprehensive review, Stein (2003) suggested that managers might overinvest seeking 
empire building, which maximises the size of the firm but not necessarily result in sales' 
growth. On the other hand, managers might be incentivized to invest in negative NPV 
projects or in risky investments that would result, on the long run, in lower or insignificant 
growth rates, for reputational reasons. 
 The problems associated with investment in long term assets; plant and equipment, 
capital investments, machinery, building etc. opened the door for studies that examined 
investment in current assets such as that of Carpenter et al. (1994) who examined investing in 
inventory (a current asset), and its impact on operations. Their conclusions matched the 
propositions of Cheatham (1989, p.20) who suggested that, "Once a firm has acquired the 
necessary buildings and fixtures to begin operations, most of its cash flows are the result of 
investing in and selling of current assets. The bulk of a firm's cash expenditures are for the 
purpose of either purchasing or adding value to inventories. All of a firm's cash inflow from 
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normal operations is generated from sales. Sales occur as the eventual result of the 
liquidation of inventories." This implies that firm growth, in terms of sales, could be a direct 
result of investment in current assets rather than long term assets. Thus, firms that invest 
more in current assets could have higher growth rates than those who invest less in current 
assets and keep accumulating long term assets.  
 The agency problems associated with investing in long term assets are mainly related 
to firms that have Q-ratio that deviates from one (Koch and Shenoy, 1999). Thus, the more 
the deviation from one is, the severer the agency conflicts. Hence, it would be inappropriate 
for the firm to invest in long term assets because this investment is likely either an empire 
building behaviour or continuing negative NPV projects to maintain reputation. In both cases, 
the firm's growth would be hindered in terms of sales or profits.  
 Based on the above discussion, the researcher suggests that on the one hand, at high 
levels of information asymmetry, for firms that suffer from agency problems of corporate 
investment and whose Q-ratio is lower than one, investment in current assets could have a 
positive impact on firm's sales growth. On the other hand, such firms should not primarily 
invest in long term assets because those investments would be associated with higher agency 
costs due to empire building behavior or continuing in negative NPV projects. Conversely, 
firms that have a Tobin's Q higher than one and suffer less from information asymmetry and 
agency costs of corporate investment could invest in long term assets and still contribute to 
firm growth because those investments are more likely to be expenditure in corporate 
expansion or exploiting profitable investment opportunities.  
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2.5 Interaction of investment, financing, and dividend decisions and 
firm growth  
 In the previous sections, the impact of each major corporate finance decision: 
financing, dividend, and investment on firm growth is discussed. Therefore, the review of 
relevant literature suggests the existence of a relationship between each of the three decisions 
and firm growth and how this relationship can be affected by the issue of information 
asymmetry. This section expands this discussion by exploring how the three decisions are not 
separate from each other but rather interact together and how this interaction will affect the 
growth of the firm. 
 On practical and theoretical levels, a firm that depends more on internal financing 
would normally pay out less in dividends. Moreover, the lower the dividend payments, the 
higher the available funds for investment expenditures and vice versa. Thus, it is obvious that 
each of the three decisions could not be taken in isolation from the other two. Some studies 
presented a relationship between each two of the three decisions while other studies 
combined all three of them. Chen et al. (2010) suggested a relationship between each two of 
the three decisions; investment and dividend, dividend and financing, and investment and 
financing, suggesting that the three decisions are not separate from each other. Yet, Chen et 
al. (2010) did not consider the role of this interaction in helping/hindering firm growth or in 
mitigating agency conflicts and asymmetry of information.  
 Dividend policy and corporate investment are related according to Chen et al. (2010, 
pp. 23-24) as they suggest that, "Retained earnings are most often the major internal source 
of funds made available for investment by a firm. The cost of these retained earnings is 
generally less than the cost associated with raising capital through new common-stock 
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issues. The availability of retained earnings is then determined by the firm’s profitability and 
the payout ratio, the latter being indicative of dividend policy." Therefore, firms that rely 
more on internal financing tend to have lower payout ratios when they have profitable 
investments. This implies that a relationship exists between dividend policy and corporate 
investments. Moreover, financing decision is not distinct from this relationship because firms 
that regularly pay dividends will have to rely on external financing (new equity or debt 
issues) to finance their investments. This explains why a direct link exists between financing 
decisions, or the capital structure in general, and dividend policy. Firms that have high payout 
ratios will have limited internal funds to finance new investments and vice versa. 
 Similarly, a relationship exists between corporate investment and financing decisions. 
Firms should invest as long as its cost of capital is reasonable, or what is known as capital 
budgeting decision (Myers, 1974). Prior studies examined whether firms should rely on risky 
debt to finance new investments or rely only on low-risk financing instruments (Rendleman, 
1978; Chambers et al., 1982). Moreover, the optimal capital structure and the acceptable level 
of risk for financing new investments has been a considerable research area in the finance 
literature (See for example Miller (1991)). Recent studies went further to suggest that not 
only the financing decision affects investment strategy but even the type of debt financing 
affects the investment decision. By analysing financing investments using US bank loans and 
bond data, Morellec et al. (2014) found evidence that appears to support this proposition.  
 Other than the above relationships between each two of the three decisions, some 
studies examined the interaction between the three decisions. A close study that examined the 
interaction between the three decisions and the amount of information available is Koch and 
Shenoy (1999). The authors conclude: "our results indicate that dividend and capital 
structure policies interact to provide significant predictive information about future cash 
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flow. We also find a U-shaped relation between the amount of information and Tobin's q. The 
minimum of this relation occurs near a q-value of one. This outcome implies a stronger 
information effect for both over-and under investing firms than for value-maximizing firm". 
These findings suggest an impact for dividend and financing policies on investment 
decisions. It also implies that this interaction could differ according to the amount of 
information available. 
 Similarly, Bolton et al. (2011) proposed a model that combines corporate investment, 
financing decisions, and risk management for firms suffering from liquidity problems. Their 
findings support the existence of a relationship between investment and financing policies for 
such firms because the relation between investment and liquidity is found to differ according 
to the source of financing. The latter is affected by the dividend payout ratio as mentioned 
before. Thus, the study suggests that the relationship between the three decisions and how 
they interact together to affect firm growth could differ according to the level of information 
asymmetry or agency conflicts in general.  
 Two similar studies are Lang et al. (1996) and Brush et al. (2000), which both 
examined firm growth taking into consideration the investment and financing decisions or 
firm growth when accounting for agency conflicts. Lang et al. (1996, p. 28) suggest that a 
negative relation exists between leverage and firm growth for firms with low Q ratios, but not 
for firms with high Q ratios. They reason that "the negative effect of leverage on growth 
affects only those firms with good investment opportunities that the market does not 
recognize and those firms that do not have good investment opportunities." (i.e. low-q firms). 
This finding supports the argument that leverage level, the financing decision, and investment 
opportunities do indeed interact to affect firm growth. Brush et al. (2000) investigates the 
profitability of firms having free cash flow from sales growth at different monitoring levels, 
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with different levels of agency conflicts. They conclude that "consistent with agency theory, 
firms with free cash flow gain less from sales growth than firms without free cash flow. But 
different governance conditions affect sales growth and performance in different ways. 
Having substantial management stock ownership mitigates the influence of free cash flow on 
performance, despite allowing higher sales growth." The finding that management's stock 
ownership and governance mechanisms affect sales growth supports the argument that 
information asymmetry do have an impact on firm growth (if sales growth is used as a 
proxy).  
 Combining the findings of Lang et al. (1996) and Brush et al. (2000) with the above 
evidence that the three corporate finance decisions (financing, dividend, and investment) do 
interact together, we can conclude that each of the three decisions is affected by information 
asymmetry. Moreover, firm growth is affected by the level of corporate governance and is a 
direct result of decisions taken within the firm. Thus, a relationship between financing, 
dividend, and investment decisions and firm growth exists and this relationship may differ 
according to the level of agency conflicts, corporate governance, and information asymmetry. 
An identified gap in the existing literature is how these three decisions contribute to firm 
growth at each level of information asymmetry; high and low, which is the objective of this 
study. This question is answered in the following chapter. 
 2.6 The effect of changes in ownership structure on firm growth at 
various levels of information asymmetry 
 The assertions of Brush et al. (2000) that ownership matters to this relationship 
opened the door for another set of the determinants of firm growth: the non-financial 
variables. Although the financial variables discussed above might be important contributors 
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to firm growth, other factors could not be ignored. Variables like ownership structure, board 
composition, internal audit unit, and committees of both executives and non-executives are 
all used to enhance firm performance and reduce the informational gap between managers 
and shareholders. More recent studies on the roles of such variables exist, for example 
Fazlzadeh et al. (2011); Judge (2010); and Aguilera et al. (2008). Recent financial scandals 
have drawn extensive attention to corporate governance and its impact on efficiency and 
effectiveness of managers' decisions.  
 The scope and range of these variables and their impact on firm performance is too 
broad to address in one study. This study, therefore, due to availability of data, focuses on the 
most common variable that is believed to have a direct impact on firm growth, or firm 
performance in general: changes in ownership structure. In a recent study examining the 
impact of institutional ownership on firm performance; Al-Najjar (2015, p. 98) claimed that, 
"The review of literature for the impact of institutional ownership on the firm’s performance 
shows no agreed relationship, and delivers strong debate on the topic among various studies 
in different countries from developed to developing countries." Regarding the impact of 
institutional investors versus individual investors on firm performance prior research has 
shown that institutional investors, such as investment managers, insurance firms, and 
brokerage firms possess more knowledge, skills, and capital than individuals. As large 
shareholders, they are encouraged to monitor the behavior of managers and therefore, they 
are believed to have an influence on corporate governance (Grossman and Hart, 1980).  
 A considerable number of studies have examined the impact and scope of this effect 
on firm performance. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) claimed there is a greater 
incentive for institutional shareholders to monitor managers' behavior than board members 
who possess little or no shares in the firm. In addition, Cornett et al. (2007, pp. 1773) stated 
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that, "McConnell and Servaes (1990), Nesbitt (1994), Smith (1996) and Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999) all have found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that corporate 
monitoring by institutional investors can result in managers focusing more on corporate 
performance and less on opportunistic or self-serving behavior." This confirms that 
institutional shareholders have a direct impact on firm performance.  
 Other studies favoured an opposite view, suggesting that not all institutional 
shareholders hold huge amount of shares in firms and care about the long-term survival of the 
firm. In fact, many institutional shareholders care more for liquidity of their shareholdings 
and short-term profitability rather than spending money, time, and effort on monitoring and 
they are reluctant to spend significant amounts on monitoring while other shareholders enjoy 
"a free ride" (i.e. they benefit from the efforts and investment of the institutional shareholder 
for free). More detailed explanations of disincentives to effective monitoring by institutional 
shareholders can be found in the literature, for example Bhide (1994); Demirag (1998); and 
Maug (1998).  
 Despite the mixed evidence on the impact of institutional shareholders on corporate 
governance and monitoring schemes, empirical evidence suggests that ownership structure 
can sometimes affect firm performance as McConnell and Servaes (1990); Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999); Cornett et al. (2007); and Chen et al. (2008) found a positive relation 
between the percentage of institutional ownership and various performance measures. This 
finding is consistent with results from studies from different countries and different time 
horizons such as Manawaduge and De Zoysa (2013) in Sri-Lanka, an emerging Asian market, 
and Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) in European countries. However, other studies have found 
an insignificant impact, such as like Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Faccio and Lasfer (2000), 
and Fazlzadeh et al. (2011). These mixed empirical results are consistent with the assertions 
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of Al-Najjar (2015) that no certain conclusion can be drawn about the effect of institutional 
ownership on firm performance. 
 More recent studies tried to integrate various governance variables such as ownership 
structure, and board composition and independence together into a ranking system in order to 
better understand the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; and Judge, 2010), yet using these complex measures rather than 
individual measures resulted in contradictory and ambiguous results (Bhagat et al., 2008). To 
the best of the researcher’s knowledge, none of the previous studies examined the effect of 
ownership structure on firm growth under various levels of information asymmetry. The only 
close study was that of Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) who used sales growth as a proxy for 
firm performance and found that firms whose largest shareholder is a family or another firm 
have higher sales growth.  
 Hence, prior research reports mixed results regarding the impact of institutional 
ownership, or ownership structure in general, on firm growth. In the following empirical 
chapters, the roles of both financial and non-financial determinants on firm growth are 
investigated under high and low levels of information asymmetry, with chapter three 
examining the relative contribution of investment, financing, and dividend decisions to firm 
growth along with the integrated role of the three of them in hindering or stimulating firm 
growth. Chapter four examines the contribution of changes in ownership structure to firm 
growth under alternative conditions of information asymmetry; while, chapter six examines 
the relative weight of financial variables, ownership structure, industry and size effects in 





An Empirical Investigation of the relative contribution of investment, 
financing, and dividend decisions to firm growth. 
3.1 Hypotheses Development 
 The relevant literature includes a number of relationships that are examined in this 
thesis. Financing decision is found to be affected by agency problems due to information 
asymmetry that causes possible conflicts between shareholders and management and/or due 
to the signal conveyed to the market from the issuance of debt or equity (Jensen, 1986; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Klein et al. 2002). Frank and Goyal (2005) argue that the relationship 
between debt financing and firm growth is negative. They further advocate the trade-off 
theory which places little emphasis on agency considerations and information asymmetry and 
focus instead on tax considerations and bankruptcy costs. The gap in the related literature has 
been highlighted by Lemmon and Zender (2010) who concluded that future research should 
examine the interaction between financing and growth in assets. 
 The assertions of Frank and Goyal (2005) could hold for firms facing a low level of 
information asymmetry, which could have a lower impact on operating performance and 
earnings. However, this might not be the case for firms facing a high level of information 
asymmetry, as using equity financing for firms with high information asymmetry might 
hinder the ability of such firms to raise capital from stockholders or at least would increase 
their cost of capital as investors will require extra return to invest in such firms. This would 
hinder the abilities of such firms to invest in growth opportunities or at least decrease its 
benefits from growth options in comparison to firms facing low information asymmetry. 
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A testable hypothesis can be derived based on this proposition and the above 
mentioned empirical findings that higher debt (lower equity) financing is positively 
associated with earnings and operating performance, i.e.  
H1: "A positive relationship exists between debt financing and firm Sales growth at high level 
of information asymmetry" 
 Another testable hypothesis could be developed from the relationship between 
dividend policy, information asymmetry, and firm growth. Empirical studies suggest that 
dividend payouts do signal firm performance to the market. Rozeff (1982) and Bartram et al. 
(2007) both suggest a negative relationship between dividend payout and firm growth. 
However both suggest increasing payout ratios to decrease information asymmetry. There is 
evidence that historical firm growth and dividend policy are related and that agency costs and 
information asymmetry affect this relation, with several studies (Borokhovich, 2005; Amidu 
and Abor, 2006; and Skinner and Soltes, 2011) suggesting that the dividend policy may 
contribute to firm growth. This contribution varies according to the level of agency conflicts 
on firm level or/and country protection level (La Porta et al., 2000; Bartram et al., 2007). 
Therefore, firms that suffer from a high level of information asymmetry should pay more in 
dividends to signal their performance to the market. This type of signaling would enable easy 
access to sources of financing and might stimulate future growth. Nevertheless, firms that 
have low information asymmetry problems do not have to pay as much in dividends to signal 
their performance because investors are already well-informed about the firm's performance. 
A testable hypothesis to examine this relationship could be drawn as follows:  
 H2: "A positive relationship exists between dividend payouts and firm growth at high 
level of information asymmetry" 
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 Although cash dividends is the most common form of profit distribution, a limitation 
to the above relationship is the existence of several types of dividends such as stock 
dividends, special dividends, and stock repurchases. Due to the availability of data about only 
cash dividends and payout ratios in terms of the amount of cash distributed versus the amount 
of retained earnings, the above hypothesis is related only to cash dividends.     
 Investment decisions have the most direct relationship with firm growth, especially 
when measured in terms of growth in assets. However, investment decisions face various 
forms of agency conflicts due to information asymmetry as discussed above. These forms are 
over- and under-investment, overconfidence, short-termism, and career concerns (Stein, 
2003). The agency problems are mainly related to firms that have Q ratios that are lower than 
one (Koch and Shenoy, 1999). In this case, further investment in long-term assets might be a 
result of one of these agency conflicts. Thus, investment in long-term assets might imply 
higher growth in terms of assets. However, it might not imply higher growth in terms of 
sales, profitability and market share. Cheatham (1989) suggests that firms tend to invest in 
current assets after they acquire the necessary long-term assets and use such investment to 
grow their sales and profits. Thus, it could be predicted that for firms facing a high level of 
information asymmetry and more investment-related agency conflicts, investment in current 
assets could stimulate growth. However, investment in long-term assets would appear to 
hinder firm growth except when measuring firm growth in terms of growth in assets. More 
specifically, Carpenter et al. (1994) suggested investment in inventory in particular. Three 
testable hypotheses could be drawn as follows: 
  H3: "A negative relationship exists between investments in long-term assets and firm 
growth at high level of information asymmetry." 
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 H4: "A positive relationship exists between investments in current assets and firm 
growth at high level of information asymmetry" 
 H5: "A positive relationship exists between investments in inventory and firm growth 
at high level of information asymmetry" 
 These three hypotheses apply only when measuring firm growth using proxies other 
than growth in assets because if tested using growth in assets both investment in current and 
long-term assets would directly result in positive impact on firm growth. 
 Finally, the relative contribution of financing, dividend and investment decisions to 
firm growth under each level of information asymmetry (high and low) should be tested to 
examine the various determinants of growth at high and low levels of information 
asymmetry. This thesis develops the above mentioned hypotheses that, due to the existence of 
information asymmetry, determinants of firm growth might vary from one level to another. 
3.2 Data and Methodology  
 The sample for this study includes the S&P 500 non-financial firms. The dataset 
comprises of accounting and financial data (stock prices) covering a period of twenty-five 
years (1989 to 2014). All data used are of a panel structure (cross-sectional and time-series) 
and are unbalanced due to the variability in listing date for each firm and the availability of 
its data items. Data include determinants of investment, financing, and dividend decisions 
like payout ratio, debt ratio, dividend yield, current-to-fixed assets etc. All data are obtained 
from Thomson’s DataStream database. The following table shows the distribution of sample 
firms across the 9 industries that represent the constituents of S&P 500 during the time of 
105 
 
data download. Financial firms are excluded from the sample due to the differences in their 
financial statements relative to the rest of the firms.  
Table 3.1: The distribution of sample firms across industries 
Industry Name Number of firms 
Abbreviation 
of Industry 
Industrials 65 Industry1 
Health Care 53 Industry 2 
Information Technology 63 Industry 4 
Utilities 30 Industry 5 
Materials 30 Industry 6 
Consumer Staples 40 Industry 7 
Consumer Discretionary 84 Industry 8 
Energy 44 Industry 9 
Telecommunications Services 5 Industry 10 
 
The sample includes financial data for the non-financial active firms listed in S&P 500 as 
shown in the above table. A total of 414 firms are included in the sample. The data for the 
missing items are excluded. The variables are categorised according to the standard 
determinants of investment, financing, and dividend decisions. The descriptions of the 
variables are discussed is further details in the next section. 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 This study measures the contribution of financing, dividend, and investment decisions 
to firm growth at different levels of information asymmetry. Therefore, the dependent 
variable in the empirical analysis is firm growth. The literature cites different proxies for 
measuring firm growth: growth of employment, market share, profit, sales, assets etc. (see for 
example Delmar et al., 2003). Empirically, two conventional measures for firm growth are 
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growth of fixed assets and growth of sales (Fairfield, 2003; Broussard, 2011; Cooper et al., 
2008; Lipson, et al. 2009; Gray and Johnson, 2011; Yao, et al. 2011). 
 A new measure of firm growth that considers the interaction between fixed assets and 
sales was introduced by Eldomiaty and Rashwan (2013). They argue that the conventional 
measures of firm growth may not be good representative of firm growth. Since sales revenue 
is measured in monetary units, sales may grow due to successive increases in prices rather 
than increases in volume. Furthermore, increases in sales may or may not indicate the 
efficiency of using the assets. The second measure (growth of assets) is an indication of 
successive increases in assets that may or may not be associated with increase in sales. For 
example, the additions to fixed assets may not necessarily be associated with increases in 
productivity. The same is true in case of current assets. Therefore, they suggest using sales-
weighted fixed assets growth as a measure for proportionate increase in both sales and assets. 
Lastly, growth in total assets was used as a proxy for firm growth in various studies (see for 
example Delmar et al., 2003). Thus, this study suggests four proxies to measure firm growth, 
namely: 
  The continuous compound growth rate of fixed assets (Hart, 1995; Delmar et al., 
2003). 
 The continuous compound growth rate of sales (Hoy et al., 1992; Ardishvili et al., 
1998; Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000). 
 The sales-weighted fixed assets growth (Eldomiaty and Rashwan, 2013) 
 The continuous growth rate of Total assets. (Hart, 1995; Delmar et al., 2003)   
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 To select one of the above four measures to be used in the empirical analysis as the 
dependent variable (Y), descriptive statistics are used to determine which proxy is associated 
with the least standard error. The following results are obtained:   








Growth is Long-term 
assets 
Mean 0.123 0.135 0.045 0.112 
Standard Error 0.018 0.018 0.004 0.018 
Median 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Mode 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Standard Deviation 2.789 2.864 0.680 2.798 
Sample Variance 7.781 8.207 0.462 7.829 
Kurtosis 5122.830 5117.590 1912.680 5060.600 
Skewness 57.023 56.981 33.160 56.490 
Range 317.822 300.329 56.708 317.570 
Minimum -26.213 -0.878 -9.138 -25.960 
Maximum 291.609 299.451 47.570 291.609 
Sum 2972.819 3274.138 1090.061 2704.052 
Count 3612 3612 3612 3612 
 
 According to the above descriptive statistics, growth in sales shall be used as the 
proxy for firm growth in this thesis as it was associated with the least standard error among 
the four proxies of firm growth. The reason behind selecting growth in sales as a proxy for 
firm growth stems from two arguments. First, the literature cites growth in sales as the most 
conventional financial statements-based measure (Hoy et al., 1992; Ardishvili et al., 1998; 
Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000). Second, the nature of the analysis of this thesis accounts for 
investments in current, fixed and total assets (Investment decision) as contributors to firm 
growth. Thus, the other three proxies that incorporate any kind of assets (growth rate of fixed 
assets, sales-weighted fixed assets growth, and growth rate of total assets) will be misleading 
in the analysis.  
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3.2.2 Independent Variables 
 This thesis examines the contribution of financing, dividend and investment decisions 
to firm growth. The independent variables are the determinants of each of three decisions as 
cited in the literature. The financing decision is measured using either debt ratio or debt-to-
equity ratio (Stonehill et al., 1975; Bhandari, 1988). The corporate dividend decision is 
measured by payout ratio and dividend yield (La Porta et al., 2000; Gugler, 2003). The 
corporate investment decision is measured in this thesis using the change in fixed assets, 
change in current assets, change in inventory, and ratio of current-to-fixed assets 
(Sundararajan, 1987; Lam, 1997). The author suggests adding other variables that are widely 
used as determinants of firm performance such as effective corporate tax rate, operating 
income-to-assets, operating income-to-sales, non-debt tax shield, bankruptcy risk, and 
probability of default. 
3.2.3 Proxy Measures of Information Asymmetry 
 This study measures the contribution of the three corporate decisions to firm growth 
under different levels of information asymmetry. Several sources in the literature suggest that 
the agency problem between corporate managers and investors is associated with information 
asymmetry. The outcome of the problem of information asymmetry is an adverse selection. 
Accordingly, the trade spread is commonly used to measure the asymmetry between 
investors’ price expectations (Glosten and Harris, 1988; George et al., 1991; Lin et al., 1995; 
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans, 1997; Huang and Stoll, 1997). The common and 
major critics to traded spread are the econometric problems associated with time series and 
price dependency that renders the trade spread biased. In this regard, the author considers the 
use of proxies of information asymmetry that incorporate corporate data and recognise the 
possibility of adverse selection directly. These proxies are as follows: 
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1) The Sensitivity of Stock Returns to Expected ROE. In this case, the beta algorithm 
can be utilised operationally. The negative beta refers to adverse selection and positive beta 
refers to favorable selection. This proxy is in line with the prior studies in the field such as 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Christie (1987) and Dierkens (1991). The rationale 
of this proxy is that positive betas indicate that the investors are able to expect the firm's ROE 
and the stock prices are associated with changes in ROE positively. Negative betas indicate 
that the investors' reaction, in terms of stock price changes, goes against the expected ROE 
which is viewed as an adverse selection.  
 
2) The Probability of Adverse Selection using the Black-Scholes option pricing model 
(probability of occurrence  dN 2  is the cumulative standard normal density function). The 
 dN 2 = 0 refers to favorable selection and  dN 2 ≥ 0 refers to adverse selection, thus the 
existence of asymmetric information. The Black and Scholes (1972, 1973) option pricing 
model offers a stochastic method for calculating the expected value of an option when the 
inputs (current stock price and strike price) are expected as well. The standard linear 
stochastic Black-Scholes model is as follows: 
 




   (Equation 3.1) 
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Where S = current stock price, X = strike price, (T-t) = time to maturity, σ = standard 
deviation, Rf = risk-free rate of interest, N (.) is the cumulative standard normal density 
function. 
 The rationale of using the Black-Scholes model in the context of this thesis is that the 
expected stock return and ROE are subject to stochastic processes. Therefore, the option 
pricing model can be adapted as follows:  
 
  )dN( e R - )dN(  E = returnIntrinsic 2t)-(T  Rt1 f 

tROE     (Equation 3.4) 
 This equation shows that the information asymmetry between financial managers and 
the investors creates a disconnection between stock returns and a firm's profitability. The 
former might be far higher or lower than the latter. In this case, the favorable selection of a 
stock occurs when the stock return is equal or less than firm's expected profitability. Since 
investors are expecting future price, the stock return is associated with a probability of 
occurrence. Therefore, the probability of default (PD) = 1-  tROEE . In this case, the PD is 
associated with an adverse selection. The probability of occurrence  dN 2  calculates as 
follows. 
   
 
t-T  














       (Equation 3.5) 
The probability of occurrence  dN 2  is the cumulative standard normal density function.  
 These equations offer two advantages. The first advantage is that they allow for price 
correction when the stock return goes higher or lower than the firm profitability. The second 
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advantage is that they guarantee the investors an expected return  tROEE  when prices do 
not change (return = zero) 
3) Another measure for information asymmetry that was used by Varici (2013) is the Q ratio 
presented by Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969). This measure is applied by 
differentiating between Q ratio either higher or lower than one, where the lower the Q ratio, 
the severer the information asymmetry problem between management and market 
participants. This is mainly due to under-investment behaviour of management (Koch and 
Shenoy, 1999: Stein, 2003). Q ratios that are much higher than one might result in over 
investment problems like empire building, yet in most cases it means that the firm is trying to 
utilise its capacities better and invest more. The calculation of Q ratios in this study follows 
the approximate calculation of Q developed by Chung and Pruitt (1994) who used available 
balance sheet items to calculate Q ratios and successfully tested it empirically against values 
calculated using the Lindenberg and Ross (1981) model, that employs a more sophisticated 
approach. Chung- Pruitt (C-P) Q Ratio is calculated as follows: 
              
                                        
                                                                                       
 
 
Where: [1] MV (CS) = Market value of common stocks; [2] BV (PS) = Book Value of 
Preferred stocks; [3] BV (LTD) = Book Value of Long Term debt; [4] BV (INV) = Book 
Value of Inventory; [5] BV (CL) - BV (CA) = Book Value of Current Liabilities – Book 




The data, as mentioned above, was downloaded from DataStream Database. The following 
three tables summarise which variables were downloaded and which ones were calculated, 
the chosen variables, and the key descriptive statistics for them. 
Table 3.3: Downloaded and calculated variables: 
Variable Downloaded Calculated 
Sales-Weighted Fixed assets growth   Using Net Sales and Fixed Assets 
Growth in total assets √  
Sales Growth (Y) √  Using Net Sales 
Growth in fixed assets √  Using Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) 
Debt-to-Equity (DE) √  
Debt-to-Equity t-1      (DE t-1)   Using D/E 
Expected Debt-to-Equity (Expected DE)   Using D/E 
Debt Ratio (DR t) √  
Debt Ratio t-1 (DR t-1)    Using DR 
Delta Debt Ratio     (Delta DR)   Using DR 
Fixed Assets-to-total Assets (FATA)   Using PPE and Total Assets 
Non Debt Tax shield (NDTAX)   Using Total Debt and Taxes 
Delta Non Debt tax shield (DeltaND)   Using Total Debt and Taxes 
Effective Corporate tax rate (ECTR)   Using Total Taxes and EBT 
Bankruptcy risk (BR)   Using EBIT, Interest paid, and SD EBIT 
Operating income-to-sales (OIS)   Using EBIT and Sales 
Operating income-to-assets (OIA)   Using EBIT and Total Assets 
Dividend payout ratio (DPR) 
√ 
 Using Dividends per share and Earnings per 
share 
Current Assets-to-Fixed assets (CAFA)  Using Total Current Assets and PPE 
Dividend Yield (DY) √  
Change in Inventory (LNInventory) √  
Probability of Default (PD)  Using TD, MVE, and, asset volatility 
Market Value of Equity (MVE) Dummy in USD √ Using Market value of Equity 
Total Assets (TA) Dummy in USD √ Using Total Assets 
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Table 3.4: Definition of Variables 
 Firm Growth Proxies: References 
Dependent  Variable Growth in Sales  Continuous compound growth rate of Sales  (Hoy et al., 1992; Barkham et al. ,1995; Ardishvili et 
al., 1998; Flamholtz, 1986 Davidsson and Wiklund, 
2000) 
Growth in Fixed Assets Continuous compound growth rate of Fixed 
Assets  
(Hart, 1995; Delmar et al., 2003) 
Growth in Total Assets Continuous compound growth rate of Total 
Assets  
(Delmar et al., 2003; Hart ,1995) 
Sales-weighted fixed assets growth Sales growth and fixed assets growth  (Eldomiaty and Rashwan, 2013) 
  
Regressors related to financing, 
















Financing Debt/Equity Ratio, Debt Ratio, Delta Debt 
Ratio, Expected Debt Ratio  
(Kim and Sorensen, 1986) 
Dividend Dividend yield,  (Schooley and Barney Jr., 1994) 
 Dividend payout Ratio  (Dempsey and Laber, 1992; Noronha et al., 1996; 
Manos, 2003; Borokhovich et al., 2005) 
Investment Ratio of Current assets-to-fixed assets  
Ratio of fixed assets–to-Total assets  
(Cheatham, 1989) 
Stein (2003) 
 Investment in Inventory (Carpenter et al. ,1994) 
 Other Contributing variables 
 
Information asymmetry 






Role of agency 
problems 
Deviation of Q-Ratio from  one Q-Ratio  (Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Koch and Shenoy, 1999: 
Stein, 2003) 
Sensitivity of stock returns to expected 
ROE 
ROE and stock prices  (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam ,1999; Christie 
,1987; and Dierkens, 1991) 
Probability of Adverse selection The probability of default using Black-
Scholes Option Pricing model 
Author's Contribution 
Control Variables    
Firm   Size (Small, 
medium, Large) 
Ln (Total Assets) 
 Ln (MVE)   
Dummy variables (dichotomous 0,1) (Evans, 1987; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006; and Hart 
(1995) 
Industry Type  Dummy variables (dichotomous 0,1) Rajan and Zingales (1995) 




Table 3.5: Key Descriptive Statistics for the chosen variables 
Variable Mean Median Mode Minimum Maximum 
Sales-Weighted Fixed assets growth 0.089 0.054 0.080 -3.248 1.055 
Growth in total assets 0.105 0.068 0.000 -0.826 2.246 
Sales Growth (Y) 0.088 0.073 0.000 -1.763 1.380 
Growth in fixed assets 0.088 0.055 -0.025 -3.248 1.055 
Debt-to-Equity (DE) 0.460 0.760 0.740 -30.360 24.430 
Debt-to-Equity t-1      (DE t-1) 0.675 0.517 0.737 -35.703 24.914 
Expected Debt-to-Equity (Expected DE) 0.775 0.527 0.231 -41.053 72.978 
Debt Ratio (DR t) 0.558 0.550 0.722 0.128 1.465 
Debt Ratio t-1 (DR t-1) 0.558 0.551 0.722 0.128 1.465 
Delta Debt Ratio     (Delta DR) -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.514 0.972 
Fixed Assets-to-total Assets (FATA) 0.448 0.398 0.591 0.006 0.944 
Non Debt Tax shield (NDTAX) 0.050 0.046 0.040 0.004 0.269 
Delta Non Debt tax shield (DeltaND) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.080 0.183 
Effective Corporate tax rate (ECTR) 0.350 0.360 0.500 -14.075 15.571 
Bankruptcy risk (BR) -55.540 -8.012 -6.941 -48282.582 13.511 
Operating income-to-sales (OIS) 0.147 0.124 0.171 -2.255 0.784 
Operating income-to-assets (OIA) 0.111 0.107 0.201 -1.048 0.430 
Dividend payout ratio (DPR) 0.330 0.210 0.000 0.000 29.000 
Current Assets-to-Fixed assets (CAFA) 1.922 0.978 0.209 0.035 139.530 
Dividend Yield (DY) 0.014 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.136 
Change in Inventory (LNInventory) 12.819 13.040 13.456 5.937 17.574 
Probability of Default (PD) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.086 
Market Value of Equity (MVE) Dummy in USD 18,727,317 7,291,980 742,925 12,534 536,481,277 
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 The data are divided into two groups according to each proxy of information 
asymmetry independently. According to the first approach (Sensitivity of Stock Returns to 
Expected ROE), the two groups address the cases of favorable (adverse) selection where 
stock returns are positively (negatively) associated with ROEs. According to the second 
approach (Probability of Default), the two groups address the cases of favorable (adverse) 
selection where PD = zero (1). Finally the distinction of Q ratio above (below) one addresses 
the likelihood of management to invest (under-invest) and therefore corresponds to low 
(high) levels of information asymmetry. Observations are grouped in terms of firm size and 
industry type to understand the variation in results across both factors. Two dummy variables 
are used for firm size; Total assets (TA) and Market value of Equity (MVE) and the data are 
distributed among small, medium, and large size of firms according to each of them. 
3.2.4. Model Estimation 
 Since the data are a cross section-time series panel, the Hausman specification test 
(Hausman, 1978; Hausman and Taylor, 1981) is required to determine whether the fixed or 
random effects model should be used. The test looks for the correlation between the observed 














         
Where itx = regressors, and k  is the error term. 
 The issue of linearity versus nonlinearity is addressed and examined as well. 
Regression Equation Specification Error Test, RESET (Ramsey, 1969; Thursby and Schmidt, 
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The null hypothesis refers to linearity and the alternative refers to nonlinearity.
2
 The 
estimating equation of the random effect nonlinear partial adjustment model takes the form of 








kktk β-1α  Xyyy   (Equation 3.7) 
Where t = 1, …..,n; k is the number of firms in each group; y  is the Firm growth; 
*
y is the 
Target firm growth;  -1  is the Speed of adjustment; X is the determinants of investment, 
financing and dividend decisions; β  is the coefficient of estimated predictors;   is the 
















F where RSSE and USSE  are the sum squared errors for the restricted 
and unrestricted models respectively, J refers to the two hypotheses under consideration, T is the number of 
observations, and K is the number of regressors. 
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3.2.5 Statistical Tests and Estimation Methods 
The estimation of the parameters required addressing four econometric issues; the 
normality versus non-normality, the linearity versus nonlinearity, fixed versus random effects 
estimation, and endogeneity. 
1) Normality versus Non-normality 
The Anderson-Darling test (1952, 1954) is used to examine the normality of the data. This 
test examines the closeness of the variables distribution to the assumptions of the normal 
distribution. The test assumptions are:  
H0: The data are drawn from normal distribution. 
H1: The data are drawn from non-normal distribution 
The results indicate that the dependent as well as the independent variables are not normally 
distributed as the P-value is less than 5%. (Graphs showing normality testing are available in 
Appendix 1). The variables are converted into normal values using the Van der Waerden 
method (Van der Waerden, 1927, 1930, 1931).  
2) Multicollinearity 
As various proxies are used to measure one set of decisions, for example multiple variables 
are used to test for financing decisions, it is necessary to test for multicollinearity of variables 
in order to make sure that there is no high correlation between independent variables. The 
variables that are associated with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) above 5 are excluded. The 
following table shows the results of the VIF test. The results show that none of the variables 
are free from multicollinearity. 

























DE 0.000 0.000 -0.036 -2.632 0.008 0.995 1.005 
 
DRt -0.001 0.000 -0.086 -5.827 0.000 0.895 1.116 
 
DeltaDR -0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.479 0.631 0.920 1.086 
 
FATA -0.003 0.000 -0.075 -4.773 0.000 0.778 1.285 
 
NDTAX -0.065 0.040 -0.036 -1.616 0.106 0.385 2.594 
 
deltaNDTAX 1.814 0.159 0.250 11.385 0.000 0.403 2.479 
 
ECTR 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.084 0.932 0.999 1.000 
 
BR 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.676 0.499 0.999 1.000 
 
OIS -0.001 0.000 -0.011 -0.790 0.429 0.859 1.163 
 
OIA 0.006 0.001 0.078 5.092 0.000 0.817 1.223 
 
DPR 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.279 0.779 0.976 1.023 
 
DY -0.597 0.101 -0.087 -5.915 0.000 0.889 1.123 
 
CAFA 0.000 0.000 0.358 25.656 0.000 0.999 1.000 
 
LnInventory 0.000 0.000 -0.032 -2.183 0.029 0.876 1.140 
 
PD 1.728 0.123 0.196 14.049 0.000 0.996 1.003 
 
a. Dependent Variable: 
SG 
 
       
 
        
3) Fixed Versus Random effects 
The Hausman specification test is used to identify whether the fixed or random effects model 
should be used (Hausman, 1978; Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The test examines the 
correlation between the observed 
itx  and the unobserved k , hence is run under the 
hypotheses that follow. 
 
  effect fixedor  ,0,cov:H













itx = independent variable (regressor), and k =error term. 
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The results of the test show that the random model fits the distribution of the data. Therefore, 
Lagrange Multiplier is used for standardising the variances across firms for the dependent 
and independent variables (Briand and Carter, 2011). 
 Table 3.7: Results of LM used for testing fixed versus random effects 
Decision Platform: Chi square-test 
Data Input 
 
  N number of subjects 355 
  T number of time series 4 
   Significance level 5% 




CHIINV(m, alpha) 3.842 
LM test 
 
LM equation 35.787 
  
conclusion 
IF(Chi square= Chi square critical, "Reject Ho,"Do 
Not Reject Ho" Reject Ho 
  p-value CHIDIST(Chi square, degree of freedom) 0.000 
  conclusion IF(p-value<= Alpha, "Reject Ho,"Do Not Reject Ho" Reject Ho 
4) Linearity versus Non-Linearity 
 The issue of linearity versus nonlinearity is addressed and examined as well. The 
Regression Equation Specification Error Test, RESET (Ramsey, 1969; Thursby and Schmidt, 













The null hypothesis refers to linearity and the alternative refers to nonlinearity. The 





the rejection of the null hypothesis, thus a nonlinear model is appropriate. Table 3.8 shows 
the results of the RESET used for examining the issue of linearity versus non-linearity of 
variables.   
Table 3.8: Results of RESET for testing linearity versus non-linearity  
Hypothesis Testing Using 
the F distribution   
Data Input 





Alpha (Prob) 0.05 
Computed Values 
 df-numerator 2 
df-denomerator 10328 
F 1433.866 
Right Critical Values 2.996 
Decision Reject Ho 
p-value 0.000 
It is worth noting that the algorithm of testing linearity uses the F test to compare 
between two model specifications using the sum of squared errors. The restricted form 
specifies the regression model assuming that the association between dependent and 
independent variables is linear. The regression run of the restricted form results in sum of 
squared errors (SSE-restricted). The unrestricted form specifies the regression model 
assuming that the dependent variable is non-linear that takes polynomial forms such as square 
or cubic powers. The run of the unrestricted form results in another sum of squared errors 
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(SSE-unrestricted). The results in table 3.8 show a comparison between the linear (restricted) 
and the non-linear (unrestricted) using the F test. As far as the SSE-unrestricted is less than 
SSE-restricted, the data fit a non-linear specification. The computed value of F test is carried 










where RSSE and USSE  are the sum squared errors for the restricted and unrestricted 
models respectively, J refers to the two hypotheses under consideration, T refers to the 
number of observations, and K refers to the number of regressors. 
5) Endogeneity 
 A statistical test that should be performed is the Hausman specification test 
(Hausman, 1978), which can be used to check for endogeneity of variables to measure the 
effects of a two-way relationship between dependent and independent variables. In panel data 
analysis it is rather difficult to establish exogeneity between the regressors and error term 
especially in firm financial data. This causes the direction of causality between variables to 
be ambiguous due to potential endogeneity. Firm and individual effects are primarily treated 
by first differencing the variables while use of dummies for each year accounts for time 
effects (Hansen, 1982).  
Consider the following model: 








                                   , ……….                         (Equation 3.9)                             
   is an observed individual effect and    is an observed individual effect. In this model, 
unrestricted serial correlation in     implies that 
3
1, tiy  is an endogenous variable. 
The results reported in table 3.9 show that all the variables are endogenous except for the 
change in non-debt tax shield, DeltaND (Complete outcomes of Hasuman test for 
Endogeneity are reported in Appendix 2). 
Table 3.9: Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity  
Variable Residual t- statistic F-statistic 
Lagged Sales Growth 1.044 269.259*** 3920.77
***
 
Bankruptcy risk 0.076 7.385*** 224.72*** 
Delta Non-debt tax shield -0.017 -1.45 224.72
***
 





Debt-to-Equity 0.153 10.877*** 224.72*** 
Dividend Payout Ratio 0.158 8.849*** 224.72*** 
Debt Ratio -0.098 -6.589*** 224.72*** 
Dividend Yield -0.479 -24.847*** 224.72*** 










Ln Inventory -0.036 -3.436*** 224.72*** 
Non Debt Tax shield 0.140 11.723*** 224.72*** 
Operating Income-to- Assets 0.030 2.182** 224.72*** 
Operating Income-to- Sales 0.101 7.819*** 224.72*** 





*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Thus, it is needed to use an instrumental variable (IV) estimation method such as the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) or the Two Stage Least Square based on 
simultaneous equation systems (Brooks, 2002). GMM is an instrumental variable estimation 
method widely used for models with random regressors. It has the advantage of solving 
problems of simultaneity bias between the firm growth measure and the explanatory 
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variables, and the measurement error issue. It also allows for controlling unobserved 
individual effects present in static model. 
An unbalanced panel model is used on e-views software and the PVAL is calculated using 
the Sargan test (Sargan, 1975) to check the strength of the instruments used. It is calculated 
manually as follows: scalar pval=@chisq(J-Statistic, instrument rank-number of regressors in 
the model). A PVAL that is higher than 0.1 indicates that better instruments are used.  
 Moreover, the use of GMM models would allow the possibility of simultaneous 
determination and reverse causality of sales growth with the other explanatory variables. 
Thus, the assumption that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous is relaxed. Under 
the GMM, instrumental variables that are uncorrelated with the unobservable effects to the 
function that these effects are not included in the error term are being used. The researcher 
uses Arellano and Bover’s (1995) system estimator which they called the GMM-in-system. 
The reason behind using GMM-in-system is to overcome the shortcomings of GMM in 
difference suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). Although GMM in difference solves the 
potential problem of unobserved individual effects, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that 
when the dependent and explanatory variables are persistent overtime, lagged levels of these 
variables are weak instruments for the regression equation in differences.  
 Finally, using the GMM-in-system estimator for dynamic panel data models combines 
moment conditions for the model in first differences with moment conditions for the model in 
levels. Arellano and Bover (1995) show that when there are instruments available that are 
uncorrelated with the individual effects    these variables can be used as instruments for the 
equations in levels. This means using lagged differences of endogenous variables as 
instruments. The GMM-in-system estimator makes an additional assumption that differences 
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of the right-hand side variables are not correlated with the unobserved individual effects and 
precision of the coefficient estimates. 
 The GMM-in-system estimator is used to control for unobserved firm-specific effects 
that might be correlated with other explanatory variables causing OLS estimators to be 
biased and inconsistent. 
The basic testable model in the paper is based on equation (3.10): 
               
           (Equation 3.10)                          
 where, 
3
,tiy  = is the dependent variable, sales growth at time t, xkit is the explanatory 
variables at time t, Time (with t=1,…..,T) are time dummies that control for the impact of 
time on the firm growth of all sample firms, 
ηit is a firm specific effect to allow for the 
unobserved influences on the growth rate of each firm and is assumed to remain constant 
over time, and, υit  is the disturbance term. 
Following Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), this thesis proposes a 
linear GMM estimator in a system of first-differenced and level equations. This linear 
estimator uses lagged differences of the series as instruments for the equations in first 
differences. Specifically, it uses (x i,t-1 -x i,t-2) and (x k,t-1 - x k,t-2)  in addition to lagged levels of 
the series dated (t-2), (t-3) and (t-4) under the assumption that these differences are 
uncorrelated with the firm-specific effect, ( it )even though the levels of the series are 
correlated with ( it ). 




3.3 Results and Discussion 
 This section presents the outcome of the GMM models and analyses the results 
obtained from each of them. Each of the corporate finance decisions (financing, investment 
and dividends) is presented separately, and also presented is the combined effect of all three 
of them on growth of the firm. For one of the proxies of information asymmetry, Beta ROE, 
adverse observations were too few to fit in a model that requires using instrumental variables. 
Thus, only favorable results using Beta ROE as a proxy for information asymmetry are 
reported.  
 Table 3.10 presents the contribution of financing decisions to the growth of the firm, 
among other variables such as operating income-to-assets and operating income-to-sales, 
probability of default and bankruptcy risk.. The dependent variable (Y) is the sales growth 
and the Xs are the determinants of financing policy (capital structure).  
All proxies are assessed under both favorable and adverse selection indicating low and high 
levels of information asymmetry. Three proxies for information asymmetry are used: Beta 
ROE, PD ROE, and Q ratio. It is worth mentioning that upon using each proxy, the number 
of favorable and adverse observations varied significantly as various observations were 
classified as adverse or favorable differently according to the proxy used.  
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 Table 3.10: The association between financing decision and growth of the firm 
Variables 
Proxies of Information asymmetry 
(Favorable selection) 
Proxies of Information asymmetry 
(Adverse selection) 
Dependent Sales Growth Sales Growth 
  Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio Beta ROE Q Ratio PD ROE 
Constant 0.006 -0.008 0.006 
 
0.001 -0.007 
Debt-to-Equity -0.029 -0.019 -0.01 
  
0.048 0.097*** 
Debt Ratio -0.045* -0.007 -0.068*** 
  
0.143*** -0.185*** 
Delta Debt Ratio 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 
  
0.052 0.074*** 
Non-Debt Tax Shield -0.037 -0.051* -0.131*** 
  
0.029 -0.012 
Delta Non-debt 0.048 -0.078 0.217*  -0.03 -0.230* 
Effective Corporate Tax Rate 0.012 0.004 0.01 
  
-0.033 0.037* 
Business Risk -0.041*** -0.006 0.006 
  
-0.125*** -0.108*** 
Operating income-to-sales -0.060*** -0.029 -0.107***  -0.021 -0.262*** 
Operating income-to-assets 0.139*** 0.234*** 0.138*** 
  
0.158*** 0.229*** 
Probability of Default -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.135*** 
  
-0.115*** -0.096*** 
Industry 1 0.201 0.099 -0.157 
  
0.144 -0.121 
Industry 2 0.238 0.138 -0.268 No Results 0.099 0.138 
Industry 4 -0.378** -0.373*** -0.761*** 
 
0.025 -0.19 
Industry 5 -0.023 -0.038 -0.363 
  
0.033 -0.123 
Industry 6 -0.034 -0.16 -0.278 
  
-0.175 -0.308** 
Industry 7 0.096 -0.113 -0.535*** 
  
0.111 -0.164 
Industry 8 0.121 0.105 -0.350** 
  
0.099 -0.267* 
Industry 9 -0.446** -0.004 -0.491** 
 
-0.278 -0.450** 
Total Assets Small 0.058 0.202*** 0.220*** 
  
0.265*** 0.000 
Total Assets Medium -0.029 0.134*** 0.06 
  
0.127*** -0.169*** 
N 2607 1573 2209 
  
1202 1612 




0.092 0.132 0.044 
  
0.081 0.107 
SE 1.355 1.282 1.311 
  
1.32 1.361 




















Debt-to-equity = total debt/total equity; Debt ratio = total debt/total assets; Delta DR= DRt-DRt-1; Non-Debt 
Tax Shield = DDA/total assets; DeltaND = NDTAXt-NDTAX t-1; Effective corporate tax rate = taxes 
paid/EBT; Bankruptcy risk = (Interest paid – EBIT)/ σEBIT; Operating income-to-sales = EBIT/sales; 
Operating income-to-assets = EBIT/total assets; Probability of Default = 1- N(d2)ROE; Industry 1-9 
corresponds to industry dummies as classified in table 3.1 and total assets small, medium corresponds to size of 
the firm dummies. 
 
**** D-W test significant at 5% two-sided level of significance. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
 In the hypotheses development section, H1 proposes a positive relation between debt 
financing and firm growth at high level of information asymmetry. The empirical findings in 
the adverse models (High level of information asymmetry) support this hypothesis in the Q 
model where debt ratio has a significant positive impact on growth while findings of the PD 
model contradicts this hypothesis as debt Ratio has a negative impact on growth. Debt-to-
Equity Ratio was positively significant in the PD model whereas it is insignificant in the Q 
model. These findings are critically discussed in the following sections.  
 Table 3.10 shows that in the favorable models (firms face low information 
asymmetry) the three models are consistent in the impact of change in debt ratio (Delta DR), 
while the debt ratio itself (DR) showed less consistent results. Nevertheless, the Debt-to-
Equity (DE) was insignificant for the three models. The finding that Delta DR is always 
significant at 1% significance level and has a positive impact on sales growth is crucial to this 
study. It supports previous findings by Dann et al. (1991); Hertzel and Jain (1991); Lie and 
McConnell (1998); and Nohel and Tarhan (1998) that leverage-increasing transactions have 
positive impact on operating performance. Moreover, this finding supports the Pecking Order 
theory by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) that favors financing new investments 
using debt rather than equity after consuming internal sources of funding. 
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  The DR had a significant negative impact on firm growth for two of the three models 
while it was insignificant only for the PD model. This finding is important as it implies that 
existing capital structures of the firms should not rely heavily on debt as it hinders growth. 
This aligns with previous assertions by Frank and Goyal (2005) that there is a negative 
relation between debt and firm growth. It is also in line with the findings of Fulghieri et al. 
(2013) that firms prefer equity financing and then shifts towards debt as they mature. This 
verifies that Delta DR had a significant positive impact on growth while the DR has a 
negative impact.  
 Other variables in the models that were significant were the operating income to 
assets and the probability of default whereas other variables such as effective corporate tax 
rate, operating income-to-sales, and bankruptcy risk were insignificant or significant in one or 
two models only. As for the dummy variables for industry and size, the only consistent 
significant impact was on the information technology industry (IND 4) while the effect of 
size varied from one model to another. For the PD model, size was significant for both small 
and medium sized firms while for the Q model it was significant only for small firms.   
 For the adverse models, for firms facing high level of information asymmetry, only 
two models are presented because the Beta ROE model, as mentioned before, had too few 
observations to fit in a GMM model that uses instrumental variables. As for the other two 
models, inconsistent results were obtained: for the Q ratio, only DR was significant among 
the variables that measure financing decisions while for the PD model all three were 
significant. These conflicting results prove that firms facing high level of information 
asymmetry grow in different ways and that investors might face lots of uncertainties when 
they invest in them. The DR had a positive impact on firm growth in the Q model and a 
negative impact in the PD model. Moreover, the Delta DR had a positive impact in the PD 
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model, consistent with the favorable models, while it was insignificant for the Q model. 
Finally, the DE ratio was positively significant for the PD model and insignificant for the Q 
model.  
 The results are somewhat similar to what Noe and Rebello (1996) proposed regarding 
capital structure under information asymmetry, as they suggested that shareholders would 
prefer debt financing to benefit from their control over earnings and the cash that 
management captures. However, introducing information asymmetry to this equation might 
change the preferences of both the managers and shareholders. On one hand, the latter would 
base their preference for either debt or equity on the trade-off between costs of payments to 
management and costs of adverse selection. Thus, shareholders might prefer equity financing 
if the costs of adverse selection are greater than costs of cash paid to managerial staff. On the 
other hand, managers would prefer debt financing if the costs of adverse selection are high 
even on the expense of their benefit. With the given managerial control over firms, managers 
would prefer relying on higher debt financing as it conveys favorable information to the 
market. This might explain why the DE and DR ratios resulted in different outcomes under 
the adverse models.  
 The adverse models also show a more significant contribution for another variable 
that was insignificant for two of the favorable models: bankruptcy risk. This finding also 
emphasises the uncertainties that are associated with financing firms with severe information 
problems. Still, the operating income to assets and probability of default were significant 
while industry effects were mostly insignificant. As for the size effect, the relationship is 
significant for medium sized firms and for small firms in the Q model only. The variations in 
size effect among the five models (the three favourable and the two adverse ones) show that 
those firms grow in different patterns. The finding that large firms are not affected by these 
130 
 
relationships might be due to their level of maturity and stable income streams that allow 
them to rely less on external financing.   
The following table presents the contribution of investment decisions to firm growth.  
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Table 3.11: The association between investment decision and growth of the firm 
Variables 
Proxies of Information asymmetry 
(Favorable selection) 
Proxies of Information asymmetry 
(Adverse selection) 
Dependent Sales Growth   Sales Growth 
 
Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio 
Constant 0.007 0.023 0.023 
No Results 
-0.018 0.007 
Fixed Assets-to-total assets 0.01 -0.025 -0.072 0.149*** 0.14 
Non-debt tax shield 0.004 -0.089*** -0.188*** -0.050* 0.064 
Delta non-debt -0.322* 0.122* 0.262** -0.422*** -0.216* 
Effective corporate tax rate 0.025 0.008 -0.008 0.031* -0.042** 
Bankruptcy risk 0.017 -0.034 0.014 -0.114*** -0.117*** 
Operating income-to-sales -0.072** -0.061** -0.145*** -0.229*** -0.014 
Operating income-to-assets 0.161*** 0.227*** 0.191*** 0.177*** 0.071* 
Current assets-to-fixed assets -0.169 -0.045 -0.165*** -0.028 0.209*** 
Change in Inventory 0.039 0.038 0.033* -0.008 -0.038** 
Probability of Default -0.148*** -0.120*** -0.197*** -0.110*** -0.018 
Industry 1 0.516*** -0.134 -0.192 -0.18 0.091 
Industry 2 0.607*** -0.034 -0.215 0.260* 0.084 
Industry 4 -0.1 -0.617** -0.623*** 0.049 -0.169 
Industry 5 0.278 -0.272 -0.426** -0.407** 0.111 
Industry 6 0.263 -0.353 -0.322* -0.328** -0.235 
Industry 7 0.306 -0.334 -0.649*** -0.182 0.115 
Industry 8 0.498*** -0.162 -0.360** -0.181 -0.043 
Industry 9 -0.086 -0.222 -0.504*** -0.609*** -0.29 
Total assets small 0.151** 0.336*** 0.350*** 0.06 0.03 
Total assets medium 0.008 0.192*** 0.129*** -0.125** 0.011 
N 2522 1575 2210 1612 1202 
J-Statistic 20.77 21.654 21.616 20.78 15.648 
 
0.008 0.122 0.011 0.016 0.057 
SE 1.422 1.297 1.333 1.435 1.341 
P-VAL 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.61 






Fixed assets-to-total assets = total fixed assets / total assets; Non-Debt Tax Shield = DDA/total assets; DeltaND 
= NDTAXt-NDTAX t-1; Effective corporate tax rate = taxes paid/EBT; Bankruptcy risk = (Interest paid – 
EBIT)/ SDEBIT; Operating income-to-sales = EBIT/sales; Operating income-to-assets = EBIT/total assets; 
current assets-to fixed assets = total current assets / total fixed assets; change in inventory = inventory t- 
inventory t-1; Probability of Default = 1- N(d2)ROE; Industry 1-9 corresponds to industry dummies as classified 
in table 3.1 and total assets small, medium corresponds to size of the firm dummies.                  
**** D-W test significant at 5% two-sided level of significance.          
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
In the hypotheses development section, three hypotheses are suggested for firms that are 
facing high level of information asymmetry; a negative relationship between investment in 
long-term assets (Fixed assets) and firm growth, and a positive relationship between 
investments in current assets, inventory and firm growth. The empirical findings contradict 
these hypotheses in the PD model where investment in fixed assets has a significant positive 
impact on growth while both current assets and inventory are insignificant. The Q model 
supports one of the hypotheses as the current assets investments has a significant positive 
impact on growth while fixed assets investment is insignificant and inventory has a negative 
impact on growth. These results are critically discussed as follows.   
Table 3.11 shows the contribution of investment decisions to the growth of a firm at both 
high and low levels of information asymmetry. The three proxies used to differentiate adverse 
and favorable observation are Beta ROE, PD ROE, and Q ratio. The Q ratio is the most 
relevant measure for investment in particular as it shows whether the firm is under-investing 
or not. In addition, the problems associated with investment decisions are related more to 
managerial behaviour rather than asymmetry of information. As Li (2011) suggests that the 
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information content or the signal effect of investment decisions is not as severe as in other 
corporate decisions like the dividend payout for example. His argument is based on the 
findings of Skinner and Soltes (2011) who examined the earnings quality based on dividend 
decisions and concluded that investment in capital and labour are less sensitive to information 
signaling than dividend decisions. Results obtained from the various models are discussed in 
the following paragraphs.  
 In the favorable models, firms experience low information asymmetry and do not 
suffer from underinvestment problems (in the Q model), the consistent result is related to the 
amount of fixed assets to total assets (FATA) that was insignificant in the three models. 
Current assets-to-fixed assets (CAFA) was only significant in the Q model, and similarly the 
change in inventory level (LNINV) was significant only in the Q model. CAFA was found to 
have had a negative impact on firm growth while inventory level had a positive impact. The 
latter finding is consistent with suggestions of Carpenter et al. (1994) that firms should invest 
in inventory to promote growth. However, the results were not found to be consistent with the 
theory of Cheatham (1989) that firms tend to invest in current assets after they acquire the 
necessary long-term assets and use such investment to grow their sales. Nevertheless, FATA 
was consistently insignificant, indicating that the amount of fixed assets does not matter when 
it comes to promoting growth in sales for firms that already have sufficient assets to function 
well (i.e. for firms that acquired the necessary long term assets, with Q above one).  
 Industry effects varied across models, however size effect was found to be the most 
significant. Specifically, the relationship for size effect was significant for small firms in the 
three models and for medium sized firms in two of the three. Other significant variables that 
contribute to or hinder growth were operating income to sales, operating income to assets, 
and probability of default. 
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 In the adverse models, firms face a high level of information asymmetry (PD ROE) or 
have a Q Ratio lower than one (Q) and thus suffer from underinvestment problems. The 
results of the two models varied significantly, strengthening the argument that firms suffering 
from higher levels of information asymmetry grow in different ways. However, the 
assumption is that the PD model focuses on firms facing information problems whereas the Q 
model focuses on firms suffering from managerial-related considerations.   
 Starting with the PD model, the FATA was found to have a significant positive 
impact on firm growth, suggesting that firms should invest more in fixed assets to grow their 
sales revenues. However, the CAFA and the change in inventory were insignificant. This is 
the opposite of what Cheatham (1989) and Carpenter et al. (1994) suggested regarding 
investment in current assets and inventory to grow rather than long term assets. This outcome 
also suggests that firms that suffer from high level of information asymmetry still can grow 
by investing more in assets to produce and sell more etc. Other significant variables in this 
model were non-debt tax shielding, the change in non-debt tax shielding, bankruptcy risk, 
effective corporate tax rate, operating income to sales, operating income to assets, and 
probability of default. The large number of contributing variables in this model, in 
comparison to favorable models, shows that understanding and predicting growth for firms 
suffering from information problems is more difficult as. As for the industry and size 
dummies, the relationship was only significant for medium sized firms and for four of the 
industries.  
 In the Q model, the one that matters the most when it comes to investment and agency 
problems, different outcomes are found. First, the FATA is insignificant, consistent with the 
all the favorable models. Second, the CAFA and LNINV are significant, opposing to the Q 
model, yet they had opposite signs when compared with Favorable Q model. This time the 
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CAFA had a positive impact on firm growth while the change in inventory had a negative 
impact on it. The finding that investing in current assets is better for firms with severe agency 
problems is consistent with those of Cheatham (1989) that suggested that firms should focus 
more on investing in current assets. This is supported by the implication that these firms 
suffer from underinvestment problems, meaning that an investment in current assets is 
needed to address the issues hindering growth. However, the negative impact of inventory, 
(in contradiction to the theory of  Carpenter et al. (1994)), despite it being a current asset, 
implies that accumulating inventory for firms that already suffer from underinvestment 
problems hinders their abilities to grow. 
 This model showed no impact for size and industry dummies while other variables 
were mostly in line with the PD model. Again, the adverse models place much emphasis on 
sources of risk, unlike favorable models, such as bankruptcy risk and probability of default 
which proves that firms suffering from information asymmetry problems or underinvestment 
agency considerations could still grow but they need to focus on the "whole picture" and try 






Table 3.12: The association between dividend decision and growth of the firm 
Variables 
Proxies of Information asymmetry 
(Favorable selection) 
Proxies of Information asymmetry 
(Adverse selection) 
Dependent Sales Growth Sales Growth 
 Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio 
Constant -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 
 
-0.014 0.009 
Non Debt tax shield -0.027 -0.097*** -0.168***  -0.048** 0.068** 
Delta non-debt 0.04 0.011 0.298**  -0.037 -0.231** 
Effective corporate tax rate -0.009 -0.018 -0.03  0.052*** -0.048*** 
Bankruptcy risk -0.059*** -0.024 0.001  -0.092*** -0.121*** 
Operating income to sales -0.048* -0.049** -0.055**  -0.150*** -0.058* 
Operating income to assets 0.132*** 0.225*** 0.197***  0.142*** 0.201*** 
Dividend payout ratio 0.202*** 0.124*** 0.213***  0.204*** 0.249*** 
Dividend yield -0.455*** -0.380*** -0.570***  -0.474*** -0.362*** 
Probability of default -0.096*** -0.080*** -0.244***  -0.156*** 0.007 
Industry 1 0.186 -0.253*** -0.508***  -0.392*** 0.353** 
Industry 2 0.137 -0.211*** -0.614***  -0.224** 0.323* 
Industry 4 -0.469** -0.460*** -1.075*** No Results -0.325*** 0.126 
Industry 5 0.301 -0.068 -0.480**  -0.031 0.580*** 
Industry 6 -0.043 -0.315*** -0.514***  -0.577*** -0.09 
Industry 7 0.074 -0.312*** -0.697***  -0.381*** 0.361** 
Industry 8 0.098 -0.230*** -0.584***  -0.522*** 0.259 
Industry 9 -0.488* -0.235*** -0.838***  -0.934*** 0.022 
Total assets small -0.024 0.103*** 0.055  0.086** -0.032 
Total assets medium -0.099*** 0.064*** -0.01  -0.111*** -0.037 
N 2607 1571 2295  1610 1113 
J-Statistic 20.495 23.296 22.699  17.322 18.541 
 0.137 0.185 0.045  0.175 0.095 
SE 1.324 1.239 1.298  1.282 1.304 
P-VAL 0.24 0.22 0.16  0.43 0.35 







Non-Debt Tax Shield = DDA/total assets; DeltaND = NDTAXt-NDTAX t-1; Effective corporate tax rate = 
taxes paid/EBT; Bankruptcy risk = (Interest paid – EBIT)/ SDEBIT; Operating income-to-sales = EBIT/sales; 
Operating income-to-assets = EBIT/total assets; dividend payout ratio = total dividends / net income; Dividend 
yield = dividend per share / market price per share; Probability of Default = 1- N(d2)ROE; IND1-9 corresponds 
to industry dummies as classified in table 3.1 and total assets small, medium corresponds to size dummies. 
 
**** D-W test significant at 5% two-sided level of significance. 
*** Significant at the level 1%, ** Significant at the level 5%, * Significant at the level 10% 
 
 In the hypotheses development section, the hypothesis regarding the dividend payout 
suggests a positive impact of dividend payout on firm growth at high level of information 
asymmetry. The empirical findings support this hypothesis in both favorable and adverse 
models where dividend payout ratio has a significant positive impact on firm growth in all the 
empirical models. These findings are the only consistent ones across all favorable and 
adverse models. In the following context, the impact of dividend policy on firm growth is 
critically discussed.   
 Table 3.12 shows the association between dividend policy and growth of the firm. 
Dividend policy, as mentioned before, is what each investor can easily understand, interpret, 
and act upon, unlike the financing and investment decisions that are only interpreted by 
experienced and professional investors. Using the three proxies of information asymmetry; 
Beta ROE, PD ROE, and Q ratio, and by dividing the observations into favorable and adverse 
selections, the above results were obtained. It is obvious that for all the models the 
determinants of dividend policy; payout ratio (DPR) and dividend yield (DY) had the same 
sign, significance level, and even very close coefficients. 
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 In the favorable models, all three showed a significant positive contribution of DPR 
and a significant negative contribution of DY to firm growth. This finding is in contrast with 
suggestions of Rozeff (1982) and Bartram et al. (2012) that both suggested a negative 
relationship between dividend payout and firm growth. However both suggest increasing 
payout ratios to decrease agency costs. Nonetheless, this finding aligns with other studies that 
suggested that increasing dividend payments signal higher earnings for the firm like Beer 
(1993); Brook et al. (1998); and Balachandran and Nguyen (2004). These studies support 
Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) models that suggest that firms signal their 
superior operating performance through increase in dividends. Moreover, these results 
support previous findings by Skinner and Soltes (2011) who examined the relation between 
dividend policy and the quality of firms' earnings. Earnings are widely used as a proxy for 
firm growth as mentioned before. The findings of this study indicated that dividend-paying 
firms have more persistent earnings than firms that do not pay dividends frequently.    
 The effect of other variables matched the favorable models for financing and 
investment decisions to a significant extent. The size effect, was found to vary from one 
model to another, contradicting the findings of Lloyd et al. (1985) who examined the role of 
size in the payout policy and found significant relation between the payout ratios and firm 
size. As for the industry effect, the relationship was significant for most of the industries yet 
the three models yielded similar results for two industries: information technology and 
energy. For both, the effect was negative which might be due to the fact that both industries 
require large spend on research and development and large capital investments, thus, 
investors in such firms prefer less payout and more retention for future expansion. Other 
variables such as operating income to sales, operating income to assets, and probability of 
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default were significant for the three models and showed similar results to those of favorable 
models for financing and investment decisions. 
 In the adverse models, unlike the financing and investment models, the favorable and 
adverse models yield similar results; the DPR has a significant positive effect and the DY has 
a significant negative effect on firm growth. The difference is only in other variables such as 
bankruptcy risk that is significant in the adverse models, as it was in those for the financing 
and investment ones. The consistent impact of dividends proves that firms care most about 
dividend payments to signal their performance to investors. This is consistent with previous 
studies such as Beer (1993); Brook et al. (1998); and Balachandran and Nguyen (2004) who 
supported the signaling hypothesis, while it opposes studies like that of Yoon and Starks 
(1995); Bernhardt et al. (2005); and Brav et al. (2005) that rejected this hypothesis.  
 The most important finding in these models is that dividend decisions do not differ in 
terms of its impact on firm growth from firms that suffer from high or low information 
asymmetry. This contradicts the studies that suggested a relationship between payout policy 
and agency problems such as Nam et al. (2004); Chetty and Saez (2006); and Brown et al. 
(2007). In addition, the close results obtained from both adverse and favorable models defies 
the Rozeff (1982); Easterbrook (1984); and Borokhovich et al. (2005) propositions that 
paying out more dividends reduces agency conflicts either by increasing monitoring by 
financial markets or by decreasing the cash on hand available for management to misuse. 
However, it does align with their propositions that the payout of increased dividends can be 
beneficial, not for agency considerations, but rather to promote firm growth. This finding 
shows that firms, regardless of their level of information asymmetry, focus on their dividend 
policy as it is monitored closely by market participants. 
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 Finally, the early attempt by Ross (1977) to link information asymmetry with the 
dividend decision in inefficient markets is somewhat supported by the results of these 
models. He argued that management could use the dividend policy to signal information to 
the less informed shareholders. For example, a higher payout ratio would signal higher 
anticipated profits. However, it emerged that even the firms with low information asymmetry 
follow the same policy of signalling their performance through dividend payments. This 
provides support to the traditional bird-in-hand theory that investors prefer to receive 
dividends rather than wait for future benefits. Surprisingly, paying out more in dividends 
contributes to firm growth rather than hinders its ability to invest the cash in alternative 
investments. However, this could also be explained by the fact that firms that grow in terms 
of sales, in most cases, are likely to have higher profits and thus are able to pay more 
dividends.   
 A final table in this chapter presents the impact of the three financial decisions on 
firm growth at high and low levels of information asymmetry. Although the previous models 
examined the impact of each of the three decisions (Financing, Investment, and Dividend) on 
firm growth, and despite the fact that the literature does not cite any interactive terms 
between the three of them, the motive behind this model is to examine the synergy effect of 
financial decisions and firm growth as those decisions are inseparable from each other. 
Therefore, table 3.13 presents the relative contribution of investment, financing, and dividend 
decisions to firm growth at both high and low levels of information asymmetry. 
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Table 3.13: The association between financing, investment, and dividend decisions and growth of the firm 
 
Variables 
Proxies of Information asymmetry (Favorable 
selection) 
Proxies of Information asymmetry (Adverse 
selection) 
Dependent Sales Growth Sales Growth 
  Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio 





 0.024 -0.034**  0.034 0.017 
Debt Ratio 0.009 -0.022 -0.051***  -0.069* 0.169*** 
Delta Debt ratio 0.044*** 0.070*** 0.084***  0.042* 0.058** 
Fixed assets-to-total assets -0.018 0.01 -0.126**  -0.039 0.057* 
Non-debt tax shield -0.01 -0.122*** -0.198***  -0.354*** -0.139 
Delta non-debt -0.109 0.170** 0.302**  0.031** -0.037** 
Effective corporate tax rate -0.021 -0.021 -0.039*  -0.115*** -0.117*** 
Bankruptcy risk -0.024 -0.016 0.021  -0.258*** -0.006 
Operating income to sales -0.034 -0.009 -0.113***  0.235*** 0.187*** 
Operating income to assets 0.119*** 0.194*** 0.251***  0.223*** 0.250*** 
Dividend payout ratio 0.187*** 0.148*** 0.249***  -0.484*** -0.401*** 
Dividend yield -0.429*** -0.433*** -0.614***  0.017 0.102 
Current assets to fixed assets -0.07 ------ -0.205***  -0.131*** 0.174*** 
Change in Inventory 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.075***  0.034** -0.032 
Probability of Default -0.089*** -0.116*** -0.239*** No Results -0.077*** -0.087*** 
Industry 1 0.285 -0.332*** -0.617***  -0.387*** 0.194 
Industry 2 0.247 -0.326*** -0.712***  -0.184 0.049 
Industry 4 -0.424** -0.527*** -1.033***  -0.424*** -0.064 
Industry 5 0.410** -0.174** -0.133  -0.136 0.449*** 
Industry 6 0.078 -0.344*** -0.710***  -0.562*** -0.191 
Industry 7 0.131 -0.433*** -0.860***  -0.390*** 0.388*** 
Industry 8 0.232 -0.316*** -0.790***  -0.537*** 0.126 
Industry 9 -0.350* -0.300*** -0.936***  -0.924*** -0.109 
Total assets small 0.083 0.194*** 0.193***  0.037 -0.018 
Total assets medium -0.012 0.136*** 0.076**  -0.146*** 0.002 
N 2521 1657 2201  1611 1113 
J-Statistic 26.084 24.154 27.13  24.14 26.26 
 
0.139 0.173 0.064  0.101 0.152 
SE 1.327 1.236 1.28  1.356 1.279 
P-VAL 0.29 0.28 0.25  0.39 0.28 
D-W test 3.016**** 2.925**** 2.919**** 






 Debt-to-equity = total debt/total equity; Debt ratio = total debt/total assets; Delta DR= DRt-DRt-1; Fixed 
assets-to-total assets = total fixed assets / total assets; Non-Debt Tax Shield = DDA/total assets; DeltaND = 
NDTAXt-NDTAX t-1; Effective corporate tax rate = taxes paid/EBT; Bankruptcy risk = (Interest paid – 
EBIT)/ SDEBIT; Operating income-to-sales = EBIT/sales; Operating income-to-assets = EBIT/total assets; 
dividend payout ratio = total dividends / net income; Dividend yield = dividend per share / market price per 
share; current assets-to fixed assets = total current assets / total fixed assets; change in inventory = inventory 
t- inventory t-1; Probability of Default = 1- N(d2)ROE; IND1-9 corresponds to industry dummies as 
classified in table 3.1 and total assets small, medium corresponds to size dummies.   
            
**** D-W test significant at 5% two-sided level of significance.         
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10 
 
  Table 3.13 shows the combined effects of the three main corporate finance decisions 
on firm growth. The importance of this relationship is derived by previous studies that 
suggested an existing relation between each set of two, or all three of them such as Koch and 
Shenoy (1999); Chen et al. (2010); Bolton et al. (2011); and Morellec et al. (2014). To the 
best of the researcher's knowledge, none of the previous studies examined the combined 
effect of the three of them on firm growth under high and low levels of information 
asymmetry. The results obtained from the three favorable and the two adverse models are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 Starting with the favorable models, most variables were consistent over the three 
models which suggest that firms suffering from low information asymmetry grow in a 
structured way. The variables that were consistent in terms of coefficient sign and 
significance were DELTADR, OIA, DPR, DY, LNINVEN, and PD. Other variables were 
only significant in one or two models like DE, DR, FATA, and CAFA. The change in debt 
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level had a positive effect (DELTADR) which again suggests the financing of new 
investments using debt. The DPR had a positive effect as well which suggests increasing 
payout ratios. Moreover, the change in inventory had a positive effect which suggests 
investing in inventory to increase sales growth. Lastly, the operating income to assets had a 
positive while the probability of default had a negative impact on firm growth.  
 The variables that were significant in one or two models only, such as the DE, DR, 
FATA, and CAFA all had a negative impact on growth suggesting that low debt levels and 
lower investment in assets, other than inventory, helps firms grow. This is especially the case 
for firms with Q ratio higher than one which suggests that these firms already acquired assets 
using debt. The relationship was significant for every industry and for both small and 
medium sized firms in at least two of the three models. It can be concluded that for firms 
experiencing low level of information asymmetry growth is a function of financing new 
investments using debt, increasing dividend payout ratio, and investing more in inventory 
rather than fixed assets or other current assets. 
 As for the adverse models, for firms facing high level of information asymmetry or 
experiencing agency issues (Q ratio is lower than one), some variables were found to be 
significant for both models, such as DR, DELTADR, DPR, DY, BR, ECTR, OIA, CAFA, 
and PD. However, for three of them; DR, ECTR, and CAFA the coefficient had opposite 
signs in both models. Also, the DELTADR was significant at a lower significance level for 
both models (5% and 10%). The finding that DR and CAFA had opposite coefficients 
suggests that firms that suffer from high level of information asymmetry grow in a different 
manner. High debt level can affect growth positively or negatively, although increasing debt 
can help firms grow. Nevertheless, investing in current assets can either hinder or enable 
144 
 
growth. When associated with increasing inventory, it hinders growth (PD model). Whereas, 
it contributes positively when there is no significant impact of inventory (Q model).  
 Bankruptcy risk affects growth negatively for both models suggesting that firms 
should try to reduce or mitigate such risk to enable growth. While dividend payout and 
operating income-to-assets, similar to the favorable models, contribute positively to firm 
growth, other variables like DE and FATA were insignificant in both models while the 
change in inventory had a significant impact for the PD model only. As for the size and 
industry dummies, the relationship was insignificant for small firms while it was significant 
only for medium sized firms in the PD model. The industry effect was significant in at least 
one model or in both except for one industry: healthcare (IND 2). Yet, it had opposite effect 
in one of the industries; consumer staples (IND 7) suggesting, again, different patterns of 
growth for firms facing high level of information asymmetry.            
 The above results are not linked to previous literature as the individual effect models 
for each of the three decisions; financing, investment, and dividend because, as mentioned 
above, none of the previous studies examined this relationship. An important finding that is 
derived from this chapter is that differentiating the sample using different proxies for 
information asymmetry resulted in variation in the number of observations. For example for 
the favorable models discussed above the number of observations using Beta ROE as a proxy 
for information asymmetry were 2521 while using PD ROE it dropped to 1657, and 2201 
using the Q ratio. Nevertheless, this study used one proxy for firm growth - Sales growth - as 
it was associated with the least standard error using descriptive statistics. Other proxies of 
growth should be used in future research to show whether consistent results will be obtained 
or not. Since the adjusted R-squared was low for all the models, there is a need to examine 
other variables that could contribute to firm growth. In this chapter, financial variables like 
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investment, financing, and dividend decisions were used to examine their contribution to firm 















The effect of ownership structure on firm growth at various levels of information 
asymmetry 
4.1 Hypothesis development and methods of estimation  
4.1.1 Hypotheses development 
 The previous chapter addressed the contribution of financial variables - investment, 
financing, and dividend decisions - to firm growth under high and low levels of information 
asymmetry. In this chapter, one of the major non-financial variables, ownership structure, is 
examined to measure its impact on firm growth. As mentioned before in the review of 
relevant literature (chapter 2) recent financial scandals have drawn extensive attention to 
corporate governance and its impact on efficiency and effectiveness of managers' decisions. 
Variables such as ownership structure, board composition, internal audit units, and 
committees of both executives and non-executives are all used to enhance firm performance 
and reduce the informational gap between managers and shareholders.   
 Institutional investors like mutual funds, investment managers, and brokerage firms 
(When they own shares rather than play their initial role as an intermediary in the secondary 
market) typically possess a substantial amount of shares and are better able to monitor the 
performance of managers. This monitoring encourages managers to focus on firm 
performance rather than on personal benefits. As mentioned in section 2.6, prior empirical 
evidence suggested either a positive impact or no effect of institutional investors on firm 
performance. The better performance shall enable these firms to grow in terms of sales, 
assets, etc. For example, Faccio and Lasfer (2000); and Fazlzadeh et al. (2011); and Al-Najjar 
(2015) suggested that mixed results were obtained regarding the impact of institutional 
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investors on firm performance. Whereas, McConnell and Servaes (1990); Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999); Cornett et al. (2007); and Chen et al. (2008) found a positive relation 
between the percentage of institutional ownership and various performance measures. These 
results suggest that institutional investors might contribute to firm growth. In particular, firms 
that face high level of information asymmetry might rely on monitoring by institutional 
shareholders among other monitoring mechanisms to enhance firm growth. Thus, higher 
institutional ownership concentration could contribute to corporate performance in general 
and to firm growth in particular. Therefore, especially for firms facing high level of 
information asymmetry, a testable hypothesis could be derived as follows: 
H1: "A positive relationship exists between institutional ownership concentration and firm 
growth at high level of information asymmetry." 
 Nevertheless, individual investors, though they vary substantially in terms of 
knowledge, experience, etc., generally have less access to information than institutional 
investors. Barber and Odean (2000) argue that individual investors are typically less informed 
and their average annual returns are substantially less than the average market return. They 
conclude that individuals are advised not to invest on their own as this affects their personal 
wealth. Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) claim that ownership concentration could 
serve as a substitute for the weak protection rights of investors. Since the individual investors 
are typically the less protected and less informed investors, they will normally increase their 
ownership portion only in firms where they have access to sufficient information upon which 
they can take their decision on whether to invest or not. Typically, they will select successful 
firms that are expected to perform better in the future in terms of profitability, growth etc. 
Therefore another testable hypothesis could be: 
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H2: "A positive relationship exists between increase in individual ownership concentration 
and firm growth at low level of information asymmetry." 
4.1.2 Data and definition of variables 
 The sample used in this study is the S&P 500 non-financial firms. Annual ownership 
data for the period from 2004-2014 are obtained from Thomson Reuters' database. Ownership 
structure is divided into three items: individual investors, investment managers, and 
brokerage firms. The latter two variables correspond to institutional investors' ownership 
whereas the first one corresponds to individuals' ownership. The dependent variable in this 
analysis is the change in sales growth (SG), the proxy of firm growth associated with the 
lowest standard error. The independent variables are: change in individual investments, 
change in brokerage firms' ownership and change in investment managers' ownership. 
Brokerage firms typically play the role of financial intermediary in the secondary market yet 
sometimes brokerage firms hold shares in some firms as a form of investment. Thus, in 
Thomsen Reuter Eikon, brokerage firms' ownership and investment managers' ownership are 
considered proxies for institutional ownership while individual investors are separately 
classified. 
 Control variables are used for industry and size effects as in the previous chapter 
where industries are given dummies from one to ten except for industry three (financial 
firms). Additionally, the other control variable, size, is measured using the same two proxies 
that were used in the previous chapter: total assets and market value of equity. Data is 
distinguished using the same three proxies for information asymmetry: Beta ROE, PD, and Q 
ratio to distinguish between high and low levels of information asymmetry. The following 
two tables, table 4.1 and table 4.2, summarise the variables used in the analysis, which will be 
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Table 4.1: Definition of Variables 
 Firm Growth Proxies: References 
Dependent  Variable 
Growth in Sales  Continuous compound growth rate of Sales  
(Hoy et al., 1992; Barkham et al. ,1995; Ardishvili et 
al., 1998; Flamholtz, 1986 Davidsson and Wiklund, 
2000) 
Growth in Fixed Assets Continuous compound growth rate of Fixed Assets  (Hart, 1995; Delmar et al., 2003) 
Growth in Total Assets Continuous compound growth rate of Total Assets  Hart (1995) 
Sales-weighted fixed assets 
growth 
Sales growth and fixed assets growth  (Eldomiaty and Rashwan, 2013) 
Independent Variables 
 
LN Individual investment 
Proxies: Barber and Odean (2000) 
LN Brokerage firms' ownership 
Change in each of the three ownership variables 
downloaded from Thomson Reuters Eikon  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997); McConnell and Servaes 
(1990); Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999); Cornett et 
al. (2007); and Chen et al. (2008) 





Information asymmetry Proxies: 
 
Role of agency problems 
Deviation of Q-Ratio from  one Q-Ratio  
(Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Koch and Shenoy, 1999: 
Stein, 2003) 
Sensitivity of stock returns to 
expected ROE 
ROE and stock prices  
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam ,1999); Christie 
,1987); and Dierkens, 1991) 
Probability of Adverse selection 
The probability of default using Black-Scholes 






Firm Size (Small, medium, 
Large) 
 
Ln (Total Assets) 
 
 
Value of Total Assets 
 
Market Value of Equity 
Dummy variables (dichotomous 0,1) 
Ln (MVE) 
 
Industry Type  
 
Type of industries form 1-10 except industry 3 
(Financial firms) 
Dummy variables (dichotomous 0,1) 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for ownership data 
  Investment Managers Brokerage Firms Individual Investors 
Mean 0.665 0.022 0.313 
Standard Error 0.003 0.000 0.003 
Median 0.678 0.019 0.300 
Standard Deviation 0.165 0.013 0.168 
Sample Variance 0.027 0.000 0.028 
Kurtosis 2.610 8.684 2.862 
Skewness -0.944 2.200 0.978 
Range 1.000 0.113 1.000 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 0.113 1.000 
Sum 2141.777 71.873 1006.351 
Count 3,220 3,220 3,220 
 
4.1.3 Statistical Tests and Estimation Methods 
As in the previous chapter, arranging the data and choosing the type of model to be 
used requires addressing four econometric issues: the normality versus non-normality, the 
linearity versus nonlinearity, fixed versus random effects estimation and endogeneity. Starting 
with the normality issue, the Anderson-Darling test (1952, 1954) is used to examine the 
normality of the data. The results indicate that the dependent as well as the independent 
variables are not normally distributed as the P-value is less than 5%. (Normality testing 
graphs are available in Appendix 3). The variables are converted into normal values using the 
Van der Waerden method (Waerden, 1927, 1930, 1931). In addition, collinearity was tested to 
ensure there is no similarity between independent variables in the model. As for the fixed 
versus random effects, the Hausman specification test is used to identify whether the fixed or 
random effects model should be used (Hausman, 1978; Hausman and Taylor, 1981). The 
results of the test show that the random model fits the distribution of the data. Therefore, the 
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Lagrange Multiplier is used for standardising the variances across firms for the dependent and 
independent variables (Briand and Carter, 2011). 
The issue of linearity versus nonlinearity is addressed and examined as well. The 
Regression Equation Specification Error Test, RESET (Ramsey, 1969; Thursby and Schmidt, 
1977; Thursby, 1979; Sapra, 2005; Wooldridge, 2006) is used and the results of F test (α = 
1%) show that the F statistic is greater than the critical value leading to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis, thus a nonlinear model is appropriate.
3
 Thus, the variables are raised to the 
power of three to make them fit a linear model.  Finally, the Hausman specification test 
(Hausman, 1978) is used to check for endogeneity of variables to measure the effects of a 
two-way relationship between dependent and independent variables. This is performed by 
comparing the instrumental values estimates to ordinary least squares estimates. After 
performing the test on the variables used in this study, it was found that the three ownership 
variables are exogenous. Therefore, an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method is appropriate 
for examining the contribution of changes in ownership structure to firm growth under high 
and low levels of information asymmetry.   
4.2 Results and Discussion 
 The following table presents the outcome of the regression analysis where favorable 
observations are grouped in the left hand side of the table and adverse observations are 











F where RSSE and USSE  are the sum squared errors for the restricted 
and unrestricted models respectively, J refers to the two hypotheses under consideration, T is the number of 





grouped on the right. The left hand table presents the impact of ownership structure on firm 
growth at low level of information asymmetry as per the three proxies of asymmetry; Beta 
ROE, PD, and Q ratio. The right hand presents the impact of ownership structure on firm 
growth at high level of information asymmetry using the same three measures. Growth in 
sales was used as the dependent variable as it was associated with the least standard error 


















Table 4.3: The contribution of ownership structure to firm growth 
Variables Proxies of Information asymmetry (Favorable selection) Proxies of Information asymmetry (Adverse selection) 
Dependent Sales Growth Sales Growth 
  Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio Beta ROE PD ROE Q Ratio 
Constant -0.31 0.355 0.191 0.343 -0.741 -0.516 
Investment Managers 0.053 0.068 0.056 0.244* 0.016 0.072 
Brokerage Firms 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.052*** 0.103 0.082*** 0.144*** 
Individual Investors 0.116*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.142 0.098* 0.134* 
Industry 1 0.183*** ----- 0.124** 0.025 0.197** -0.002 
Industry 2 0.149** -0.108 0.131** 0.225 0.337* -0.013 
Industry 4 -0.205*** -0.450*** -0.310*** -0.627** -0.114 -0.303* 
Industry 5 0.097 -0.197* -0.011 -0.088 0.178 ----- 
Industry 6 0.117 0.039 0.035 -0.269 0.056 0.018 
Industry 7 -0.115 -0.368*** -0.280*** -1.061*** -0.037 -0.115 
Industry 8 ----- -0.1 ----- ----- ----- -0.215* 
Industry 9 0.703*** 0.606*** 0.891*** 0.904*** 0.779*** 0.460*** 
Industry 10 0.453*** 0.446** -0.15 ----- 0.346* 0.481** 
TASMALL 0.491*** ----- ----- ----- 0.492*** 0.448*** 
TAMED 0.199*** -0.213*** -0.152*** -0.154 0.233*** 0.242** 
TALARGE ----- -0.433*** -0.304*** -0.843*** ----- ----- 
MVESMALL -0.293*** -0.103 -0.139*** 0.344* 0.349*** 0.302*** 
MVELARGE 0.141*** 0.068 0.062 0.339 0.558*** 0.419*** 
N 2479 1415 1822 153 1289 956 
F statistics (Sig F) 17.519*** 13.016*** 21.761*** 4.679*** 10.725*** 5.472*** 
 0.09 0.113 0.146 0.253 0.102 0.066 
SE 0.909 0.845 0.778 0.88 0.963 1.046 






Investment managers = Ln investment managers ownership (t / t-1); Brokerage firms = Ln Brokerage firms 
ownership (t / t-1); Individual investors = Ln individual investors ownership (t / t-1); Industry 1-10 corresponds 
to industry dummies as classified in table 3.1 and total assets small, medium, large and Market value of equity 
small, medium, large corresponds to size dummies. 
**** D-W test significant at 5% two-sided level of significance.        
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 The results of the empirical analysis are mostly supporting the developed hypotheses 
especially for individual investors' ownership concentration. The latter is positively 
significant in the three favorable models (where firms face low level of information 
asymmetry). However, less support is given to the hypothesis related to institutional 
ownership concentration where investment managers' ownership is significant in one model 
and brokerage firms' ownership significant in two models. Yet, none of the findings 
contradict the stated hypotheses. These results are discussed thoroughly as follows.  
 The above table presents the contribution of changes in ownership structure to sales 
growth at high and low levels of information asymmetry. The results of the favorable models 
are very consistent using the three proxies of information asymmetry whereas the adverse 
models showed less consistency. For all models, increasing ownership concentration - either 
individual or institutional - contributes positively to firm growth or is insignificant. Starting 
with the favorable models, the change in investment managers' ownership was insignificant 
for the three models whereas the change in brokerage firms' ownership was positively 
significant at 1% significance level for the three models. Additionally, an increase in 
individual investments was positively significant at 1% as well. The finding that institutional 
ownership has a positive impact on firm growth is consistent with theories in literature that 
institutions help monitor managers' behavior and thus contributes to operating performance, 
156 
 
such as McConnell and Servaes (1990); Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999); Cornett et al. 
(2007); and Chen et al. (2008). As for individual investments, the finding that they have a 
positive impact on firm growth supports the notion that ownership concentration leads to 
better performance as suggested by Manawaduge and De Zoysa (2013).  
 Nevertheless, investment managers, the other form of institutional ownership, were 
found to be insignificant in the three models. This is consistent with other studies that 
suggested insignificance of ownership structure on corporate performance like Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996); Faccio and Lasfer (2000); and Fazlzadeh et al. (2011). This could be 
verified professionally by the fact that investment managers are reluctant to interfere in 
corporate governance and focus more on short-term benefits like capital gains and dividend 
payments as suggested by Bhide (1994); Demirag (1998); and Maug (1998).  
 This relationship was significant for most of the industries in at least one of the three 
models except for two industries; material and consumer discretionary (IND 6 and 8). 
Additionally, the relationship was significant for various firm sizes whether measured by 
total assets or by market value of equity. This finding proves that regardless of the firms' size, 
most firms target growth even the large ones. The adjusted R-squared ranged from 9%-15% 
in the three models giving insight on the relative contribution of changes in ownership 
structure to firms' growth when the firm is facing low level of information asymmetry.   
 Moving to the adverse models, the Beta ROE model, the one with the least number of 
observations, showed different results from the other two models that were consistent in their 
results: PD and Q ratio. In the Beta ROE model, only investment managers' ownership was 
positively significant at a 10% significance level while both brokerage firms and individual 
investments were insignificant. This shows that individual investors are repelled from firms 
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suffering from high level of information asymmetry and even brokerage firms prefer not to 
get involved with such firms as suggested by Bhide (1994); Demirag (1998); and Maug 
(1998). The other two models were consistent in their results as for both, ownership was 
positively significant at a 1% significance level for brokerage firms' and 10% for individual 
investments. This finding is consistent with the favourable models except that the impact of 
individual investments is less significant. This gives supporting evidence to the role of 
institutional investments in monitoring corporate managers' performance and to the 
suggestion that individual investors prefer not to invest in firms suffering from a high level of 
information asymmetry.  
 As for the industry and size effects, the relationship is significant for most of the 
industries in at least one of the three models except for two industries, utilities and materials 
(IND 5 and 6), whereas size is significant in all three models. The adjusted R-squared ranged 
from 6%-25% showing various impacts of ownership concentration on firms facing high 
level of information asymmetry.  
 Overall, the results are consistent with recent findings by Al-Najjar (2015) that 
ownership structure and concentration revealed mixed results when testing their impact of 
firm performance. The contribution of this study is that favourable models showed more 
significant positive impact of individual investments than the adverse models. Moreover, 
institutional investments have a significant positive impact on firm growth and this impact is 
more stable for firms facing a low level of information asymmetry than firms facing a high 
level of asymmetry where the impact varies more across the three models. Finally, the 
findings of this study are consistent with previous findings that ownership structure and 
concentration can in fact affect firm performance, such as McConnell and Servaes (1990); 
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Nesbitt (1994); Smith (1996); Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999); Cornett et al. (2007); and 
Manawaduge and De Zoysa (2013).  
4.3 Conclusion 
 In the previous chapter, the contribution of financial decisions; investment, financing, 
and dividend to firm growth is examined. In this chapter, a major non-financial decision - 
changes in ownership structure - is examined. Empirical findings show a significant 
contribution of changes in ownership structure to firm growth at high and low levels of 
information asymmetry. Favourable models are more consistent in terms of significance and 
coefficients whereas adverse models showed less consistency than the favorable ones. Yet, 
there is still a significant contribution of changes in ownership structure to firm growth for 
firms facing high level of information asymmetry.  
 The empirical results obtained from both chapters prove that both financial and non-
financial factors contribute to firm growth and that this contribution varies according to the 
level of information asymmetry. Both financial and non-financial variables are not distinct 
from each other in the corporate context, therefore, in the next empirical analysis, both 
variables will be integrated together to better understand the relative contribution of both 
financial and non-financial variables to firm growth under a high and low level of 






The relative contribution of financial and non-financial variables to firm growth 
5.1 Introduction 
 In the previous two chapters, the relative contribution of financial and non-financial 
variables to firm growth was examined. Since both financial and non-financial variables are 
not isolated or distinct from each other, this chapter tries to examine the relative contribution 
of both sets of variables to firm growth and the relative weight of each variable under the 
three classifications of data according to level of information asymmetry. Observations are 
classified as adverse or favorable using the three proxies of information asymmetry; Beta 
ROE, PD, and Q ratio. Financial variables include determinants of investment, financing, and 
dividend decisions, while non-financing variables include ownership variables, changes in 
investment managers' ownership, brokerage firms, and individual investors. The data include 
S&P 500 non-financial firms from 2004-2014. This relationship was examined using 
discriminate analysis and constructing a Z-score model as discussed in the following context. 
5.2 Discriminate, Content and Construct Validity 
An examination for the discriminate validity, content and construct validity are 
necessary for ensuring the effectiveness of the discriminate analysis and the resulting 
discriminate model (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). The use of discriminate analysis is a well-
known practice used in creating a Z-score model. The Z-score model tackles the problem of 
separating two or more groups of observations (e.g. individuals, firms), by measuring these 
observations on several variables (Hair et al., 1995; Manly, 1998).  
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The main purpose behind the discriminating function is to categorise observations 
into deduced groups based on the characteristics of each observation. In theoretical terms, the 
main application of the discriminate analysis is to categorise and/or make forecasts for 
situations in which the dependent variable is found in qualitative terms. In this thesis, the 
qualitative factor is the growth of the firm, under conditions of favorable and adverse 
selection (in response to low and high information asymmetry respectively).  
The use of discriminate analysis in the field of business was initiated by Altman 
(1968, 1971), Altman and Sametz (1977) and Altman and Fleur (1981) through building a Z-
score model which differentiates between solvent and insolvent banks through the use of 
accounting information available to the public. The Z-score models are also used in other 
applications which include the examination of corporate transitional performance (Eldomiaty, 
2005), the study of the development of enterprises (Eldomiaty and Rashwan, 2011) and the 
inspection of both systematic and non-systematic financial risks (Eldomiaty et. al., 2011). 
5.3 Discriminate Function Analysis 
Functions of the variables X 1 , X 2 , …X p  are presented by the discriminate analysis, 
in an attempt to separate the m groups with high or low information asymmetry. The most 
straightforward approach involves taking a linear combination of the X variables as follows. 
Z = a 1 X 1  + a 2 X 2 +…+a p X p  (Equation 5.1) 
In this form, the Z reflects group differences as much as possible. Groups can be separated 
using Z if the mean value differs considerably from a group to another, with the values within 
a group being fairly constant. Deciding on the discriminate coefficients a 1 , a 2 ,… a p  in the 
161 
 
index can be done through maximising the F ratio for a one-way analysis of variance. 
Accordingly, a suitable function for the splitting of the groups can be described as the linear 
combination for which the F ratio is as large as possible. When this approach is employed, it 
may be possible to decide on several linear combinations for the separation of groups. In 
general, the number available is the smaller of p and m-1. The reduction of the space 
dimensionality (i.e., from the number of different independent variables X to m-1 
dimension[s]) is one of the advantages of the linear discriminate analysis. Since this thesis is 
concerned with two groups (favorable and adverse selections), the resulting Z function is only 
a single function (i.e., one-dimensional analysis). 
When the discriminate coefficients are attributed to the actual ratio, a basis is in place 
for classification into one of the mutually exclusive groupings. In that sense, the discriminate 
analysis technique has the benefit of taking into consideration an entire spectrum of 
characteristics that are common to the relevant observations (i.e. firms) as well as the 
interaction of these characteristics with each other. Another benefit for the linear discriminate 
analysis is that it yields a model with a considerably small number of selected measurements, 
which potentially conveys large quantities of information (Altman, 1968, 1971; Altman and 
Sametz, 1977). 
5.4 The Z-Score Models 
The researcher derived two linear discriminating functions with their Z index (Z 
model). These functions can help predict growth of firms listed in the S&P based on the 
values of financial and non-financial variables. The selection algorithm produces certain 
significant variables as predictors of grouping. The researcher carried out algorithm three 
times. The three runs involve the financial and ownership-related variables that are associated 
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with the three proxies of information asymmetry; Beta ROE, PD, and Q. The discriminating 
functions with p-value  0.05 are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Table 1 
shows the discriminating functions with their standardised coefficients. 
Table 5.1: The Components of the Discriminate Models for Favourable and adverse selection 
using Beta ROE as a proxy for information asymmetry 






Delta Debt Ratio 0.214 
Operating income-to-assets 0.590 
Dividend payout ratio 0.591 
Dividend Yield 0.251 
Ln Inventory 0.158 
Probability of Default -0.278 
Investment Managers -0.187 
Brokerage Firms -0.227 
Individual Investors -0.446 
Industry 4 -0.743 
Industry 5 0.804 




% of Variance 100% 





When examining the determinants of firm growth using Beta ROE as a proxy for 
information asymmetry, the above variables were significant. Comparing these results with 
results obtained in previous chapters, a consistent outcome was found for the favorable 
                                                           
*** Significant at 1% significance level.  4 Standardized Canonical Discriminate Function Coefficients. 
5
 The variance in a set of variables explained by a factor or component and denoted by lambda. An eigenvalue is the sum of 






ikk a  where ika is the factor loading for variable i on factor k, 
and m is the number of variables. 
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model. For example, debt to equity and probability of default are negatively significant, while 
Delta DR, payout ratio, and operating income to assets are positively significant. However, 
some findings contradict the previous results, specifically dividend yield and all three 
ownership proxies. Further discrimination between adverse and favorable models in 




















Table 5.2: The Components of the Discriminate Models for Favourable and adverse selection 
using PD ROE as a proxy for information asymmetry 





Debt Ratio -0.531 
Delta Debt Ratio 0.159 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.259 
Delta Non-debt 0.074 
Effective Corporate Tax Rate 0.069 
Bankruptcy risk 0.157 
Operating income-to-sales -0.015 
Operating income-to-assets -0.739 
Dividend payout ratio -0.596 
Dividend Yield 0.508 
Current assets-to- fixed assets 0.111 
Ln Inventory -0.187 
Probability of Default 0.625 
Investment Managers 0.054 
Brokerage Firms -0.199 
Individual Investors 0.162 
Industry 1 -0.008 
Industry 2 0.156 
Industry 4 0.574 
Industry 5 -0.118 
Industry 6 0.328 
Industry 7 0.946 
Industry 8 0.348 
Industry 9 -0.130 
Total assets SMALL -0.038 
Total assets MEDIUM -0.019 
Eigenvalue 0.110 
% of Variance 100% 





*** Significant at 1% significance level. 
                                                           
6
 Standardized Canonical Discriminate Function Coefficients. 
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When using PD ROE as a proxy for information asymmetry and examining the 
determinants of firm growth, mixed results were obtained. Only Delta Debt Ratio and 
individual investors' ownership had similar coefficients, with both favorable and adverse 
models obtained from the previous chapters. Other variables that had similar coefficients with 
one of the two models included firm size, operating income to sales, debt ratio, and effective 



















Table 5.3: The Components of the Discriminant Models for Favorable and adverse selection 
using Q Ratio as a proxy for information asymmetry 




Debt Ratio -0.038 
Delta Debt Ratio 0.170 
Fixed Assets to total assets 0.028 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.103 
Delta Non-debt 0.147 
Effective Corporate Tax Rate -0.114 
Bankruptcy risk 0.024 
Operating income-to-sales 0.098 
Operating income-to-assets 0.747 
Dividend payout ratio 0.530 
Dividend Yield -0.408 
Current assets-to- fixed assets -0.112 
Ln Inventory 0.084 
Probability of Default -0.550 
Investment Managers -0.008 
Brokerage Firms 0.071 
Individual Investors -0.053 
Industry 1 2.040 
Industry 2 2.452 
Industry 4 2.018 
Industry 5 0.285 
Industry 6 2.333 
Industry 7 2.296 
Industry 8 2.225 
Industry 9 1.460 
Total assets SMALL 0.701 
Total assets MEDIUM 0.508 
Eigenvalue 0.889 
% of Variance 100% 





*** Significant at 1% significance level. 
Using Q ratio as a proxy for information asymmetry and examining determinants of 
firm growth resulted in the above results. Many variables confirmed previous findings for 
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both favorable and adverse models and had similar coefficients like delta debt ratio, effective 
corporate tax rate, operating income to assets, dividend payout ratio, dividend yield, 
probability of default, and brokerage firms' ownership. Other variables that were significant 
in one of the two models included debt ratio, current assets to fixed assets, change in 
inventory, non-debt tax shielding, and size effect.  
The above results are related to the determinants of firm growth regardless of the 
discrimination between favourable and adverse observations. The results varied depending on 
the proxy for information asymmetry used. This is also confirmed by the variation in the 
number of observations in each group, favourable and adverse, using the three proxies. To 
examine the validity of the results obtained in the previous chapters for both groups, the 
following table (Table 5.4) summarises the coefficients of the significant and insignificant 
components of financial, non-financial, industry, and size variables. The table is divided into 
two categories: The first examines the determinants of firm growth under favourable 
selection using the three proxies of information asymmetry, while the second examines the 
determinants of firm growth under adverse selection using the same proxies. Results obtained 
from this table are compared with previous findings for financial and non-financial 









Table 5.4: A Summary of the Trend for Effects of Independent Variables on Growth of S&P 
Firms 
Independent variable  Beta ROE PD Q 
Favorable 
Debt-to-Equity - Insignificant + 
Debt Ratio Insignificant + + 
Delta Debt Ratio + + + 
Fixed Assets to total assets Insignificant Insignificant - 
Non-Debt Tax Shield Insignificant + + 
Delta Non-debt Insignificant - - 
Effective Corporate Tax Rate Insignificant + - 
Bankruptcy risk Insignificant - + 
Operating income-to-sales + + + 
Operating income-to-assets Insignificant - - 
Dividend payout ratio + - + 
Dividend Yield - + + 
Current-assets-to-fixed 
assets 
Insignificant - - 
Ln Inventory + + + 
Probability of Default - - - 
Investment Managers - + + 
Brokerage Firms - + + 
Individual Investors - + + 
Industry 1 Insignificant + + 
Industry 2 Insignificant + + 
Industry 4 + + + 
Industry 5 + + + 
Industry 6 Insignificant + + 
Industry 7 Insignificant + + 
Industry 8 Insignificant + + 
Industry 9 + + + 
Total assets SMALL Insignificant + + 
Total assets MEDIUM Insignificant + + 
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Independent variable  Beta ROE PD Q 
Adverse 
Debt-to-Equity + Insignificant + 
Debt Ratio Insignificant + + 
Delta Debt Ratio - + + 
Fixed Assets to total assets Insignificant Insignificant - 
Non-Debt Tax Shield Insignificant + + 
Delta Non-debt Insignificant - - 
Effective Corporate Tax Rate Insignificant + - 
Bankruptcy risk Insignificant - + 
Operating income-to-sales Insignificant + + 
Operating income-to-assets - - - 
Dividend payout ratio - - - 
Dividend Yield - + + 
Current-assets-to-fixed 
assets 
Insignificant - - 
Ln Inventory + + + 
Probability of Default + + + 
Investment Managers + + + 
Brokerage Firms + + + 
Individual Investors + + + 
Industry 1 Insignificant + + 
Industry 2 Insignificant + + 
Industry 4 + + + 
Industry 5 + + + 
Industry 6 Insignificant + + 
Industry 7 Insignificant + + 
Industry 8 Insignificant + + 
Industry 9 + + + 
Total assets SMALL Insignificant + + 
Total assets MEDIUM Insignificant + + 
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 For the Beta ROE model, the favourable classification resulted in consistent results 
with the previous findings for most of the variables included in the analysis. Variables that 
had a significant positive impact on firm growth and were consistent with previous findings 
included delta debt ratio, dividend payout ratio, and change in inventory. In addition, 
variables with a significant negative contribution to growth consistent with previous findings 
are dividend yield, probability of default, and industry four. Finally, variables that were 
insignificant included debt ratio, fixed assets to total assets, non-debt tax shielding, effective 
corporate tax rate, bankruptcy risk, current assets to fixed assets, and size effect.  
 Some variables in the favorable models had coefficients that differed significantly 
from those in previous findings (Chapter two), for example, debt to equity had a positive 
rather than negative impact on firm growth. Operating income to sales had a positive rather 
than an insignificant impact, while operating income to assets was insignificant rather than 
positively significant. The major differences were in the ownership impact, as the three 
proxies for ownership structure had different results from previous findings (Chapter three). 
All three had a negative impact on firm growth rather than previous findings that were either 
positive or insignificant. As for the adverse results, the financial variables were not examined 
in the previous chapters due to the lack of a sufficient number of observations to fit into a 
GMM model. As for the ownership variables, the brokerage firms' and individual investors' 
ownership were consistent with previous findings as both had a positive impact on firm 
growth. Size effect was also insignificant as found before. Investment managers' ownership 
differed as it was positively significant in comparison to previous findings where it was 
insignificant.   
 For the PD models, the favorable model gave mixed results with regards to 
consistency with findings in chapters two and three. Consistent findings included variables 
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such as delta debt ratio, bankruptcy risk, change in inventory, brokerage firms and individual 
investors' ownership, size effect, and industry effect. The adverse model resulted in consistent 
variables such as delta debt ratio, delta non debt tax shield, effective corporate tax rate, 
bankruptcy risk, current assets to fixed assets, change in inventory, and brokerage firms' and 
individual investors' ownership. Other variables in both models were inconsistent with 
previous findings. 
 Finally, the Q ratio favorable model was largely consistent with previous findings as 
many variables had similar coefficients, including delta debt ratio, fixed assets to total assets, 
effective corporate tax rate, dividend payout ratio, current assets to fixed assets, change in 
inventory, probability of default, brokerage firms' and individual investors' ownership, and 
size effect. Variables that were inconsistent with previous findings include debt ratio, debt to 
equity, bankruptcy risk, operating income-to-assets, operating income-to-sales, dividend 
yield, and investment managers' ownership. As for the adverse model, it showed less 
consistent outcome as less variables had similar coefficients like previous findings. These 
variables are debt ratio, delta debt ratio, non debt tax shield, effective corporate tax rate, and 
brokerage firms' and individual investors' ownership. All other variables were inconsistent 
with previous findings.  
 Overall, in both favorable and adverse models few variables showed similar results 
using the three proxies of information asymmetry. In the favorable models, delta debt ratio, 
operating income to sales, change in inventory, probability of default, and industry effect for 
industries 4, 5, and 9 were consistent across the three models. Regarding the adverse models, 
consistent variables were operating income to assets, dividend payout ratio, change in 
inventory, probability of default, industry effect for the same industries; 4, 5, and 9, and all 
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three ownership proxies. These results strengthen the argument that many observations were 
classified differently under various measures of information asymmetry.  
 This finding suggests the need for calculating the cut-off points for each of the three 
proxies of information asymmetry. The cut-off Points are calculated on the Z-scale using the 
estimated prior probability ratios, and are shown in Table 5.5. The cut-off points are 
calculated as ln (P1/P2), where P1= the prior probability of favorable selection and P2= the 
prior probability of adverse selection. The prior probability ratio is as estimate of the 
proportion of firms that have observations similar to those of the corresponding groups 1 and 
2.   
Table 5.5: The Cut-Off Point for Growth of the firm and information asymmetry 
Prior 
Probability 
Favorable Adverse Cut-Off Point 
Beta ROE 0.958 0.042 -3.127 
PD 0.492 0.508 -0.032 
Q 0.677 0.323 -0.74 
 
5.5 Relative Contribution of the Model’s Discriminatory Power 
The main use of the discriminate analysis is that the profile of the final variables 
shows the relative contribution of each variable to the total discriminatory power of the Z-
Score model and the interaction between them. The common approach to the assessment of 
the relative contribution is based on measurement of the proportion of the Mahalanobis D
2
 
or the distance between the centroids of the two constituent groups accounted for by each 
variable (Mosteller and Wallace, 1963; Taffler, 1982, 1983). It is calculated as follows. 
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       (Equation 5.2) 
Where P j = the proportion of the D
2
 - distance accounted for by ratio j r

if  and r

is  = the 
means of the below-median and above-median groups for ratio i respectively. 
Table 5.6: Relative Contribution of the Models’ Discriminatory Power 
Components of the Z model Relative Contribution (%) *  
Beta ROE 
Debt-to-Equity 5.12% 
Delta Debt Ratio 4.49% 
Operating income-to-assets 12.39% 
Dividend payout ratio 12.41% 
Dividend Yield 5.27% 
Ln Inventory 3.32% 
Probability of Default 5.84% 
Investment Managers 3.93% 
Brokerage Firms 4.77% 
Individual Investors 9.37% 
Industry 4 15.61% 
Industry 5 16.89% 
Industry 9 0.59% 
TOTALS 
% of Financial  48.86% 
% of Non-Financial 18.06% 
Industry Type 33.08% 




Components of the Z model Relative Contribution (%) *  
PD 
Debt Ratio 7.47% 
Delta Debt Ratio 2.24% 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 3.64% 
Delta Non-debt 1.04% 
Effective Corporate Tax Rate 0.97% 
Bankruptcy risk 2.21% 
Operating income-to-sales 0.21% 
Operating income-to-assets 10.39% 
Dividend payout ratio 8.38% 
Dividend Yield 7.14% 
Current assets-to- fixed assets 1.56% 
Ln Inventory 2.63% 
Probability of Default 8.79% 
Investment Managers 0.76% 
Brokerage Firms 2.80% 
Individual Investors 2.28% 
Industry 1 0.11% 
Industry 2 2.19% 
Industry 4 8.07% 
Industry 5 1.66% 
Industry 6 4.61% 
Industry 7 13.31% 
Industry 8 4.89% 
Industry 9 1.83% 
Total assets SMALL 0.53% 
Total assets MEDIUM 0.27% 
TOTALS 
% of Financial  56.68% 
% of Non-Financial 5.84% 
Industry Type 36.68% 
Size 0.80% 
* Mosteller-Wallace measure. 
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Components of the Z model Relative Contribution (%) *  
Q 
Debt-to-Equity 0.56% 
Debt Ratio 0.19% 
Delta Debt Ratio 0.86% 
Fixed Assets to total assets 0.14% 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.52% 
Delta Non-debt 0.74% 
Effective Corporate Tax Rate 0.57% 
Bankruptcy risk 0.12% 
Operating income-to-sales 0.49% 
Operating income-to-assets 3.79% 
Dividend payout ratio 2.68% 
Dividend Yield 2.06% 
Current assets-to- fixed assets 0.56% 
Ln Inventory 0.42% 
Probability of Default 2.78% 
Investment Managers 0.04% 
Brokerage Firms 0.36% 
Individual Investors 0.26% 
Industry 1 10.34% 
Industry 2 12.43% 
Industry 4 10.23% 
Industry 5 1.44% 
Industry 6 11.83% 
Industry 7 11.64% 
Industry 8 11.28% 
Industry 9 7.40% 
Total assets SMALL 3.55% 
Total assets MEDIUM 2.57% 
TOTALS 
% of Financial  16.56% 
% of Non-Financial 0.67% 
Industry Type 76.64% 
Size 6.13% 
* Mosteller-Wallace measure. 
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 The tables above show the contribution of financial, non-financial, industry, and size 
variables to firm growth. The contribution of each variable is presented along with the totals 
for each category. Results of the Beta ROE model show that 48% of firm growth could be 
attributed to financial variables, while 33% of firms' growth is a direct impact of variation in 
industry type. Only 18% of firm growth could be linked to changes in ownership structure.  
 The results of the PD model are different - the financial variables explain 56% of 
firms' growth while ownership structure contributes to less than 6% of growth. Industry type 
explains 36% of firms' growth whereas size was found to be the least significant, explaining 
only 0.8% of the growth of firms. Finally, the Q Ratio model gave a significantly different 
insight on the determinants of growth as industry type had the highest impact with 76% and 
financial variables dropped to only 16%. Size was more significant than previous models as it 
was found to contribute to 6% of growth. Changes in ownership structure had the smallest 
contribution, at 0.6%. These results raise the need for an accuracy matrix to understand better 
the classification of observations using different models since it is evident that each test is 
associated with mixed results using each of the three proxies for information asymmetry. 
5.6 The Accuracy-Matrix of the Z model 
In a multigroup case, the discriminate analysis produces a measure of success, which 
is a classification table or so-called ‘accuracy matrix’. The actual group membership is 
equivalent to the priori groupings utilised by the model in an attempt to classify these groups 
correctly. At this stage, the model is basically explanatory. In addition, the discriminate 
model produces a predictive function as long as new groups are classified. The Hs (Hits) 
stand for correct classifications and the Ms (Misses) stand for misclassification. M1 
represents a Type I error and M2 represents a Type II error. The jack-knife test, or 
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Lachenbruch Holdout Test (Lachenbruch, 1967) is a well-known statistical test to produce a 
classification table. The final results of the jack-knife test are shown in Table 5.8. Type I and 
Type II errors are presented in table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: The accuracy matrix for the discriminate analysis. 
 
Actual Group Membership 
 
Predicted Group Membership 
 Favorable Selection Adverse Selection 
Favorable Selection H    M 1  
Adverse Selection    M 2  H 
 Type I and Type II errors can be easily observed according to the accuracy matrix 
shown in Table 5.7. It is worth noting that Table 5.7 shows that Type I and II errors are less 
than the Hs (Hits) in both groups of Favorable and Adverse selection. This result supports the 
high relative reliability of the estimated discriminate models. 
Table 5.8: Lachenbruch Holdout Test (Jack-knife test), Favorable and Adverse selections 
Actual Group Membership No. of cases Predicted Group Membership 
Beta ROE 
  Favorable Adverse 
Favorable Selection 1498 1496 2 
  99.9% 0.1% 
Adverse Selection 66 65  1 
  98.5% 1.5% 
PD 
  Favorable Adverse 
Favorable Selection 782 536 246 
  68.5% 31.5% 
Adverse Selection 809 329  480 
  40.7% 59.3% 
Q 
  Favorable Adverse 
Favorable Selection 1118 1039 79 
  92.9% 7.1% 
Adverse Selection 534 354  180 
  66.3% 33.7% 
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Table 5.8 shows that the three discriminate models for the three models differ in their 
discriminate power (BETA ROE 95.7%, PD 63.9%, and Q 84.3%). This indicates that the Z 
score model for the Beta ROE and Q ratio can be used more operationally than the model for 
PD. This also means that the variables in the Beta ROE model explain most of the variations 
in firm growth. On the other hand, some of the variations in firm growth using the PD model 
can be explained by factors other than those included in the model. Beta ROE model is also 
associated with the least number of adverse observations and correspondingly with the 
highest number of favourable ones. This could be explained by the rising attention to 
corporate governance and monitoring imposed on the S&P 500 firms from financial markets. 
Such large firms with significant institutional ownership; investment managers and 
brokerage firms are less likely to have severe agency issues and high level of information 
asymmetry. This could be the reason why Beta ROE model outperformed the other two 














Summary and conclusion 
6.0 Introduction 
 This chapter is a summary of the findings of this thesis. Section 1 summarises the 
empirical findings. Section 2 addresses potential limitations that can be associated with the 
issues of data availability (or lack of) including the use of other relevant proxies to measure 
the same effects. Section 3 presents recommendations and policy implications. Section 4, 
discuss areas for future research.  
6.1 Conclusions 
 The empirical analysis in this research study was presented in chapters three, four, 
and five. Chapter three investigated the relative contribution of financing, investment, and 
dividend decisions to firm growth under conditions of high and low levels of information 
asymmetry. Chapter four examined the impact of a major non-financial variable, ownership 
structure, on firm growth. Finally, chapter five combined both financial and non-financial 
variables such as ownership structure, industry effect, and size to examine the relative 
contribution of each and the relative weight of each variable using discriminate analysis and a 
Z-score model. 
 In chapter three, the effects of the three main corporate finance decisions on firm 
growth were examined under favourable and adverse selections corresponding to low and 
high information asymmetry, respectively. In the favourable models, most variables were 
consistent using the three proxies of information asymmetry which suggest that firms 
suffering from low information asymmetry grow in a structured and predicted way. The 
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variables that are found to be consistent in terms of coefficient sign and significance are: i) 
change in debt ratio, ii) operating income-to-assets, iii) payout ratio, iv) dividend yield, v) 
changes in inventory level, and vi) the probability of default. The change in debt level proxy 
had a significant positive effect on firm growth which suggests that firms facing a low level 
of information asymmetry and trying to finance new investments should rely more on debt. A 
similar finding was made for the payout ratio - a positive effect on growth - which suggests 
that increasing payout ratios could be used as a strategy to enhance growth. The change in 
inventory was also found to have a positive effect which suggests investing in inventory 
could be used as a strategy to increase sales growth. Lastly, the operating income to assets 
had a positive impact while the probability of default had a negative impact on firm growth.  
 The variables that were significant in one or two models out of the three examined, 
such as the debt-to-equity, debt ratio, fixed assets-to-total assets, and current assets-to-fixed 
assets, all report a negative impact on growth suggesting low debt levels and low investment 
in assets (other than inventory) help firms grow. This is particularly the case for companies 
with a Q-ratio > 1, which suggests that these companies already acquire assets using debt as a 
form of financing. The relationship was significant for every industry and for both small- and 
medium-sized firms in at least two of the three models. From these results, it is concluded 
that for firms experiencing a low level of information asymmetry, growth is a function of 
financing new investments using debt, increasing dividend payout ratio, and investing more 
in inventory rather than in fixed assets or other current assets. 
 In the adverse models, for firms facing high levels of information asymmetry or 
experiencing agency issues (Q-ratio < 1), the results are mixed.  Some of the variables 
examined are found to be significant for both models, e.g. the debt ratio, changes in debt 
ratio, payout ratio, dividend yield, bankruptcy risk, effective corporate tax rate, operating 
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income-to-assets, current assets-to-fixed assets, and probability of default. However, in three 
cases, (DR, ECTR, and CAFA) the coefficients reported have opposite signs for both models. 
In addition, the change in debt ratio appears to be significant at a lower level for both models 
(5% and 10%). The finding that DR and CAFA had opposite coefficients suggests that firms 
that suffer from high level of information asymmetry grow in different manners or patterns. 
High debt levels can affect growth positively or negatively, although increasing debt can help 
firms grow. Similarly, investing in current assets can either hinder or enable growth – e.g. 
increasing inventory levels appears to hinder firm growth (PD model), while current asset 
investments can contribute positively when there is no significant impact of inventory levels 
(Q model).  
 Regarding the issue of bankruptcy risk, the results of this study suggest that it can 
affect growth negatively. This result is consistent using both econometric models. These 
results suggest that firms should try to reduce or mitigate such risk as much as possible to 
enable firm growth. On the contrary, proxies for dividend payout and operating income-to-
assets ratios are found to perform similarly to the favorable models and to contribute 
positively to firm growth. This can be explained as firms facing a high level of information 
asymmetry focus on their dividend policies and operating profitability to enhance firm 
growth as both proxies are monitored closely by stakeholders. Other variables such as DE 
and FATA were insignificant in both models while the change in inventory had a significant 
impact for the PD model only. As for the size and industry dummies, the relationship was 
insignificant for small firms while it was significant only for medium sized firms in the PD 
model. The industry effect was significant in at least one model or in both except for one 
industry - healthcare (IND 2). In addition, it had opposite effect in one of the industries - 
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consumer staples (IND 7) - suggesting, again, that there are different patterns of growth for 
firms facing a high level of information asymmetry.            
 In chapter four, the contribution of ownership structure to firm growth was examined 
using ownership data for the S&P 500 non-financial firms. The results of the favorable 
models are largely consistent across the three proxies of information asymmetry whereas the 
adverse models showed less consistency. In all models, increasing ownership concentration 
(either individual or institutional) contributes positively to firm growth but there are cases 
where these proxies appear to be insignificant in statistical terms. Starting with the favourable 
models, the change in investment managers' ownership was insignificant for the three models 
whereas the change in brokerage firms' ownership was positively significant at 1% 
significance level in all cases. Additionally, an increase in individual investments was 
positively significant at the 1% level. These findings suggest that increasing ownership 
concentration enhances firm growth. However, the two forms of institutional ownership 
(brokerage firms and investment managers) vary in terms of statistical significance. 
 This relationship was significant in most industries examined and for at least one of 
the three models tested. There are only two exceptions: material and consumer discretionary 
(IND 6 and 8). The finding that ownership structure is insignificant for both industries could 
be due to the nature of their products as for both industries’ growth in sales could be affected 
by variables other that ownership structure, e.g. the preferences of consumers and the global 
demand on material. Additionally, the relationship was significant for various firm sizes as 
measured by total assets and/or by market value of equity. This finding proves that regardless 
of size, most firms concentrate on achieving high growth. According to the results, the 
adjusted R-squared values range from 9%-15% giving reliable insight on the relative 
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contribution of ownership structure to firms' growth when the firm is facing low level of 
information asymmetry.   
 Moving to the adverse models, the Beta ROE model (the one with the least number of 
observations) reports different results to those from the other two models, the PD and Q ratio. 
In the Beta ROE model, only investment managers' ownership was positively significant at 
the 10% significance level while both brokerage firms’ and individual investments are found 
to be insignificant. This suggests that individual investors are deterred from investing in firms 
suffering from high level of information asymmetry. This finding, to some extent, is also 
applicable to the case of the brokerage firms which also appear to avoid investing in such 
firms. The other two models are consistent in their results. Brokerage firms' and individual 
investors’ ownership proxies appear to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
(brokerage) and 10% (individual investments) significance levels. This finding is consistent 
with the favourable models. This gives supporting evidence to the role of institutional 
investments in monitoring corporate managers' performance and to the theory that individual 
investors prefer not to invest in firms suffering from high level of information asymmetry. As 
for the industry and size effects, this relationship is found to be significant in most of the 
industries examined and for at least one of the three models used. The only two exceptions 
are the case of utilities and materials (IND 5 and 6). On the contrary, corporate size appears 
to be significant in all three models used. Finally, the adjusted R-squared results range from 
6% to 25% indicating various levels of attributory power of the ownership concentration 
proxy for the case of firms that face high level of information asymmetry. 
 Overall, all results indicate that favourable models are positively related with 
individual investments; while the opposite holds true for the case of the adverse (high-
information asymmetry) models. Moreover, institutional investments have a positive impact 
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on firm growth. This is more evident for the case of firms that face low levels of information 
asymmetry. Also, this relationship appears to be of different magnitude across the three 
models used.  
 Finally, in chapter five both financial and non-financial variables were examined 
along with industry and size dummies to measure the relative contribution of each of them to 
firm growth using both discriminate analysis and a Z-score model. Starting with the results of 
the discriminate analysis for the Beta ROE model, the favourable classification findings are 
consistent with the ones reported earlier, with the exception of few variables. Significant 
variables that show a positive impact on firm growth include the delta-debt ratio, dividend 
payout ratio, and the changes in inventory. Moreover, significant variables that appear to 
contribute negatively to growth are the dividend yield, probability of default. Negative 
growth was also observed in industry four (Information Technology). Finally, insignificant 
variables include the debt ratio, fixed assets to total assets, non-debt tax shielding, effective 
corporate tax rate, bankruptcy risk, current assets to fixed assets, and finally, the size effect.  
 A few variables in the favourable models have different coefficients than previous 
findings. For example, in the latter tests, the debt to equity proxy appears to be positively 
related rather than negatively related (as in the previous chapters) to firm growth. Operating 
income to sales has a positive rather than an insignificant impact, while operating income to 
assets is found to be insignificant (compared to earlier tests that report a significantly positive 
relationship). The major differences are attributed to the impact of the ownership 
concentration proxy used, as the three proxies for ownership structure examined report 
different results. All these proxies (investment managers, brokerage firms, and individual 
investors' ownership) appear to have a negative impact on firm growth as compared to the 
previous findings, chapter four) where they appear to be either positive or insignificant. As 
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for the adverse results, the financial variables are not examined in the previous chapters due 
to the lack of enough observations to fit in a GMM specification. Regarding ownership 
variables, both the brokerage firms’ and individual investors' ownership proxies are 
consistent with all previous findings which suggest a positive relationship with the firms’ 
growth. Finally, size effect is found to be insignificant (as in earlier tests), while investment 
managers' ownership is reported to be positive and significant, in line with previous findings 
in this study. 
 As for the PD models, the favourable model reports mixed results. Consistent findings 
included variables like delta debt ratio, bankruptcy risk, change in inventory, brokerage firms 
and individual investors' ownership, size effect, and industry effect. The adverse model 
resulted in consistent variables like delta debt ratio, delta non debt tax shielding, effective 
corporate tax rate, bankruptcy risk, current assets to fixed assets, change in inventory, and 
brokerage firms' and individual investors' ownership. Other variables in both models were 
inconsistent with previous findings. The same applies for the case of the Q-ratio favorable 
model, which findings are consistent with the previous tests. Most variables have similar 
coefficients, e.g. delta debt ratio, fixed assets to total assets, effective corporate tax rate, 
dividend payout ratio, current assets to fixed assets, change in inventory, probability of 
default, brokerage firms' and individual investors' ownership, and size effect. This suggests 
that firms suffering from low level of information asymmetry enhance their growth through 
focusing on the same variables: the determinants of dividend policy, financing new 
investments through debt, and ownership structure. 
 Other variables were inconsistent with previous findings like debt ratio, debt to 
equity, bankruptcy risk, operating income to assets, operating income to sales, dividend yield, 
and investment managers' ownership. This shows that although firms facing low level of 
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asymmetry grow in a structured way, there is variation due to differences in operations, 
riskiness etc. The adverse model, demonstrated a less consistent outcome as fewer variables 
had similar coefficients like previous findings. These variables are debt ratio, delta debt ratio, 
non debt tax shielding, effective corporate tax rate, and brokerage firms' and individual 
investors' ownership. All other variables were inconsistent with previous findings. This again 
suggests that firms facing high levels of information asymmetry can still grow but in different 
and less consistent patterns.  
 Overall, in both favorable and adverse models few variables showed similar results 
using the three proxies of information asymmetry. In the favorable models, delta debt ratio, 
operating income to sales, change in inventory, probability of default, and industry effect for 
industries 4, 5, and 9 (Information Technology, Utilities, and Energy) were consistent across 
the three models. This shows that regardless of the proxy used for information asymmetry, 
these three industries they were consistent in their impact on firm growth. Regarding the 
adverse models, consistent variables are operating income to assets, dividend payout ratio, 
change in inventory, probability of default, industry effect for the same industries; 4, 5, and 9, 
and all three ownership proxies.  
 Upon examining the relative weight or contribution for each group of variables, 
financial, ownership, industry, and size to firm growth, the following results were obtained: 
The Beta ROE model show that 48% of firm growth could be attributed to financial variables, 
while 33% of firms' growth is a direct impact of variation in industry type. Only 18% of firm 
growth could be linked to changes in ownership structure.  
 The PD model shows different results as the financial variables explain 56% of firms' 
growth while ownership structure contributes to less than 6% of growth. Industry type 
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explains 36% of firms' growth whereas size if the least significant as it only explains 0.8% of 
the growth of firms. Finally, the Q Ratio model showed significantly different insight on 
determinants of growth as industry type had the highest impact with 76% and financial 
variables dropped to only 16%. Size was more significant than previous models as it verifies 
6% of growth, and the changes in ownership structure had the smallest contribution of 0.6%. 
Previous literature discussed in chapter two suggests an impact for ownership structure and 
financial determinants on firm growth (Lang et al., 1996; Cornett et al., 2007; and Chen et al., 
2008). The findings of this study contribute to previous literature by empirically weighing the 
relative contribution of such variables along with size and industry effects. 
Finally, the three discriminate models for the three models differ in their discriminate 
power (BETA ROE 95.7%, PD 63.9%, and Q 84.3%). This indicates that the Z score model 
for the Beta ROE and Q ratio can be used more operationally than the model for PD. This 
also means that the variables in the Beta ROE model explain most of the variations in firm 
growth. On the other hand, some of the variations in firm growth using PD model can be 
explained by other factors than those included in the model. Beta ROE model is also 
associated with the lowest number of adverse observations and correspondingly with the 
highest number of favourable ones. This could be verified by the rising attention to corporate 
governance and monitoring imposed on the S&P 500 firms from various stakeholders in the 
financial markets due to the size and impact of such firms. Such large firms with significant 
institutional ownership - investment managers and brokerage firms - are less likely to have 
severe agency issues and high level of information asymmetry due to the monitoring 
imposed by institutional shareholders (Aguilera et al., 2008; and Judge, 2010). This could be 
the reason why Beta ROE model outperformed the other two models in explaining 




 A major limitation that faced this study was the availability of secondary data. For 
example, few data items were missing for sample firms which are the constituents of S&P 
500. The use of S&P 500 has minimized the possible problem of survivorship bias, yet those 
few missing observations affect a small part of the GMM analysis as with case of adverse 
model using Beta ROE as the proxy of information asymmetry. Moreover, non-financial data 
like board structure and composition were not available on DataStream or Thomson Reuters 
Eikon. This limited the empirical analysis of non-financial determinants of firm growth to 
changes in ownership structure. Another limitation regarding the S&P 500 constituents is that 
DataStream downloads the current index constituents at the time of download (2015). Over 
the last 25 years many firms might have been removed or added to the index. Similarly, the 
analysis included large firms, with huge market capitalization and the results can't be 
generalized for all type of firms in the U.S for example.  
 Another limitation to this study was the existence of many proxies to measure specific 
items like firm growth or information asymmetry. For example, firm growth could be 
measured by growth in sales, assets, profits, sales-weighted assets growth, employment etc. 
Also, information asymmetry could be measured by the trade spread, Beta ROE, Probability 
of default of ROE, or Q ratio. These various measures lead to various and mixed findings by 
previous studies that could be sometimes misleading or inconsistent. Therefore, researchers 
should be aware and very careful when using historical accounting and financial 
information/data. 
 Furthermore, the availability of different proxies for measuring information 
asymmetry -and the fact that previous research did not confirm the superiority of any of 
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them- resulted in different classifications for data. For example for the favourable models 
discussed in chapter three, the number of observations using Beta ROE as a proxy for 
information asymmetry were 2521, 1657 for PD ROE, and 2201 using Q ratio. The 
variability and huge difference in sample size proves that for a given observation, it could be 
classified as favourable or adverse according to the proxy used. This in turn, hinders the 
reliability of these proxies in measuring the level of information asymmetry. Finally, as 
mentioned in chapter three in the section of hypotheses development, dividend payout 
acknowledged only cash dividends when analyzing payout policies. Other types of dividends 
were not examined due to lack of data regarding other types of profit distribution. 
6.3 Recommendations and policy implications 
 Based on the empirical findings of this thesis, we provide evidence that the rule of 
‘one size fits all’ does not apply to the case of capital structure. This decision exhibits 
considerable complexity as there are many interconnected intrinsic and extrinsic micro-
characteristics in a modern business. Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that firms can 
adjust their financial policies to adhere to the level of information asymmetry they are subject 
to. For example, firms suffering from high level of information asymmetry should be more 
transparent in communicating prospect investments and the financing instruments employed 
to make sure that false signals are not sent to market participants. Moreover, firms that suffer 
less from informational problems could rely more on debt financing when pursuing new 
corporate investments and enhancement of firm growth. The empirical findings suggest that 
some variables are significant only for one or more of the industries and for specific firm 
sizes. Therefore, investors need to understand the determinants of growth that maximise their 
utility based on the size of the firm and the industry it belongs to. Nevertheless, the 
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ownership structure that best fits their knowledge and investment style could alter their 
investments from one firm to another.  
 Managers and corporate board members should also be fully familiar with the level of 
information asymmetry, ownership structure, the industry where they operate, and their firm 
size. Using the findings of this empirical study, they can make more informed decisions 
regarding the design of investment, financing, and dividend policies/strategies so as to 
enhance firm growth. Nonetheless, they should try to mitigate the effects of variables than 
hinder growth like Bankruptcy risk and probability of default. For instance, as my empirical 
findings suggest, firms facing high level of information asymmetry should avoid investing in 
current assets due to the high probability of a negative impact of inventory in the pursue of 
growth targets (PD model). On the contrary, investing in current assets could be beneficial 
and positively associated to firm growth if inventory levels are kept to the absolute minimum 
(Q model).  
6.4 Scope for future research 
 A major area for future research is to examine the same relationships examined in this 
study using datasets from different countries (developed and emerging) to better understand 
whether consistent results can be obtained under alternative political, economic, financial and 
regulatory regimes. Also, future research should consider using alternative proxies for firm 
growth and examine the consistency of such growth measures. For example, proxy measures 
like weighted-fixed assets growth, growth in assets, and growth in employment size could be 
used.  
 Future research should address the problem of inconsistency of proxies for 
information asymmetry. As mentioned before, using each measure of the three used in this 
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study resulted in huge differences in sample size. The absence of a "widely accepted" 
measure for information asymmetry that could be easily calculated using available market 
data is a challenging issue that future research must tackle. The problem associated with 
available measures is that they require using market or accounting data that are sometimes 
misleading or unavailable. For example, trade spread, one of the proxies of information 
asymmetry in previous studies (Glosten and Harris, 1988; Madhavan et al., 1997; Huang and 
Stoll, 1997) could be a direct result of market volatility and preferences of investors rather 
than an information asymmetry problem. Future research should also concentrate on 
identifying other determinants of firm growth and especially the case of other financial and 
non-financial/qualitative measures. As the findings of chapter five suggest, indicators such as 
industry classifications, ownership structure, and firm size can significantly determine and/or 
been associated to firm growth. This opens the opportunity for examining such non-financial 
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Results of Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
Table (A): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Bankruptcy risk 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.002 0.009 0.192 0.848 
NDE 0.156 0.014 11.149 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.042 0.011 3.807 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.018 0.012 -1.541 0.123 
NDPR 0.170 0.018 9.626 0.000 
NDRT -0.111 0.015 -7.598 0.000 
NDY -0.498 0.019 -26.300 0.000 
NECTR -0.148 0.010 -14.630 0.000 
NFATA -0.160 0.014 -11.768 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.044 0.010 -4.281 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.140 0.012 11.707 0.000 
NOIA 0.016 0.014 1.138 0.255 
NOIS 0.091 0.013 7.123 0.000 
NPD 0.035 0.014 2.540 0.011 
RESID 
(Bankruptcy risk) 0.076 0.010 7.385 0.000 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
residual 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Bankruptcy Risk has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this variable 
suffers from endogeneity and needs an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
233 
 
Table (B): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Delta non-debt tax shield 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.003 0.009 0.287 0.774 
NBR 0.076 0.010 7.412 0.000 
NDE 0.153 0.014 10.846 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.046 0.011 4.222 0.000 
NDPR 0.154 0.018 8.692 0.000 
NDRT -0.096 0.015 -6.442 0.000 
NDY -0.475 0.019 -24.908 0.000 
NECTR -0.137 0.010 -13.281 0.000 
NFATA -0.163 0.014 -11.933 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.035 0.010 -3.373 0.001 
NNDTAX 0.138 0.012 11.468 0.000 
NOIA 0.032 0.014 2.309 0.021 
NOIS 0.100 0.013 7.776 0.000 
NPD 0.022 0.014 1.575 0.115 
RESID 
(DeltaNDTAX) -0.017 0.012 -1.453 0.146 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
residual 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Delta Non-Debt tax shield has a probability of 0.146 which shows that this 





Table (C): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Delta Debt Ratio 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.003 0.009 0.299 0.765 
NBR 0.075 0.010 7.254 0.000 
NDE 0.165 0.014 11.727 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.021 0.011 -1.878 0.060 
NDPR 0.159 0.018 8.924 0.000 
NDRT -0.100 0.015 -6.720 0.000 
NDY -0.482 0.019 -25.042 0.000 
NECTR -0.131 0.010 -13.056 0.000 
NFATA -0.160 0.014 -11.660 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.040 0.011 -3.785 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.138 0.012 11.601 0.000 
NOIA 0.028 0.014 2.044 0.041 
NOIS 0.101 0.013 7.852 0.000 
NPD 0.021 0.014 1.481 0.139 
RESID (Delta 
DR) 0.045 0.011 3.991 0.000 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Delta Debt Ratio has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this variable 





Table (D): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Debt-to-equity  
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.000 0.009 0.044 0.965 
NBR 0.080 0.010 7.791 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.066 0.011 5.972 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.016 0.012 -1.344 0.179 
NDPR 0.158 0.018 8.881 0.000 
NDRT -0.021 0.012 -1.786 0.074 
NDY -0.472 0.019 -24.512 0.000 
NECTR -0.132 0.010 -12.871 0.000 
NFATA -0.160 0.014 -11.684 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.038 0.010 -3.704 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.126 0.012 10.585 0.000 
NOIA -0.010 0.013 -0.717 0.473 
NOIS 0.133 0.012 10.848 0.000 
NPD 0.052 0.014 3.666 0.000 
RESID (Debt-to-
equity) 0.153 0.014 10.878 0.000 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Debt-to-equity has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this variable 





Table (E): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Dividend payout ratio 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.004 0.009 0.450 0.653 
NBR 0.084 0.010 8.173 0.000 
NDE 0.154 0.014 10.897 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.046 0.011 4.093 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.007 0.011 -0.572 0.567 
NDRT -0.095 0.015 -6.376 0.000 
NDY -0.342 0.012 -28.356 0.000 
NECTR -0.143 0.010 -13.917 0.000 
NFATA -0.154 0.014 -11.310 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.040 0.010 -3.830 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.144 0.012 12.083 0.000 
NOIA 0.038 0.014 2.758 0.006 
NOIS 0.091 0.013 7.106 0.000 
NPD 0.006 0.014 0.443 0.658 
RESID (DPR) 0.158 0.018 8.849 0.000 
 
R-squared 0.233 




S.D. dependent variable 
 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 














The Residual of Dividend Payout Ratio has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this 




Table (F): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Debt Ratio 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.005 0.009 0.535 0.593 
NBR 0.086 0.010 8.489 0.000 
NDE 0.105 0.011 9.435 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.047 0.011 4.181 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.011 0.012 -0.917 0.359 
NDPR 0.154 0.018 8.628 0.000 
NDY -0.491 0.019 -25.528 0.000 
NECTR -0.138 0.010 -13.446 0.000 
NFATA -0.170 0.014 -12.574 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.045 0.010 -4.354 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.143 0.012 12.037 0.000 
NOIA 0.018 0.014 1.271 0.204 
NOIS 0.125 0.012 10.027 0.000 
NPD -0.006 0.014 -0.457 0.648 
RESID (DR) -0.098 0.015 -6.590 0.000 
 
R-squared 0.233 




S.D. dependent variable 
 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 














The Residual of Debt Ratio has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this variable suffers 





Table (G): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Dividend yield 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.002 0.009 0.220 0.826 
NBR 0.106 0.010 10.493 0.000 
NDE 0.144 0.014 10.240 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.052 0.011 4.638 0.000 
NDELTAND 0.009 0.011 0.781 0.435 
NDPR -0.204 0.011 -18.301 0.000 
NDRT -0.124 0.015 -8.337 0.000 
NECTR -0.160 0.010 -15.544 0.000 
NFATA -0.198 0.013 -14.702 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.097 0.010 -9.717 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.166 0.012 13.918 0.000 
NOIA 0.084 0.014 6.177 0.000 
NOIS 0.025 0.012 1.983 0.047 
NPD 0.012 0.014 0.850 0.395 
RESID (DY) -0.479 0.019 -24.848 0.000 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Dividend yield has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this variable 





Table (H): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Effective Corporate Tax Rate 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.003 0.009 0.372 0.710 
NBR 0.098 0.010 9.700 0.000 
NDE 0.146 0.014 10.394 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.029 0.011 2.668 0.008 
NDELTAND -0.017 0.012 -1.511 0.131 
NDPR 0.178 0.018 10.026 0.000 
NDRT -0.103 0.015 -6.919 0.000 
NDY -0.508 0.019 -26.356 0.000 
NFATA -0.183 0.014 -13.535 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.028 0.010 -2.669 0.008 
NNDTAX 0.158 0.012 13.317 0.000 
NOIA -0.009 0.013 -0.656 0.512 
NOIS 0.129 0.013 10.262 0.000 
NPD 0.013 0.014 0.895 0.371 
RESID (ECTR) -0.137 0.010 -13.264 0.000 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Effective Corporate Tax rate has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this 





Table (I): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Fixed Assets-to-Total Assets 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.003 0.009 0.401 0.689 
NBR 0.073 0.010 7.139 0.000 
NDE 0.150 0.014 10.655 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.039 0.011 3.515 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.017 0.012 -1.509 0.131 
NDPR 0.141 0.018 7.910 0.000 
NDRT -0.110 0.015 -7.479 0.000 
NDY -0.506 0.019 -26.589 0.000 
NECTR -0.149 0.010 -14.612 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.020 0.010 -1.964 0.050 
NNDTAX 0.050 0.009 5.257 0.000 
NOIA 0.070 0.013 5.172 0.000 
NOIS 0.065 0.013 5.186 0.000 
NPD 0.015 0.014 1.101 0.271 
RESID (FATA) -0.163 0.014 -11.915 0.000 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Fixed Assets-to- total assets has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this 





Table (J): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Change in Inventory 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.002 0.009 0.263 0.792 
NBR 0.079 0.010 7.725 0.000 
NDE 0.154 0.014 10.947 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.047 0.011 4.182 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.016 0.012 -1.375 0.169 
NDPR 0.160 0.018 9.016 0.000 
NDRT -0.103 0.015 -6.987 0.000 
NDY -0.494 0.019 -26.645 0.000 
NECTR -0.135 0.010 -13.152 0.000 
NFATA -0.158 0.014 -11.532 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.143 0.012 12.029 0.000 
NOIA 0.021 0.013 1.595 0.111 
NOIS 0.116 0.012 9.940 0.000 
NPD 0.027 0.014 1.940 0.052 
RESID (LnINV) -0.036 0.010 -3.437 0.001 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Change in Inventory has a probability of 0.001 which shows that this 





Table (K): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Non-debt tax shield 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.002 0.009 0.226 0.821 
NBR 0.076 0.010 7.361 0.000 
NDE 0.139 0.014 9.866 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.042 0.011 3.750 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.007 0.012 -0.575 0.565 
NDPR 0.167 0.018 9.369 0.000 
NDRT -0.103 0.015 -6.979 0.000 
NDY -0.500 0.019 -25.954 0.000 
NECTR -0.148 0.010 -14.480 0.000 
NFATA -0.067 0.011 -6.247 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.048 0.010 -4.589 0.000 
NOIA 0.057 0.014 4.119 0.000 
NOIS 0.070 0.013 5.595 0.000 
NPD 0.032 0.014 2.254 0.024 
RESID 
(NDTAX) 0.140 0.012 11.723 0.000 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Non-debt tax shield has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this variable 





Table (L): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for operating income-to-assets 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.003 0.009 0.323 0.747 
NBR 0.073 0.010 7.038 0.000 
NDE 0.146 0.014 10.700 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.044 0.011 3.939 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.018 0.011 -1.585 0.113 
NDPR 0.161 0.018 8.997 0.000 
NDRT -0.094 0.015 -6.351 0.000 
NDY -0.487 0.019 -25.742 0.000 
NECTR -0.132 0.010 -13.238 0.000 
NFATA -0.170 0.013 -12.815 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.030 0.010 -3.086 0.002 
NNDTAX 0.145 0.012 12.209 0.000 
NOIS 0.118 0.011 10.590 0.000 
NPD 0.019 0.014 1.359 0.174 
RESID (OIA) 0.030 0.014 2.182 0.029 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Operating income-to-assets has a probability of 0.029 which shows that this 





Table (M): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for operating income-to-sales 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.002 0.009 0.254 0.799 
NBR 0.068 0.010 6.681 0.000 
NDE 0.175 0.013 13.022 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.045 0.011 4.031 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.014 0.011 -1.174 0.240 
NDPR 0.145 0.018 8.166 0.000 
NDRT -0.124 0.014 -8.620 0.000 
NDY -0.440 0.019 -23.626 0.000 
NECTR -0.148 0.010 -14.726 0.000 
NFATA -0.139 0.013 -10.454 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.067 0.009 -7.170 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.120 0.012 10.384 0.000 
NOIA 0.089 0.012 7.458 0.000 
NPD 0.022 0.014 1.542 0.123 
RESID (OIS) 0.101 0.013 7.819 0.000 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 
F-statistic 224.720 Durbin-Watson stat 0.281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of Operating income-to-sales has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this 





Table (N): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for Probability of Default 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.004 0.009 0.472 0.637 
NBR 0.078 0.010 7.663 0.000 
NDE 0.157 0.014 11.169 0.000 
NDELTADR 0.044 0.011 3.913 0.000 
NDELTAND -0.015 0.011 -1.332 0.183 
NDPR 0.153 0.018 8.717 0.000 
NDRT -0.091 0.014 -6.383 0.000 
NDY -0.478 0.019 -24.790 0.000 
NECTR -0.136 0.010 -13.203 0.000 
NFATA -0.161 0.014 -11.830 0.000 
NLNINVEN -0.037 0.010 -3.562 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.141 0.012 11.816 0.000 
NOIA 0.026 0.013 1.937 0.053 
NOIS 0.100 0.013 7.784 0.000 
RESID (PD) 0.024 0.014 1.727 0.084 
 R-squared 0.233 Mean dependent variable 0.000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.232 S.D. dependent variable 0.998 
S.E. of regression 0.875 Akaike info criterion 2.572 
Sum squared 
resid 7903.200 Schwarz criterion 2.582 
Log likelihood -13284.730 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.575 




The Residual of Probability of default has a probability of 0.084 which shows that this 




Table (O): Results of Hasuman Test for Endogeneity for lagged sales growth 
     Variable 
(n=10,343) Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.215 0.014 15.756 0.000 
NBR 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.443 
NDE 0.000 0.000 -1.153 0.249 
NDELTADR 0.000 0.000 0.785 0.433 
NDELTAND -3.572 0.331 -10.787 0.000 
NDPR 590.986 56.718 10.420 0.000 
NDRT 0.000 0.000 0.237 0.812 
NDY 0.000 0.000 0.283 0.777 
NECTR 0.103 0.003 35.060 0.000 
NFATA -0.099 0.003 -34.461 0.000 
NLNINVEN -12.926 1.248 -10.353 0.000 
NNDTAX 0.000 0.000 0.466 0.641 
NOIA 0.000 0.000 -0.278 0.781 
NOIS -0.002 0.001 -3.899 0.000 
RESID (lagged 
sales growth) 0.000 0.000 -8.133 0.000 
 
    
R-squared 0.878     Mean dependent variable 0.106  
Adjusted R-
squared 0.878     S.D. dependent variable 1.031  
S.E. of regression 0.360     Akaike info criterion 0.796  
Sum squared 
resid 1337.693     Schwarz criterion 0.810  
Log likelihood -4098.589     Hannan-Quinn criterion 0.801 
F-statistic 3920.773     Durbin-Watson stat 1.985 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Note: 
The Residual of lagged sales growth has a probability of 0.000 which shows that this variable 
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